Gaza - En vurdering av stor interesse fra Down Under - Defence Connect

 

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Israel’s invasion of Gaza evidence that qualitative overmatch simply isn’t enough

GEOPOLITICS & POLICY

05 FEBRUARY 2024

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By: Liam Garman

 

The abundance of cheap, yet sophisticated weaponry on the modern battlefield has eroded the ability for nations to win wars on qualitative overmatch alone. As amply evidenced in Israel’s invasion of Gaza, technological superiority is not enough to deter and overcome a motivated aggressor and thus, Australia must reconsider the role of mass in warfare.

For decades, Australian defence policy relied on the nation’s economic fortunes to produce and procure military capabilities that its more populous neighbours could not afford. Where Australia could not project quantity, it could deter and win through sophisticated military technology.

This concept of qualitative superiority has reached strategic permanence in Australian military theory.

In 1989, then minister for foreign affairs and trade Gareth Evans detailed that Australia’s policy of technological superiority through procurement would foster regional stability. The 1994 Defence White Paper laid out how the nation would leverage its “wider national resources” to gain “relative” technological superiority vis-à-vis its regional adversaries. The idea was strengthened yet again in Australia’s Strategic Policy paper in 1997 which, perhaps even more explicitly, outlined that Australia’s economic superiority in the South Pacific would enable the country to rely on “exploiting technology” to ensure a competitive advantage.

However, with regional economies closing the economic gap enabling the acquisition of near-equally sophisticated military systems and the abundance of cheap, yet sophisticated weaponry that has found its way into the hands of transnational crime elements and nation state actors alike, Australia has ceded the qualitative edge – and even more worryingly – it has become evident that qualitative overmatch doesn’t provide the same benefit it once did.

Israel’s recent invasion of Gaza has clearly demonstrated how modern littoral and urban environments can quickly erode any perceived qualitative overmatch.

Israel maintains an absurdly large intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance advantage. Not only has the country recently bragged about its foray into fifth-generation drone warfare, but its current fleet of Elbit-made Hermes 450 systems boast electronic intelligence, electronic warfare, and signals intelligence capabilities with traditional electro optic and infrared cameras, backed up by synthetic aperture radar, automated identification systems and ground moving target identification systems. Hamas, on the other hand, relies on large numbers of cheap commercial drones that nevertheless manage to overwhelm Israeli air defence systems.

Israel has been launching military satellites since the 1980s and its recent nanosatellite program, SAMSON, was designed to identify and locate civilian signals. Meanwhile, Palestinians haven’t operated something that might even resemble an air force since the 1990s, let alone dream of one day having their own space program to match Israeli ISR. However, they still managed to move several thousand combatants into Israel undetected on 7 October.

Despite such a significant technological advantage, Israel still had to deploy between 30,000 to 40,000 combatants to the Gaza strip to pacify the nation’s 2 million-strong population, with more soldiers deployed to the country’s north to deter Hezbollah. Not far from the entire number of soldiers in the Australian Defence Force.

We are seeing the same lesson yet again; to govern someone who wants to be ungovernable requires quantity – a lesson painfully learnt in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Moreover, the democratisation of technology has enabled militants, transnational crime elements, and nation state actors alike to update and strengthen their age-old insurgent tactics.

Yes, Hamas is still relying on booby traps and ambushes, while leveraging an underground tunnel system that enables freedom of movement away from the watchful eye of the Israeli Defence Force. The US Congressional Research Service plainly detailed how challenging the urban environment would be for the IDF:

Gaza-based militants may be able to limit Israeli armoured vehicles’ manoeuvrability, with “anti-tank mines and obstacles intended to channelise them into concentrated fires,” and surface-to-air missiles targeting planes and helicopters.

But Hamas has also entered the 21^st century. In October, media outlets alleged that Palestinian militants jammed Israeli communications systems during the 7 October massacre. It happened again just weeks later on the Lebanese border, with allegations that Hezbollah, too, began jamming Israeli GPS/GNSS signals.

Meanwhile, Israel has begun to realise the extent of Hamas cyber operations, uncovering a series of large data centres targeting Israel. Recent reports have also detailed how Hamas hackers successfully hacked a series of Israeli defence end points, collecting sensitive personnel data.

Hamas has also confirmed its foray into uncrewed underwater vessels with the Al Asef UUV. While some Israeli commentators have poured water on the capability’s capacity to target Israeli vessels, the development of an indigenous Palestinian UUV is evidence that the democratisation of technological capability will only serve to erode Israel’s competitive edge.

So what does this mean for Australia?

Israel boasts both the qualitative and quantitative edge in this conflict. However, in the modern urban and littoral environment, the proliferation of cheap, plentiful, and sophisticated weaponry enables any insurgency or combatant group to achieve operational and strategic level victories over a stronger and bigger adversary.

But Australia isn’t Israel. Australia has no armed drones and seemingly has little appetite to grasp the benefits of autonomy. It also has no clear appetite to streamline the development and acquisition of large ticket defence items.

Our leaders must look at the modern battlefield and acknowledge that we have forfeited our qualitative edge – if there is still such a thing as qualitative overmatch at all.