Norwegian på Haugesund/Helganes

Som du fikk med deg så kritiserer en SAS flyger Norwegians flyging inn til Helganes i et internt forum for SAS flygere. Det fikk jeg fatt i og Flygesjef Tomas Hesthammer i Norwegian reagerer naturligvis. Nå ønsker ikke jeg å ha denne bloggen som et sted for meningsutveksling av denne typen, men for en gangs skyld gjør jeg et unntak med innlegget til Hesthammer under:

Det er to svar på dette blogginnlegget: - den korte versjonen er denne:
FAKTA vedr flygingen:

Out OSL kl 1649 (L)
In HAU kl 1820 (L)
Total BLH 1:31
Fuel på block on: 4,4 ton(hadde tanket tur/retur fra OSL)

EFB kalkulasjon på landingsforhold med vindgrenser, ingen parametre overskredet, til og med innenfor dispatch kriteria.
Capt landet på 3. forsøk. Normalt gjør vi kun 2, mulighetene for ldg vurdert vesentlig forbedret etter 2. forsøk, og derfor ble det gjort 3.
Alle parametre var innenfor limits. Ergo ingen COWBOYFLYGING. Et annet fly landet noen minutter før vår maskin.
Den andre versjonen av svaret er lengre og utdypende forklaring fra kapteinen, som jeg tror mange kunne lære noe av. Svaret fra kapteinen følger til slutt.
Vi har merket oss at en del ansatte i et annet selskap bruker mye energi på å fotfølge Norwegian, og vi kan kun oppfatte dette som forsøk på å skade selskapets omdømme. En gang ble for eksempel Norwegian rapportert av en av nevnte selskaps piloter fordi det hadde forsøkt avgang uten avising. Det var ca 10-20 cam snø på flyet. Det viste seg ved nærmere undersøkelse at flyet var under tauing til hangar. Mht HAU, så kan jo gjerne SAS pilotene svare på hvilke performance kalkulasjoner de gjorde da de begynte å fly med 800 på HAU, før banen ble utvidet (noe Ryanair var pådriver til). Vi befinner oss alle i et glasshus, nokså gjennomsiktig alt vi gjør, og alt kan spores. Jeg har tidligere oppfordret våre ansatte om å ikke nedverdige seg til denne type polemikk.
Som man forstår, bruker Norwegian en del energi på å svare ut slike usaklige angrep. Når det er sagt så har faktisk SAS og Norwegian et nokså tett operativt samarbeid. Slike utfall fra enkeltpersoner bidrar ikke til noe positivt.
For å forstå hvordan kapteinen ressonerte, så følger hans rapport under. Han er selvsagt forbannet over den måten andre kollegaer gjør seg til doms over. Han står gjerne til disposisjon for å diskutere performance.

Mvh
Tomas Hesthammer’
Flygesjef

Kapteinens respons:
Inbound ENHD with active runway 32.

Before starting the approach we received the latest ATIS.
330/13 10+ FEW005 BKN027 16/1 1026

With these conditions a VOR 32 with a MDA 550 ft. (460AFE) should be uneventful.
But at MDA we had no contact due still IMC, and therefore executed a MAP.
Informed Tower about our MAP and received information that it was now suddenly OVC 350ft.
But the winds were still below 15 kts. Reported 330/13 knots on the ground.
Made a EFB calculation with the actual conditions and confirmed that we were even inside our dispatch requirement which is based on Boeings Demonstrated test data. Which we also call Max Manual Brakes. Max performance landing weight was around 68 tons, our actual ldg. weight was around 63 tons.
Note this is for dispatch requirements and not inflight conditions. But it just shows that we were even inside the 60 % dispatch requirements that is done before takeoff.

Of course the Max demonstrated test data for landing calculation is based on Boeing test pilot data and not relative to the average pilot performance. But this is what the airline industry is using for both DRY and contaminated runways dispatch calculations. Therefore the numbers that were interesting for me was the unfactored advisory data with autobrake information. Autobrake MAX, 1276M and Autobrake 3, 1780m. Even with autobrake 3 (7ft./sec*sec) I would have 220 m stop margin and this is even half the retardation of the autobrake system compared to autobrake Max. (14ft./sec*sec >80knots). I was therefore quite confident on my decision to request an ILS 14 based on my performance calculation.

When we were cleared to land we got a wind check 330/17, at this point we were visual with the runway, but I made a MAP due the tailwind now exceeded my limitation for max 15 kts.
Entered holding at VGA, and were now in contact with Stavanger Control. At this point a Widerøe Dash 8 was also inbound ENHD, he was informed that we had made two MAP. One from VOR 32 due clouds and one from ILS 14 due wind conditions. They accepted the approach to ILS 14. I am not certain of which conditions they landed on, I was preoccupied with my operation, Passenger briefing, Ground staff, checking weather in OSL, SVG, fuel check etc.

I entered Vaga holding to see if there was any improvement in the conditions. We had no issue with fuel since I had around 4,6 tons of fuel. It’s company policy to divert to alternate when you have made two MAP, I took this into considerations but since I had made two MAP with two different scenarios (Ceiling/wind). I decided that I could wait and see if there were any changes in the weather conditions. Because it was very local conditions. At Vaga NDB holding it was blue skies. The ceiling was just covering Karmøy, in a north and south direction.

After monitoring the weather changes in Vaga holding for a while, the wind had been fluctuating between 18 knots to 13 knots, but no gust. As the wind trend was going down but the ceiling was constant at 350 ft. I then briefed the passengers and crew thoroughly and explained them our options. As I said, “I do not control the weather situation, but I do control the situation of the aircraft and should any parameters be outside our limitations I would make a MAP to keep a safe operation and thereafter divert directly to Stavanger” . Decided to start the approach with the winds again was reported under 15 kts. SAS and Ryanair was just checking in on Stavanger Control as started the approach.
But on final inbound the winds were reported 330/20 and when I was on short final the winds where reported 330/15. I was then very confident, and called landing. Touch down a bit before Aiming point, and with initially autobrake 3 and later manual brakes I turned around on the runway about 350 meters from rwy end. (Aiming point rwy 32 + 50-100 m.). I was very interested in my stopping distance, since I wanted to confirm the calculated EFB distances. Estimated 1650. (Runway end?)
When I taxied in to gate I was called up by the Widerøe cpt. that had landed before us. He recognized my voice, since we been on the same flight school together in the US in the 90’ties.
He said we did an good job, but he thought it was exciting to follow us from his parking stand. I told him since I knew that he landed just after I made a MAP due to my wind limitations, that I have 180 passengers to think about when I landed. This was to send him a signal that my aircraft operation was a bit more complex and heavier. Nothing more were said, except “talk to you later”.
I see myself as a professional pilot, and a person that is playing by the book.
But when I read this “Grams blog” which is based on feedback from SAS pilots, there is a lot of assumptions that is not based on hard facts.
I can however understand why they were led into building their own conclusions like they did.

· They didn’t know our ATIS before landing was informed FEW 500ft and BKN 2700. They may have thought it was OVC 350 feet all the time. WRONG.
· I made a really good electronic calculation on the actual winds conditions dry runway 14. Both on Advisory data and on max demonstrated Boeing Test data. This was even inside the dispatch requirements. I bet that the SAS pilots didn’t do one for ILS runway 14. If they did one, they would see the hard facts themselves.
· When I started the second APP the winds were inside my limitation and performance. SAS did never hear this communication.
· I did a MAP when the winds were reported 17 knots. If I were a cowboy, I would landed and not made a GA in the first place.
· My two MAP was not due to two identical conditions. Furthermore it was very local conditions, and I had fuel for holding.
· Stopped in the runway end? Own colleges observed it. Second hand information, from the apron? I think I could see better from my seat, especially when I wanted to confirm my performance calculation with actual stop distance.
· If I wanted I could stop on 1280M but I had 2000m available and used not more brakes than I needed to stop safely and with passenger comfort. About 1650m.
· If you really want to talk performance try contaminated runways. 13 % stop margin and that is even with estimated braking actions. A Dry runway is Dry and no surprises.
· My comment “When I land I have 180 passengers, vettu” did the SAS pilots think I was talking to the tower and bragging, or did they know that my comment was a short reply to a friend that is a cpt. on a Dash 8. The SAS pilots did not know that Widerøe actually landed just after I had made two MAP.
Best regards