MAX - Oppdatering - Curt Lewis

Regulators Found High Risk of Emergency After First Boeing MAX Crash An FAA analysis found it 'didn't take that much' for a malfunction like the one confronted by the plane's pilots Officials inspecting an engine (That wheel must be from an engine, Hoskins. Red.) recovered from the crash of a Boeing 737 MAX jet that plunged into the Java Sea last year. PHOTO: DONAL HUSNI/ZUMA PRESS By Andrew Tangel and Andy Pasztor An internal risk analysis after the first of two Boeing 737 MAX airliner crashes showed the likelihood was high of a similar cockpit emergency within months, according to a Federal Aviation Administration official familiar with the details and others briefed on the matter. The regulator's analysis, not previously reported, showed that it "didn't take that much" for a malfunction like the one confronted by the pilots of the Lion Air flight that crashed into the Java Sea last year to occur, one of the people briefed on the analysis said. Based on the findings, the regulator decided it was sufficient to inform pilots about the hazards of an onboard sensor malfunction that led to a flight-control system pushing down the plane's nose. The belief was that if pilots were aware of the risk and knew how to respond, it was acceptable to give Boeing and regulators time to design and approve a permanent software fix to MCAS, the flight-control system implicated in the crash, according to the agency official and people briefed on the findings. The FAA's early goal, one of these people added, was: "Get something out immediately and then mandate something more permanent." Specifically, the FAA's analysis suggested that a warning to pilots would be enough to provide Boeing about 10 months to design and implement changes to MCAS, according to a person close to the manufacturer. Boeing had been planning to complete the changes by April, within the 10-month period, this person said. Boeing and the FAA's risk projections faced a real-world crisis in less than five months. Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 went down on March 10 in a similar nosedive prompted by the same type of automated MCAS commands pilots couldn't overcome. The dual crashes took a total of 346 lives. Investigators quickly focused on the central role of MCAS, and regulators around the world grounded the aircraft. The FAA has said it doesn't have a deadline for approving the final package of fixes but won't allow the planes back in the air until all safety issues are resolved. A Boeing spokesman said: "Boeing and the FAA both agreed, based on the results of their respective rigorous safety processes, that the initial action of reinforcing existing pilot procedures...and then the development and fielding of a software update, were the appropriate actions." He added: "The safety of everyone flying our airplanes was paramount as the analysis was done and the actions were taken." The FAA's internal analysis, prepared in the days immediately following the Oct. 29 Lion Air crash, is called a TARAM, an acronym that stands for Transport Airplane Risk Assessment Methodology. It essentially involves a spreadsheet with formulas that consider a number of factors-such as fleet size, probability that sensors will fail, passenger counts-and aims to predict how many people could die over a certain period because of potential hazards, according to people familiar with the process. There is also a subjective analysis that, along with the TARAM's numerical forecasts, informs FAA managers and engineers about what types of actions to take and when-for major but also less-serious air-safety issues. "It's kind of a cold way of looking at it," the person briefed on the analysis said, adding: "It's not foolproof. It's a tool." The analysis determined that the underlying risks from the MCAS design were unacceptably high without at least some FAA action, that they exceeded internal FAA safety standards and that the likelihood of another emergency or even accident "was over our threshold," according to the FAA official. "We decided...it was not an acceptable situation," the official said. The directive to pilots essentially reiterated that cockpit crews should counteract and then disable an MCAS misfire by following long-established emergency procedures for a related flight-control problem that can similarly push down an aircraft's nose. When the FAA determines an aircraft poses an unacceptably high safety risk, it typically mandates targeted equipment changes, inspections or training to alleviate the hazard. It is unusual for the agency to conclude that reiterating cockpit emergency procedures or tweaking manuals will suffice. The FAA's Nov. 7 emergency directive, described as an "interim action," didn't mandate design or operational changes. Because it reminded pilots how to swiftly and correctly respond to such an MCAS malfunction, that approach "wasn't removing the risk," the FAA official said Tuesday, but rather "making it acceptable for a period based on the data we had." In a report shared with Boeing in late 2018, after the FAA's directive, the agency said its analysis found the "risk is sufficiently low...until the changes to the system are retrofitted," according to the person close to the manufacturer. Grounding wasn't seriously discussed but "that's always on the table" after a deadly crash, the person briefed on the analysis said. As FAA officials learned of MCAS's design issues, they also learned of other problems that could have contributed to the accident, including maintenance and pilot missteps, this person said. Boeing said it began working on changes to MCAS shortly after the Lion Air crash. The first software fix package was formally presented for FAA approval in December, but was still being tested and analyzed when the Ethiopian crash occurred in March. Between the two crashes, FAA engineering teams continued to assess data and fold details of the Lion Air probe into their safety assessments. "We continued asking questions," the FAA official said, adding that historical safety information from U.S. operators of the MAX indicated that "we weren't getting data" revealing pilots wouldn't react appropriately to MCAS emergencies. In the end, the FAA's statistical predictions didn't anticipate another accident would happen as soon as it did. "Statistically, the calculations just didn't work out," said the person briefed on the analysis. "You can't predict randomness." It isn't clear why Boeing took longer to finish MCAS changes than some industry and FAA officials had expected. At a late March briefing in Renton, Wash., a Boeing official said the plane maker took care to fine-tune the revised software and test it. "We didn't rush it because rushing is the wrong thing to do in a situation like this," the Boeing official said. FAA engineers and safety experts prepared a separate TARAM risk analysis in the wake of the Ethiopian crash, according to the FAA official and others familiar with the matter. The full assessment was completed two days after the crash, the official recalled, and was presented to senior policy makers at headquarters the next day. That same morning, the FAA received new satellite data more directly implicating MCAS, prompting the agency to become the last major aviation regulator to ground the MAX fleet. Boeing has since experienced more delays amid subsequent company reviews, questions from the FAA and flight test results-including simulator sessions with FAA pilots-revealing a series of technical problems. https://www.wsj.com/articles/regulators-found-high-risk-of-emergency-after-first-boeing-max-crash-11564565521 Back to Top

Air Canada Pays 737 Max Pilots to Not Fly as Grounding Drags On Think U.S. airlines have it tough with the Boeing 737 Max grounding? At least they can keep pilots busy during the lengthy grounding, since they can fly older versions of the same airplane. Air Canada has no such opportunity, as executives made clear Tuesday on their second quarter earnings call, and it's hampering the airline's ability to operate efficiently. At Southwest Airlines, United Airlines and American Airlines, 737 pilots can operate all versions of the airplane, including the 737NGs, or next-generation planes, that make up the bulk of their fleets. But Air Canada doesn't fly the NG, so it trained hundreds of pilots just to fly the Max. Now, it must pay them not to work, and those costs are adding up. "We have some 400-plus pilots that we're carrying, who are waiting for the Max to come back," Air Canada CEO Calin Rovinescu told analysts on Tuesday. "Obviously, not exactly the most efficient use of their talent and their skill." Unique Problem All Max operators face similar problems with grounded airplanes and reduced capacity, but the pilot issue is unique to Air Canada. The airline decided five years ago to reduce its reliance on Airbus narrow-body jets and go with the Boeing 737 instead. It trained pilots to fly the new jet, going so far as to install a Max simulator. Because training is labor intensive and expensive, airlines prefer to train pilots as little as possible, so for the most part, Air Canada has grounded its Max pilots rather than re-train them to fly another jet. For the second quarter, chief financial officer Michael Rousseau said, Air Canada paid C$14 million ($10.64 million U.S.) in wages, salaries and benefits to non-flying Max pilots. Most were flying the 24 Max aircraft Air Canada operated before the airplane was grounded earlier this year. Those pilots will be ready go soon after regulators clear the airplane, executives said. But Air Canada had an aggressive delivery schedule, with plans to ramp up to 50 aircraft by next summer. Executives said they're not sure about Boeing's delivery schedule, and how it will may change because of the manufacturer's software issues. But they told analysts they're no longer going to be able to spool up to 50 airplanes so fast, even if Boeing can deliver them quickly. "We have not hired pilots and cabin crews for the 12 aircraft not delivered in Q2 of 2019 nor are we planning to hire for the additional 14 scheduled to be delivered in the first half of 2020 until we have clarity," Rousseau said. "As a result of this and other operational factors, it will take up to a year from the time when the decision is made to reintegrate them into our fleet after the ungrounding for all 50 planes to fly." Effect on Schedule The pilot training issue is more of a long-term problem. In the short term, Air Canada's problems look at lot like those at other North American airlines; the carrier does not have enough aircraft to fly all of its scheduled capacity. By now, executives said, Air Canada was to have 36 Max jets, and they were to fly roughly 100 departures per day by the end of June, including on some of the airline's longest (and most premier) North American routes. Like most airlines, Air Canada is doing more with less, deferring non-essential maintenance, extending leases, taking other aircraft earlier than expected and using wet-leased aircraft. But there's only so much it could do. In the second quarter, it said it was able to cover about 97 percent of planned flying. This summer, executives said, the airline will fly about 95 percent of the planned schedule. Given the uncertainty over when the Max will fly again, executives said they want to take a prudent approach on future schedules. On Tuesday, Air Canada said it is canceling all Max flights until Jan. 8, 2020, longer than any other North American airline. Southwest is the only other operator to cancel its Max flights into next year, going as far as Jan. 5. Air Canada still reported a profit in the second quarter, reporting adjusted net income of C$240 million ($182.46 million) on operating revenues C$4.757 billion ($3.6 million). Unit costs for the quarter rose 5.2 percent, an increase the airline blamed mostly on the Max grounding.

FAA hopes global regulators simultaneously approve Boeing 737 MAX to fly again Grounded Boeing 737 MAX aircraft are seen parked at Boeing Field in Seattle WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration hopes civil aviation authorities around the world will decide at about the same time to allow the Boeing 737 MAX to resume flying, the agency told Congress on Tuesday in a letter seen by Reuters. The FAA and other regulators grounded the plane in March after two fatal crashes in five months killed 346 people. Acting FAA Administrator Dan Elwell said in letters to Senators Susan Collins and Jack Reed that the agency "hopes to achieve near simultaneous approval from the major civil aviation authorities around the world" but added that every regulator will make its own determination. "We are working with our colleagues from the European Union, Canada and Brazil to address their concerns," he wrote. Collins will chair a Senate Appropriations subcommittee hearing Wednesday that will feature four senior FAA officials, including Ali Bahrami, who oversees aviation safety. Boeing Co Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg told analysts last week he was confident the MAX would be back in service as early as October after a certification flight in "the September time frame." Ryan Air Chief Executive Michael O'Leary said Monday that he had been told that flight would be delayed until October. Boeing on Tuesday reiterated Muilenburg's recent comments. Elwell said in his letter the FAA "will lift the 737 MAX grounding order only when it is safe to do so." The MAX's return has been delayed as Chicago-based Boeing works to win approval for reprogrammed stall-prevention software and related training materials. In late June, the FAA said it had identified a new risk as an agency pilot was running a flight simulator test seeking to intentionally activate the so-called MCAS stall-prevention system. Boeing has said it is working on a fix to address the problem. The FAA's Technical Advisory Board, made up of experts not involved in the original 737 MAX certification, is also reviewing the MCAS software update and training requirements. The European Aviation Safety Agency sent FAA and Boeing a list of concerns it wanted addressed before the MAX re-enters service, people familiar with the matter said. Since the crashes, federal prosecutors, the Transportation Department's inspector general, Congress and several blue-ribbon panels have been investigating how the FAA certifies new aircraft and its longstanding practice of delegating certification tasks to airplane manufacturers. Elwell noted in his letter that on March 5 he created a new Aviation Safety Organization office on delegating authority. That office is in the process of selecting staff and is developing procedures "to conduct this important mission. No substantive changes to the existing (delegation) program have been made as a result of standing up this office."