Du må være klar over at batteripakken fremdeles er sertifisert etter retningslinjer som går på gjettning. Ordbruken er "extremely remote". Dette er et system som gambler med de ombordværendes sikkerhet. I dette tilfellet betyr det at batteripakken kan overopphete, men avgasser skal kunne ventileres overbord mens varmen skal holde seg i en brannsikker boks som omgir batteriet. Akkurat nå hører og ser jeg på BBC hvor kommentator Aaron Haslehurst sier at han ikke vil fly i flyet før om tidligst ett år. Han er inne på noe der fordi Boeing og FAA har ikke funnet feilen......
A Back Seat for Safety at the F.A.A.
By JAMES E.
HALL
IF one thing is clear after this week's National Transportation
Safety Board hearings on the certification of the Boeing 787's lithium-ion
battery, it is that
the Federal Aviation Administration and the industry it
regulates share a cozy relationship that sometimes takes a front seat to safety.
This relationship contributed to the grounding of the 787 Dreamliner in January
and the astonishing swiftness with which the airplane was approved to return to
commercial flight.
As a former chairman of the
safety board, I know firsthand that effective government oversight helps prevent
fatal airplane accidents. For decades, the F.A.A. has used what it calls
"designated airworthiness representatives" to certify that aircraft meet
government safety standards. They were experts selected and supervised by the
agency, even if they worked for the manufacturer. But in 2005, the F.A.A.
changed the process of selecting those designees, ruling that aircraft
manufacturers who qualified under the new procedures could choose their own
employees to certify their planes. The distinction is important, because it
suggests a slide toward industry self-certification.
This laissez-faire certification
system would save the aviation industry nearly $25 million between 2006 and
2015, the F.A.A. said at the time - a pittance when compared with Boeing's $81
billion in revenue for 2012. It is no coincidence that the committee that helped
develop this process was made up of industry members. Essentially, aircraft
makers persuaded the F.A.A. to let them certify their own aircraft so they could
save money.
Problems with the plane's
lithium-ion batteries emerged about 14 months after the 787 entered commercial
service in November 2011, underscoring the folly of this policy. As we learned
from this week's hearings, the agency let Boeing help write the safety
standards, develop the testing protocol and then perform those tests. In 2008, a
year after standards for the battery system were approved with special
conditions on the containment and venting of the batteries, stricter industry
guidelines for these batteries were released. But the F.A.A. did not require the
787 to meet those new guidelines.
The potential for these batteries
to catch fire was well known. In 2011, one of these batteries on a jet built by
Cessna started smoking. The F.A.A. ordered Cessna to remove the batteries, and
Cessna replaced them with less combustible nickel-cadmium batteries. Incredibly,
the F.A.A. failed to absorb the lessons of this experience.
Boeing initially estimated that
there was the potential for one battery failure incident in 10 million flight
hours. As it turned out, smoke and fire broke out in batteries on two separate
787's in just the first 52,000 flight hours. Even Boeing's chief engineer on the
787, Mike Sinnett, acknowledged to the N.T.S.B. that one of the battery tests
had been inadequate and was not "conservative enough."
Now the 787 has been grounded
for months, the F.A.A. has lost face, and Boeing has been losing $50 million a
week on a plane that was supposed to demonstrate innovative aircraft design and
help the United States recapture its onetime dominance of the world aircraft
market.
Given all of that, the F.A.A.'s
recent decision to approve Boeing's plans to fix the lithium-ion battery seems
shortsighted and represents a complete failure of government oversight. It is
puzzling that the agency was so quick on its feet to accommodate Boeing in
recertifying the safety of the airplane, without even knowing the root cause of
the battery problem.
And where has Congress been? The
first hearing on Capitol Hill on the 787 was held just one week ago. But some of
the testimony was very telling. The Government Accountability Office questioned
the F.A.A.'s ability to maintain the up-to-date knowledge necessary to approve
new equipment, and the Department of Transportation's inspector general
criticized the agency for failing to ensure that personnel designated by
aircraft manufacturers to certify their aircraft or components were competent to
do so.
Congress needs to take a closer
look at the F.A.A.'s practices and procedures to make sure that safety is the
top priority, and should overhaul the agency to provide more direct government
oversight as new aviation technologies are introduced.
We enjoy the safest commercial
aviation system in the world. But what about tomorrow? After the N.T.S.B.
hearings, this question is more important than ever.
James E. Hall, a safety and
crisis management consultant, was chairman of the National Transportation Safety
Board from 1994 to 2001.
