onsdag 31. juli 2019

MAX og FAA - Står dette til troende? - AW&ST

Dette stemmer ikke med det som har fremkommet fra forskjellige kilder tidligere - (Red.)


FAA Defends Boeing MAX Certification Before U.S. Congress


Stephen Brashear/Getty Images








WASHINGTON—Senior officials from the U.S. FAA defended the agency’s certification of the Boeing 737 MAX as “fundamentally sound” during a U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee hearing July 31. “We do not, and never have, allowed self-certification, whether it’s Boeing or any other product,” FAA acting deputy administrator Carl Burleson said.  

Flyging uten bevegelige kontrollflater? - DARPA jobber med saken - AW&ST

DARPA Seeks Active Flow Control Aircraft

Magma/BAE Systems







DARPA plans to brief interested bidders on a new program to build and test a novel aircraft designed around active flow control (AFC) technologies.
The goal is to demonstrate an aircraft that can fly and maneuver with no moving control surfaces.
“Decades of investment have matured AFC component technologies and the ability to predict aerodynamic effects for a range of flow control actuators,” the Pentagon advanced research agency says, announcing an Aug. 26 proposers’ day in Washington for the Control of Revolutionary Aircraft with Novel Effecters (CRANE) program.
Previous research has tested active flow control on existing designs, augmenting or replacing mechanical flight controls. “By optimizing an aircraft for AFC from a clean sheet approach, CRANE matures and demonstrates new trade spaces for future aircraft designs,” DARPA says. The agency is seeking $13 million in 2020 to begin the preliminary design phase.
“Some of the envisioned AFC applications include: elimination of moving control surfaces for stability and control, takeoff and landing performance, high-lift flight, thick airfoil efficiency, and enhanced high-altitude performance,” DARPA says.
A NATO task group that studied active flow control for tailless unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAV) concluded the technology is “feasible and reasonable” for flight control, at least for the ingress phase of a strike mission when fluidic control could increase stealth.
Magma, an unmanned aircraft designed by the University of Manchester and BAE Systems under the NATO effort, tested two “flap-free” flow control technologies during flights in April from Llanbedr, Wales. Magma is based on an existing Boeing UCAV design.
The flights of the flying-wing UCAV model demonstrated wing circulation control using supersonic blowing through narrow slots in the trailing edge and fluidic thrust vectoring for pitch control using distributed air jets in the engine exhaust nozzle.

Hacking - Oppdatering - Curt Lewis

U.S. officials warn airplane hackers could tamper with flight controls


An Embraer Praetor 600 business aircraft performs a demonstration flight on June 18 at the Paris Air Show in Le Bourget, France. File Photo by Eco Clement/UPI | License Photo

July 30 (UPI) -- U.S. security officials issued a warning Tuesday that small airplanes are also vulnerable to hacking, and the openings might allow criminals to alter key instrument readings to produce false data in flight.

The Homeland Security Department's Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency issued a report that recommends aircraft owners restrict physical access to the planes and that aircraft manufacturers review the implementation of Controller Area Network bus systems.

Government experts said in the report, however, such hacking could not be done remotely.

"An attacker with physical access to the aircraft could attach a device to [flight equipment] that could be used to inject false data, resulting in incorrect readings in avionics equipment," the report states.

The agency said that type of hack, though, could affect everything from engine telemetry readings, compass and altitude, speed and angle of attack -- all of which are critical flight elements that could lead to catastrophic failure. A pilot relying on instrument readings would not be able to tell between false and true instrument readings.

One recommendation the department makes is to follow advances by automakers.

"The automotive industry has made advancements in implementing safeguards that hinder similar physical attacks," it said. "[Those safeguards] should be evaluated by aircraft manufacturers."

Expert Patrick Kiley said aviation technology now lags behind other technologies and part of the overall problem is a false sense of security due to the face most airplanes are stored in secure locations.

"While physical restrictions are great, we really feel like avionics, in particular, need to implement defense in-depth," he said.


Security Chiefs Warn Of Need for Aircraft Safeguards

The DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) yesterday released a warning that certain CAN bus systems aboard aircraft might be vulnerable to hacking when an attacker has “unsupervised physical access to the aircraft.” ICS-ALERT-19-211-01 cites a report that an attacker with access to the aircraft could attach a device to an avionics CAN bus to “inject false data, resulting in incorrect readings in avionic equipment.”
Issued ahead of next week’s Def Con “Hacker” Conference, that report, from IT consultancy Rapid7, stated, “After performing a thorough investigation on two commercially available avionics systems, Rapid7 demonstrated that it was possible for a malicious individual to send false data to these systems, given some level of physical access to a small aircraft’s wiring.” Pilots may not be able to distinguish between false and legitimate readings, it said. That research was conducted in a lab environment. 
CISA recommends that aircraft owners restrict access to aircraft and that manufacturers review implementation of CAN bus networks “to compensate for the physical attack vector.” 
“The DHS alert correctly points to the mitigations that are used to manage security in the aviation industry,” said GAMA v-p of operations Jens Hennig. “In evaluating such risk, it is important to consider actual real-world scenarios, especially by providing recognition of the protections our overall systems approach provides to managing aviation safety and security.”

Beechcraft King Air under lupen - Curt Lewis

WHAT'S GOING WITH ALL THESE KING AIR CRASHES?


Two deadly Beechcraft King Air accidents at the end of June helped propel business aviation safety into one of its darkest periods. The fact that both accidents occurred shortly after takeoff-and several recent similar events-might be cause for alarm for this popular twin turboprop.

Combined, these two crashes-one in Hawaii, the other in Texas-accounted for 21 of the 57 business aviation fatalities during the first half of 2019. That's a sixfold increase from the same period last year.

Since October 2014 there have been at least five King Air accidents during takeoff or initial climb. During each of these events, including the two most recent crashes, the pilot lost control of the aircraft shortly after takeoff. In four of these events, the aircraft wreckage hit structures on or near an airport.

Earlier this month, the NTSB released preliminary reports on the two most recent crashes. Each report provides information related to each event and signifies the beginning of an extensive investigation to determine probable cause; the more conclusive final reports are typically published within 12 months of an accident.

In the first of the two fatal King Air accidents this year, a King Air A90 collided with terrain after takeoff from Dillingham Airfield in Mokuleia, Hawaii. A commercial-rated pilot and 10 passengers were killed on this local skydiving flight.

According to the preliminary report, a witness (employed by the operator) stated he could hear "the engines during the initial ground roll and stated the engines sounded normal, consistent with the engines operating at high power." He then observed the aircraft at an altitude between 150 and 200 feet above ground level. It appeared to be turning and he could see the belly of the airplane and the cabin facing the ocean to the north.

Shortly afterward, the aircraft "struck the ground in a nose-down attitude, and a fireball erupted." The report continued that a preliminary review of video from an airport surveillance camera revealed "that just before impact, the airplane was in an inverted 45-degree nose-down attitude."

On June 30, nine days after the Hawaii crash, a King Air 350 collided with a hangar and terrain after takeoff from Addison Airport in Texas. Two pilots, one an ATP and the other commercial-rated, and eight passengers died. The Part 91 cross-country flight was planned to depart Addison and fly to St. Petersburg, Florida.

The NTSB is investigating the June 31 tragedy, which killed eight passengers and two crewmembers.

According to the preliminary report, the takeoff and departure of the airplane were captured by several video cameras and radar and observed by witnesses. One witness stated that as the aircraft went down the runway, "it seemed quieter than normal and sounded like it didn't have sufficient power to takeoff."

After takeoff, witnesses observed the airplane drift to the left and then roll to the left before colliding with the hangar. The report added that several security cameras captured the drift to the left after takeoff and "one camera showed the airplane roll completely inverted before it collided with the hangar." The aircraft was equipped with a cockpit voice recorder. The report stated that eight seconds before the end of the recording, a crewmember commented on a problem with the left engine. Three seconds before the end of the recording, three automated "bank angle" aural alerts were recorded.

Final reports have been published on the other three takeoff events involving King Airs-two in the U.S., the other in Australia. Examining each of these past events might provide some hints of what happened in the most recent events. Of interest: in each of these earlier cases, investigators cited pilot performance as an issue rather than aircraft performance.

On Oct. 30, 2014, a King Air B200 crashed into a FlightSafety International (FSI) simulator building at Wichita Eisenhower Airport (KICT). The ATP-rated pilot was killed along with three people in the FSI facility; two others on the ground received serious injuries. This flight was planned as a Part 91 repositioning flight from KICT to Mena, Arkansas.

During takeoff, the pilot declared an emergency and stated that the airplane "lost the left engine." According to the report, the aircraft climbed to about 120 feet above ground with its landing gear extended, continued a left turn, and descended into the building.

Post-accident examination did not identify any anomalies with the airplane, engines, or propellers that would prevent normal operation. It was determined that the left engine was developing low to moderate power while the right engine was developing moderate to high power. Neither propeller was feathered.

A "sideslip thrust and rudder study" completed by the NTSB determined that during the last second of flight, the airplane had a nose-left side slip of 29 degrees. The report concluded that the pilot likely applied substantial "inappropriate" left rudder input (remember the pilot reported a "lost" left engine) and failed to maintain lateral control of the airplane. Other contributing factors included the pilot's failure to follow emergency procedures-including feathering the propeller and retracting the landing gear-for an engine failure.

On Jan. 23, 2017, a King Air 300 crashed shortly after takeoff in Tucson, Arizona. The ATP-rated pilot and a passenger were fatally injured. According to the NTSB final report, after takeoff the aircraft "reached an altitude of about 100 to 150 feet above the runway in a nose-high pitch attitude, the airplane rolled left to an inverted position as its nose dropped, and it descended to terrain impact on the airport (coming to rest against a concrete wall), consistent with an aerodynamic stall."

Post-accident examination of the aircraft found no evidence of preexisting anomalies that would preclude normal operations. However, post-accident toxicology testing of the pilot revealed the use of multiple psychoactive substances that included over-the-counter, prescription, and illicit drugs. The NTSB determined probable cause as "the pilot's exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack during takeoff, which resulted in aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's impairment by the effects of a combination of psychoactive substances."

On Feb. 21, 2017, a King Air B200 crashed into a shopping mall seconds after taking off from Essendon Airport in Melbourne, Australia. The charter flight was scheduled to carry four American passengers to King Island to play golf; all five people on board, including the Australian pilot, were killed in the crash. An investigation by the Australian Transport Safety Board (ATSB) determined that the accident was the result of a flight control trim tab being set incorrectly before takeoff.

The ATSB could not identify any preexisting faults with the aircraft. Investigators determined that the mis-set rudder trim caused a longer takeoff roll and that once the airplane was airborne, this caused it to slip and yaw to the left. After takeoff, the pilot made two "mayday" calls and falsely identified the issue as an engine failure.

During the investigation, the ATSB also determined that the aircraft was above its maximum allowable takeoff weight during the takeoff but did not cite this weight discrepancy as a contributing factor.

Analysis of recent and past King Air accidents during takeoff and initial climb suggest that each event is unique. All three accidents examined that have a final report published identify specific pilot actions-use of the wrong rudder, loss of control due to impairment, or a mis-set trim-as probable causes and none identify any mechanical issues with the aircraft.

These pilot actions (other than the impaired pilot) can be mitigated through better training or employing safeguards (such as checklists) to ensure that items such as the trim is properly set. Not mentioned in either of the final reports was the fact that these aircraft were flown single-pilot; of all the accidents-only the Addison one had a pilot in the right seat.

A lack of familiarity or experience with an aircraft might have contributed to one recent (Addison) and two past accidents (Wichita and Tucson); those events involved either newly purchased aircraft or a "ferry" flight by a contract pilot. In the past, the insurance industry has served as the "de facto" regulator and has mandated minimum flight experience, recency, or proficiency in type.

Following the most recent King Air accidents, there will be a lot of interest when the NTSB publishes the respective final reports. From this brief analysis, the airframe, engines, and propellers appear to be sound (7,500 examples have been flying since the 1960s), but more intense scrutiny on the operators and pilots (training, qualifications, and so on) might be in order.

MAX - Oppdatering - Curt Lewis

Regulators Found High Risk of Emergency After First Boeing MAX Crash

An FAA analysis found it 'didn't take that much' for a malfunction like the one confronted by the plane's pilots


Officials inspecting an engine (That wheel must be from an engine, Hoskins. Red.) recovered from the crash of a Boeing 737 MAX jet that plunged into the Java Sea last year. PHOTO: DONAL HUSNI/ZUMA PRESS

By Andrew Tangel and Andy Pasztor

An internal risk analysis after the first of two Boeing 737 MAX airliner crashes showed the likelihood was high of a similar cockpit emergency within months, according to a Federal Aviation Administration official familiar with the details and others briefed on the matter.

The regulator's analysis, not previously reported, showed that it "didn't take that much" for a malfunction like the one confronted by the pilots of the Lion Air flight that crashed into the Java Sea last year to occur, one of the people briefed on the analysis said.

Based on the findings, the regulator decided it was sufficient to inform pilots about the hazards of an onboard sensor malfunction that led to a flight-control system pushing down the plane's nose. The belief was that if pilots were aware of the risk and knew how to respond, it was acceptable to give Boeing and regulators time to design and approve a permanent software fix to MCAS, the flight-control system implicated in the crash, according to the agency official and people briefed on the findings.

The FAA's early goal, one of these people added, was: "Get something out immediately and then mandate something more permanent."

Specifically, the FAA's analysis suggested that a warning to pilots would be enough to provide Boeing about 10 months to design and implement changes to MCAS, according to a person close to the manufacturer. Boeing had been planning to complete the changes by April, within the 10-month period, this person said.

Boeing and the FAA's risk projections faced a real-world crisis in less than five months. Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 went down on March 10 in a similar nosedive prompted by the same type of automated MCAS commands pilots couldn't overcome. The dual crashes took a total of 346 lives.

Investigators quickly focused on the central role of MCAS, and regulators around the world grounded the aircraft.

The FAA has said it doesn't have a deadline for approving the final package of fixes but won't allow the planes back in the air until all safety issues are resolved.

A Boeing spokesman said: "Boeing and the FAA both agreed, based on the results of their respective rigorous safety processes, that the initial action of reinforcing existing pilot procedures...and then the development and fielding of a software update, were the appropriate actions."

He added: "The safety of everyone flying our airplanes was paramount as the analysis was done and the actions were taken."

The FAA's internal analysis, prepared in the days immediately following the Oct. 29 Lion Air crash, is called a TARAM, an acronym that stands for Transport Airplane Risk Assessment Methodology. It essentially involves a spreadsheet with formulas that consider a number of factors-such as fleet size, probability that sensors will fail, passenger counts-and aims to predict how many people could die over a certain period because of potential hazards, according to people familiar with the process.

There is also a subjective analysis that, along with the TARAM's numerical forecasts, informs FAA managers and engineers about what types of actions to take and when-for major but also less-serious air-safety issues. "It's kind of a cold way of looking at it," the person briefed on the analysis said, adding: "It's not foolproof. It's a tool."

The analysis determined that the underlying risks from the MCAS design were unacceptably high without at least some FAA action, that they exceeded internal FAA safety standards and that the likelihood of another emergency or even accident "was over our threshold," according to the FAA official. "We decided...it was not an acceptable situation," the official said.

The directive to pilots essentially reiterated that cockpit crews should counteract and then disable an MCAS misfire by following long-established emergency procedures for a related flight-control problem that can similarly push down an aircraft's nose.

When the FAA determines an aircraft poses an unacceptably high safety risk, it typically mandates targeted equipment changes, inspections or training to alleviate the hazard. It is unusual for the agency to conclude that reiterating cockpit emergency procedures or tweaking manuals will suffice.

The FAA's Nov. 7 emergency directive, described as an "interim action," didn't mandate design or operational changes. Because it reminded pilots how to swiftly and correctly respond to such an MCAS malfunction, that approach "wasn't removing the risk," the FAA official said Tuesday, but rather "making it acceptable for a period based on the data we had."

In a report shared with Boeing in late 2018, after the FAA's directive, the agency said its analysis found the "risk is sufficiently low...until the changes to the system are retrofitted," according to the person close to the manufacturer.

Grounding wasn't seriously discussed but "that's always on the table" after a deadly crash, the person briefed on the analysis said. As FAA officials learned of MCAS's design issues, they also learned of other problems that could have contributed to the accident, including maintenance and pilot missteps, this person said.

Boeing said it began working on changes to MCAS shortly after the Lion Air crash. The first software fix package was formally presented for FAA approval in December, but was still being tested and analyzed when the Ethiopian crash occurred in March.

Between the two crashes, FAA engineering teams continued to assess data and fold details of the Lion Air probe into their safety assessments. "We continued asking questions," the FAA official said, adding that historical safety information from U.S. operators of the MAX indicated that "we weren't getting data" revealing pilots wouldn't react appropriately to MCAS emergencies.

In the end, the FAA's statistical predictions didn't anticipate another accident would happen as soon as it did. "Statistically, the calculations just didn't work out," said the person briefed on the analysis. "You can't predict randomness."

It isn't clear why Boeing took longer to finish MCAS changes than some industry and FAA officials had expected. At a late March briefing in Renton, Wash., a Boeing official said the plane maker took care to fine-tune the revised software and test it. "We didn't rush it because rushing is the wrong thing to do in a situation like this," the Boeing official said.

FAA engineers and safety experts prepared a separate TARAM risk analysis in the wake of the Ethiopian crash, according to the FAA official and others familiar with the matter. The full assessment was completed two days after the crash, the official recalled, and was presented to senior policy makers at headquarters the next day. That same morning, the FAA received new satellite data more directly implicating MCAS, prompting the agency to become the last major aviation regulator to ground the MAX fleet.

Boeing has since experienced more delays amid subsequent company reviews, questions from the FAA and flight test results-including simulator sessions with FAA pilots-revealing a series of technical problems.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-found-high-risk-of-emergency-after-first-boeing-max-crash-11564565521

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Air Canada Pays 737 Max Pilots to Not Fly as Grounding Drags On

Think U.S. airlines have it tough with the Boeing 737 Max grounding?

At least they can keep pilots busy during the lengthy grounding, since they can fly older versions of the same airplane. Air Canada has no such opportunity, as executives made clear Tuesday on their second quarter earnings call, and it's hampering the airline's ability to operate efficiently.

At Southwest Airlines, United Airlines and American Airlines, 737 pilots can operate all versions of the airplane, including the 737NGs, or next-generation planes, that make up the bulk of their fleets. But Air Canada doesn't fly the NG, so it trained hundreds of pilots just to fly the Max. Now, it must pay them not to work, and those costs are adding up.

"We have some 400-plus pilots that we're carrying, who are waiting for the Max to come back," Air Canada CEO Calin Rovinescu told analysts on Tuesday. "Obviously, not exactly the most efficient use of their talent and their skill."

Unique Problem
All Max operators face similar problems with grounded airplanes and reduced capacity, but the pilot issue is unique to Air Canada.

The airline decided five years ago to reduce its reliance on Airbus narrow-body jets and go with the Boeing 737 instead. It trained pilots to fly the new jet, going so far as to install a Max simulator.

Because training is labor intensive and expensive, airlines prefer to train pilots as little as possible, so for the most part, Air Canada has grounded its Max pilots rather than re-train them to fly another jet.

For the second quarter, chief financial officer Michael Rousseau said, Air Canada paid C$14 million ($10.64 million U.S.) in wages, salaries and benefits to non-flying Max pilots. Most were flying the 24 Max aircraft Air Canada operated before the airplane was grounded earlier this year.

Those pilots will be ready go soon after regulators clear the airplane, executives said. But Air Canada had an aggressive delivery schedule, with plans to ramp up to 50 aircraft by next summer.

Executives said they're not sure about Boeing's delivery schedule, and how it will may change because of the manufacturer's software issues. But they told analysts they're no longer going to be able to spool up to 50 airplanes so fast, even if Boeing can deliver them quickly.

"We have not hired pilots and cabin crews for the 12 aircraft not delivered in Q2 of 2019 nor are we planning to hire for the additional 14 scheduled to be delivered in the first half of 2020 until we have clarity," Rousseau said. "As a result of this and other operational factors, it will take up to a year from the time when the decision is made to reintegrate them into our fleet after the ungrounding for all 50 planes to fly."

Effect on Schedule
The pilot training issue is more of a long-term problem. In the short term, Air Canada's problems look at lot like those at other North American airlines; the carrier does not have enough aircraft to fly all of its scheduled capacity.

By now, executives said, Air Canada was to have 36 Max jets, and they were to fly roughly 100 departures per day by the end of June, including on some of the airline's longest (and most premier) North American routes.

Like most airlines, Air Canada is doing more with less, deferring non-essential maintenance, extending leases, taking other aircraft earlier than expected and using wet-leased aircraft.

But there's only so much it could do. In the second quarter, it said it was able to cover about 97 percent of planned flying. This summer, executives said, the airline will fly about 95 percent of the planned schedule.

Given the uncertainty over when the Max will fly again, executives said they want to take a prudent approach on future schedules.

On Tuesday, Air Canada said it is canceling all Max flights until Jan. 8, 2020, longer than any other North American airline. Southwest is the only other operator to cancel its Max flights into next year, going as far as Jan. 5.

Air Canada still reported a profit in the second quarter, reporting adjusted net income of C$240 million ($182.46 million) on operating revenues C$4.757 billion ($3.6 million).

Unit costs for the quarter rose 5.2 percent, an increase the airline blamed mostly on the Max grounding.



FAA hopes global regulators simultaneously approve Boeing 737 MAX to fly again

Grounded Boeing 737 MAX aircraft are seen parked at Boeing Field in Seattle

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration hopes civil aviation authorities around the world will decide at about the same time to allow the Boeing 737 MAX to resume flying, the agency told Congress on Tuesday in a letter seen by Reuters.

The FAA and other regulators grounded the plane in March after two fatal crashes in five months killed 346 people.

Acting FAA Administrator Dan Elwell said in letters to Senators Susan Collins and Jack Reed that the agency "hopes to achieve near simultaneous approval from the major civil aviation authorities around the world" but added that every regulator will make its own determination.

"We are working with our colleagues from the European Union, Canada and Brazil to address their concerns," he wrote.

Collins will chair a Senate Appropriations subcommittee hearing Wednesday that will feature four senior FAA officials, including Ali Bahrami, who oversees aviation safety.

Boeing Co Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg told analysts last week he was confident the MAX would be back in service as early as October after a certification flight in "the September time frame."

Ryan Air Chief Executive Michael O'Leary said Monday that he had been told that flight would be delayed until October. Boeing on Tuesday reiterated Muilenburg's recent comments.

Elwell said in his letter the FAA "will lift the 737 MAX grounding order only when it is safe to do so."

The MAX's return has been delayed as Chicago-based Boeing works to win approval for reprogrammed stall-prevention software and related training materials.

In late June, the FAA said it had identified a new risk as an agency pilot was running a flight simulator test seeking to intentionally activate the so-called MCAS stall-prevention system.

Boeing has said it is working on a fix to address the problem.

The FAA's Technical Advisory Board, made up of experts not involved in the original 737 MAX certification, is also reviewing the MCAS software update and training requirements.

The European Aviation Safety Agency sent FAA and Boeing a list of concerns it wanted addressed before the MAX re-enters service, people familiar with the matter said.

Since the crashes, federal prosecutors, the Transportation Department's inspector general, Congress and several blue-ribbon panels have been investigating how the FAA certifies new aircraft and its longstanding practice of delegating certification tasks to airplane manufacturers.

Elwell noted in his letter that on March 5 he created a new Aviation Safety Organization office on delegating authority. That office is in the process of selecting staff and is developing procedures "to conduct this important mission. No substantive changes to the existing (delegation) program have been made as a result of standing up this office."



Elfly og vyer så langt - AW&ST

Airlines Study How All-Electric Aircraft Will Impact Business Models

Electric aviation and battery technologies are advancing quickly, and while a major electric revolution in the aviation industry is still far off, airlines are keen to analyze how the arrival of some electric aircraft over the next decade will reshape the industry.
With debate over how to tackle the climate emergency intensifying, and airlines’ contribution to climate change increasingly under scrutiny, carriers and aerospace manufacturers know that electric aviation could be one of the tools the industry needs to meet its long-term goal of cutting carbon dioxide emissions by 50% by 2050 from 2005 levels. 
As the startups focus on getting the technology itself off the drawing board and into the skies, governments are considering how they can encourage electric aviation, and airlines are pondering how—and when—it will change the existing business models.
Norway’s government has set an ambitious target to make all its domestic flights electric by 2040, and airlines and technology experts there and elsewhere are teaming up to make sure the all-electric ambition can become a reality. 
California-based electric aircraft company Ampaire is already making strides. Its Ampaire Electric EEL hybrid-electric aircraft, a modified Cessna 337 Skymaster, took its first test flight in June and is aiming for certification in 2021.
The startup plans to begin test flights on a route flown by Hawaiian regional airline Mokulele Airlines by year-end. 
In June, Ampaire revealed it had signed a deal with Personal Airline Exchange (PAX), a U.S. startup developing an app-based per-seat, on-demand charter service for 50 of the aircraft, plus options for 50 more. 
Ampaire has a letter of intent in place with Norwegian regional operator Wideroe—just one of many it has signed with airlines around the world—and is also collaborating with Norway’s Avinor as the airport operator commits to incorporate renewable charging infrastructure into airports before 2040, says Susan Ying, Ampaire senior vice president for global partnerships. 
In Scotland, where the geography of the islands and short distances are an ideal testing ground for electric aviation, Loganair is working with Cranfield Aerospace Solutions on an island-hopping electric aircraft for the Orkney Islands, with a long-term aim of transforming the airline’s fleet of Britten-Norman Islanders to electric propulsion and a demonstrator set to fly by 2021.
Ying also sees the Scottish islands—with their short travel distances and enlightened energy policies encouraging innovation—as a region with a high potential for electric aviation to make its mark. “These will be ideal places for us to start,” she says.
“Over there, they’re still operating with a hub-and-spoke model, but what about flights between the islands or between secondary cities on the mainland and the islands? This opens up a lot of opportunities and will really enable the smaller operators,” Ying says.
Ampaire is planning to work with the Orkney Islands Council, which has a sustainable energy strategy in place and is in charge of airport infrastructure. It is also working on a proposal to the Scottish government for a flight-test program similar to the one it is running with Mokulele Airlines. 
In May, Scandinavian Airlines and Airbus signed a memorandum of understanding for research into hybrid and electric aircraft ecosystem and infrastructure requirements. The partners are set to work together on a research project to better understand the operational and infrastructure challenges involved in introducing hybrid- and full-electric aircraft to airlines’ modus operandi on a large scale. The five work packages in the project, which was set to begin last month and run until the end of 2020, focus on analyzing the impact of ground infrastructure and charging on range, resources, time and availability at airports.
UK-based budget carrier EasyJet is also investing in electric, with a partnership in place with U.S.-based startup Wright Electric, whose long-term aim is a 150-seat electric aircraft. Work is currently underway on a nine-seat technology demonstrator, and the company plans to fly a 50-seat intermediate aircraft around 2022-23 as a steppingstone toward its goal.
EasyJet’s director of operations transformation, Gary Smith, believes electric aviation will soon move out of the realms of fantasy. “In the last couple of years, opinions have been changing quite quickly to seeing electric aviation as a reality and something that is technically feasible,” he says.  
“With Wright, there’s a road map to get to an aircraft that’s at the smaller end of what we operate today. It’s about playing with range and payload, trying to find the sweet spot between the two, which we think would be 150-160 passengers initially, with a range probably able to cover London-Paris or London-Amsterdam. That would still be a significant part of our operations,” Smith says.
The partners aim to reach that goal around 2030, and while the timing may be difficult to predict precisely, Smith believes the logic of replacing part of an airline’s fleet with electric aircraft will be clear by then. 
“As we go through the years, airlines will have to make decisions about replacing aircraft in their fleet,” he says. “At a certain point, electric aircraft will become available, and at that point in time, those electric aircraft will be measured in terms of their overall economics and viability against the other aircraft available at that time.” 
While an electric aircraft will have completely different economics—lower fuel costs but perhaps more expensive manufacturing of propulsion units—Smith expects the costs to work out as competitive. 
The arrival of electric aircraft en masse, whenever that may be, could also change the shape of the air transport industry, Smith says. “I think we have to be open to the fact that the market could change, and we may have to adapt to that. We may be back to flying shorter routes, with smaller aircraft," he says. “We are willing to disrupt our own markets.” 
Ying also believes electric aircraft may have an important role to play in connecting smaller airports and cities, as well as in making airline networks denser as lower fuel costs make more routes economically feasible for airlines. 
She cites FAA figures and a 2017 airport report on European aviation that show 2,250 airports in the European Union and 5,314 in the U.S. are open to the public, but just 438 in the EU and 434 in the U.S. operate regular scheduled flights—leaving the potential for as many as four and 11 times more services, respectively, if the economics make sense, which electric aviation could help with. “If you can open up secondary city pairs, you can open up new routes. It opens up the possibility of a dense net kind of operation,” Ying says.
A shift toward shorter routes to and among secondary destinations may have a structural impact on the industry further ahead, with a wave of new entrants followed by a later consolidation phase in which established carriers dip their toes into electric aviation by acquiring those new operators focusing on just one or a few small routes.  

Helikopterulykke i Sør Afrika - ASN

Date:30-JUL-2019
Time:
Type:Silhouette image of generic B47G model; specific model in this crash may look slightly different
Westland-Bell 47G-3B-1 Sioux AH1
Owner/operator:
Registration:ZS-HGY
C/n / msn:WAS/201-WA/599/599
Fatalities:Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 3
Other fatalities:0
Aircraft damage:Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Location:Alldays, Limpopo -    South Africa
Phase:Unknown
Nature:Unknown
Departure airport:
Destination airport:
Narrative:
The helicopter impacted terrain in Alldays, Limpopo, under unknown circumstances. The helicopter was destroyed during the accident sequence and one of the three occupants onboard received fatal injures. The two remaining occupants were seriously injured.

MAX - O`Leary er sur - FlightGlobal


Boeing needs to 'get its [act] together': Ryanair chief
29   JULY, 2019 - SOURCE: FLIGHT DASHBOARD - BY: VICTORIA BRYAN
Ryanair chief executive Michael O'Leary has expressed concern about slips in the timeframe for the Boeing 737 Max's expected return to service.
The budget carrier said on 16 July that it expected the Max to be back in service by December, but after reporting first-quarter results O'Leary today said that this now seemed like it would slip into January.
"We were expecting 58 aircraft for summer 2020; that's now 30 at best. It may well move to 20, could move to 10, or zero if Boeing don't get their shit together pretty quickly with the regulators," he told analysts.
O'Leary cited Southwest's decision to remove the aircraft from its schedules until January, and said the latest he had heard from Boeing was that they now planned to submit the software amendment in October, rather than September.
"It's very difficult to deal with the Boeing delays, because they keep getting delayed further and further. Up until mid-July, we were expecting them to be back flying in September. Now it looks like January next year," he says.
Ryanair will not be taking delivery of any Max aircraft until the aircraft had been declared safe to fly by both US and European regulators, O'Leary says.
If deliveries slip further, that could cut Ryanair's planned passenger numbers for the full year to March 2021 from the revised 157 million to 155 million or even 153 million, he estimates.
Ryanair is in talks with Boeing over a new aircraft order for the period from 2023 onwards, O'Leary reveals, but he says those discussions are being hindered by the airframer's "inability" to get the Max back into service. Ryanair is also in talks with Airbus, which is pricing "very aggressively" at the moment, he notes.
"Boeing is not at a point yet where we see value in a new aircraft order for the period from 2023 onwards," adds O'Leary.
He says Ryanair will be announcing base cuts and closures as a result of the Max delays over the next week or two.
It is impossible to sign up Airbus aircraft for next summer to replace the Max shortfall, he says, because there is no availability and it will hurt the pricing of second-hand A320s. The Lauda fleet of A320s is already planned to grow from 20 aircraft this summer to 32 for next summer.

Oshkosh med moderne kopi av Flyer One - AirVenture

Like a Bird


Hachiya created the “Open Sky M-02J” jet-powered motorglider, controlled in pitch by weight shift and in roll by wing warping, using two techniques of control invented by the Wright brothers. Hachiya has made numerous short flights, and flew the bird-shaped craft at EAA AirVenture on Wednesday evening. Power is provided by a 176-pounds-thrust Nike engine made by AMT of the Netherlands.

Drone brukt for levering av marijuana i fengsel - Ikke lønnsomt - AIN

Prison Drone Dope Operation Thwarted

Eric Lee Brown, 35, pleaded guilty last week to federal charges related to attempting to use a drone to deliver marijuana to inmates at Autry State Prison in Pelham, Georgia. Brown, of Lithonia, Georgia, pleaded guilty to one count of “operating an aircraft eligible for registration knowing that the aircraft is not registered to facilitate a controlled substance offense.” He is facing a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment, three years supervised release, and a fine of $250,000. Brown admitted to attempting to use a DJI Phantom 4 to deliver the drugs.
He was arrested on March 29 after Mitchell County deputies responded to a complaint of a vehicle impeding traffic near the prison. Brown was found inside the vehicle with 294 grams of marijuana and the drone. Evidence later emerged that Brown intended to use the unregistered aircraft to deliver marijuana to prisoners. Brown does not hold a valid remote pilot’s certificate or an FAA airman’s certificate as would be required to conduct commercial operations or to be eligible to conduct unmanned aircraft operations beyond visual line of sight.

Drone delivery of contraband into prisons is becoming an increasing problem nationwide. U.S. Attorney Charlie Peeler said his office “will aggressively prosecute those who choose to smuggle cellphones, drugs, or any other contraband into our state prisons.”

SAS kvitter seg med B737-600 - Check-In

Boeing 737-600 fra SAS (Foto: SAS AB/PR)

Snart slut med uøkonomiske Boeing-fly hos SAS

Boeing 737-600, der har været en del af SAS-flåden i 21 år, udfases om fire måneder. Flyene bruger op til 30 procent mere brændstof end de øvrige Boeing-fly.
Den 18. september 1998 modtog SAS det første fly i serien Boeing 737-600, der hos det skandinaviske flyselskab oprindeligt blev indrettet med 112 sæder og sidenhen blev opgraderet til henholdsvis 123 og 120 sæder.
Første 737-600 hos SAS blev døbt Bernt Viking og indregistreret i Sverige som SE-DNM. Flyet er stadig aktivt hos SAS, hvor det i dag er på norsk register (LN-RRO) og er en af de blot fem tilbageværende 737-600´ere i SAS-flåden.
Den 1. december er det imidlertid slut. Her vil SAS gennemføre en sidste rundtur med rutenummer SK034/035 mellem Stockholm-Arlanda og Umeå. Herefter vil denne 737-variant have afsluttet sin epoke hos SAS. Sidste besøg i Københavns Lufthavn er indtil videre planlagt til mandag den 4. november på en rundtur fra Stockholm.
Dyrt i drift
SAS bestilte den lille version af Next Generation-flyene i 1995, og i 1998 og 1999 fik selskabet leveret 30 eksemplarer af denne variant, der aldrig blev nogen salgssucces hos Boeing. Det blev imidlertid 737-700 og 737-800, der havde plads til flere passagerer og dermed havde en bedre ruteøkonomi.
Begrundelsen for at anskaffe flyene var oprindeligt, at SAS ønskede en flytype med lidt færre sæder, så der især kunne indsættes flere daglige afgange på nogle af de højfrekvente indenrigsruter og intraskandinaviske ruter. Men brændstofpriserne og markedsudviklingen overhalede disse ambitioner.
Med nutidens høje brændstofpriser har det da også vist sig, at flyet er meget uøkonomisk i drift, da det bruger 31 procent mere brændstof per sædekilometer end 737-800. Således har 737-600 et brændstofforbrug på 0,038 liter per sædekilometer mod henholdsvis 0,032 og 0,029 liter på de to større varianter af det populære Boeing-fly.
Kun 69 fly
Boeing nåede aldrig at producere flere end 69 fly af denne variant, der var en egentlig konkurrent til Airbus A318. Sidste fly blev leveret i efteråret 2006 til det canadiske lavprisflyselskab WestJet, der stadig har 13 eksemplarer af flyet i sin flåde.
I dag er der kun tre operatører udover SAS og WestJet, der har Boeing 737-600 i aktiv drift. Det er Air Algérie med fem fly, Tunisair med syv fly og amerikanske EG&G (Janet Airlines). Sidstnævnte flyver personnel mellem Las Vegas McCarran Airport og den militære installation Tonopah Test Range i det tophemmelige Area 51 i den sydlige del af Nevada-ørkenen.
Den første 737-600 blev færdigproduceret i december 1997 og havde første flyvning den 22. januar 1998, inden det af de amerikanske luftfartsmyndigheder den 18. august 1998 blev certificeret til at kunne sættes i drift. Det førstproducerede eksemplar fik SAS i øvrigt leveret som SE-DNR den 7. januar 1999 – nogle måneder efter at første 737-600 til SAS var blevet modtaget.

Lufthansa taper penger - ATW

Lufthansa Group posts 1H loss on LCC competition, fuel costs

Lufthansa Airbus A350-900
Lufthansa Airbus A350-900
Rob Finlayson







Lufthansa Group delivered a 2019 first-half net loss of €116 million ($132 million), reversed from a €713 million net profit a year ago. The German carrier said the results were primarily attributed to intense LCC competition and higher fuel costs. “We are operating in one of the most challenged markets,” CFO Ulrik Svensson said on an analyst call. “Our earnings are feeling the effects of tough competition in Europe and sizeable overcapacities, especially on the Atlantic routes.