The U.S. Air Force Need More Than 300 Light Attack Aircraft
(Now)
Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein agrees
that Sen. John McCain's recommendation for "300 low-cost, light-attack fighters"
is a "great idea." Analysts have noted several merits including stemming the
decline in platform numbers, improving dwell times over target areas, lower
flight hour costs, and more stick time for USAF pilots. These are good things.
But the real issue is the substantial ongoing attrition of 4th-generation
airframes that will only partially be mitigated by the light-attack fighters
after they've arrived in inventory. That's why we need them now.
The
light-attack-fighter idea is indeed great, but it is still just a suggestion. It
is also just a possible Air Force plan, which will thus not fully unburden Navy
and Marine Corps tactical avaiation. Each service has its specialties,
particularly in the missions and phasing for the early days of a new operation.
However, history shows that once a war (usually a "small war") matures to stasis
over a number of years, each service is both expected and wants to participate,
regardless of its "big war" roles, specialties, and tacit raison d'être. So, if
the USAF of the future brings its low-cost, light attack fighters to the long
war, we can expect that 4th-generation and probably 5th-generation Navy and
Marine strike aircraft will be there too.
Following from the conventional
wisdom that we are in a long war-as General Goldfein estimated, "we're 15 years
into a long campaign in the Middle East"-we can plausibly estimate that
tomorrow, next year, and perhaps ten years from now will be similar to today.
What has been our recent level of effort?
The Department of Defense (DoD)
has shown a relatively open kimono regarding its activities, at least at a
high-level, in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), the campaign against ISIS. The
DoD has been a little less transparent regarding ongoing operations in
Afghanistan, and apparently only episodic operations in Libya. US fighters,
bombers, and armed drones have operated in each of these theaters. Recently,
Defense One estimated the number of U.S. airstrikes conducted in 2016 at over
26,000. Back in 2015, Senator John McCain asserted that only about 25 percent of
our sorties resulted in airstrikes, a claim which at least one fact-checking
source corroborated. By the military's working definition, "a strike" means at
least one aircraft employing one munition, but possible several aircraft
employing several munitions, "in roughly the same geographic location to produce
a single, sometimes cumulative effect for that location." To get to OIR targets
in Syria and Iraq, we know that American aircraft often have fairly lengthy
enroute flights to get from operating airbases in, for example, the Persian Gulf
States or from aircraft carriers when the US Navy has one stationed in the Gulf.
US combat aircraft also fly from Turkey. Without knowing the proportion of
operations out of the various operating airfield, we can estimate that the round
trip flight times to target areas in northern Iraq and Syria are about five to
seven hours from the Gulf and two to four hours from Turkey.
Though this
is all ambiguous, we can make some sense from the information above, and make a
few reasonable assumptions:
-Our tomorrow in the long war, through the
year 2022 for example, will be much like today.
-Most of the aircraft
performing strikes are 4th-generation tactical aircraft: A-10s, AV-8Bs, F-15s,
F-16s, and F-18s. Let's assume that 75 percent of the strikes are from tactical
aviation and the rest are from armed drones, gunships, F-22s, and
bombers.
- 25 percent of the US strikes are sourced from Turkish
airfields and 75 percent from the Gulf, for a very approximate average sortie
duration of 4 hours.
-Only about 25 percent of overall sorties result in
an airstrike. Many of the military's 4th-generation fighters and attack aircraft
have or are undergoing service life extensions to enable them to serve through
10,000 or more flight hours.
We can then undertake some rough
calculations to provide a ball-park figure for 4th-generation fighter
hours:
26,000 total sorties x 75% in tactical aviation x 4 flight
hours/sortie x 4 sorties/strike = 312,000 annual flight hours of tactical
aviation.
That number represents the service lives of about 31 fighters.
Unless all these campaigns wrap up soon, expect that the US will have about 150
fewer 4th-generation fighters in inventory by end of 2022. These are very rough
calculations, so if you don't like them, please run your own. The services
certainly have, and they will continue to focus on aircraft service lives and
numbers.
McCain's plan brings 200 light-attack-fighters into the Air
Force's inventory by 2022 to supplement the 228 F-35As it will receive by then.
But as we've just estimated, the services could lose about 150 4th-generation
fighters by then. The majority of these will be USAF jets, simply given the
proportion in service with each service. McCain's report notes that "the Air
Force has divested over 400 combat fighters in the last five years" and can
currently muster fewer "combat-coded fighters" than called for in the 2012
Defense Strategic Guidance. Further, the McCain report calls the USAF's
intention to buy 1,763 F-35As "unrealistic," an issue that I've commented on
previously.
McCain recommendation for the not-new, low-end,
light-attack-fighter idea is welcome, and Air Force chief's endorsement is
encouraging. Addressing the long war with lower operating-cost solutions and
keeping precision guided munitions inventories up (given our substantial
expenditures) are sound measures. But it has been a good while since we went "to
war with the Army we have." Though this is water under the bridge, we have since
used up a significant amount of tactical aviation flight hours in the past
fifteen years. McCain's recommendation and their endorsement by the Air Force
and defense analysts are probably too little too late. If buying 1,763 aircraft
is indeed "unrealistic," the USAF may want more than 300 low-end,
light-attack-fighters for the long war, and it should want to get them sooner
and at a greater rate than 40 annually thru 2022. Similar problems remain
unaddressed for the Navy and the Marine Corps.
Congress and the services
should be more aggressive sooner to stanch their attrition of tactical aircraft
by shifting the comparatively low-threat, long war air campaigns from the
wasting jet fighter fleets to more appropriate airframes. Otherwise, what will
our tactical air arms look like in 2030 at the going rate?
Dave
Foster is an engineer for Naval Air Systems Command at China Lake, California.
The views expressed in this post are those of the author and do not reflect the
official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.
This first appeared in the Defense Industrialist here.
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