Only a few weeks ago, the European Commission (EC) presented its much anticipated aviation strategy. The package is meant to ensure that European airlines will become more competitive in the global air transport market, as the sector has now been deemed vital to a healthy economy.
That the commission considers air transport to be an important industry is obviously good news for airlines. The news would be even better if Europe’s policy makers were to draw the right conclusions from their finding. As noted in an earlier commentary, the package focuses on the wrong issues such as a regulatory fight against Gulf carriers that includes an EC mandate for another round of negotiations that will likely lead nowhere.
But the problem goes deeper than that. The EC is very active in areas where it should not be and shows no action at all where it is needed. The best example of this flawed approach is the ongoing saga of the foreign air carrier permit sought by Norwegian Air International (NAI), the proposed long-haul arm of low-cost carrier Norwegian. The U.S. Transportation Department has withheld approval for the airline for approximately two years, an unprecedented delay that is based on, well, what exactly?
Credit: Joepriesaviation.net
It mainly hinges on strong opposition from U.S. labor, which, in turn, is equally strongly backed by major legacy airlines on both sides of the Atlantic. And in a less obvious example, the credibility of Lufthansa comes into play. The German airline—which is in the process of outsourcing a large part of its short-haul and much of its long-haul operations to lower-pay subsidiaries or even lower-pay third-party operators—is now declaring that it is extremely dedicated to protecting workers’ interests. It is so dedicated that it is stating that another airline cannot be allowed to operate. Lufthansa is not alone in striking a hypocritical stance. Most other filings in the docket are equally involved in self-serving goals.
To be blunt, most transatlantic carriers are trying to squelch additional competition. But competition is exactly what would be in the best interest of consumers and, ultimately, the airline industry, which stands to benefit from some new business models along with modernized versions of the old ones. 
There are remedies. The European Commission should address the concerns in the joint committee that is tasked to discuss such issues, as defined in the EU/U.S. open skies agreement. The EC should throw its political weight behind the NAI application, which arguably cannot be denied. Norwegian recently launched a second attempt to establish an operating platform, Norwegian UK (NUK), which now faces the same kind of opposition from competitors that could delay its creation by months, if not years. Here, too, the EC should clearly state that it supports the plans of one of Europe’s fastest-growing, most innovative and risk-taking airlines.
Of course and unfortunately, this is not the reality. The aviation package and the lack of action in support of true competition—in this case specifically Norwegian—shows how much the old establishment still drives policy. 
The aviation package was a pleasant surprise for the likes of Lufthansa and Air France-KLM, the carriers that seem to have the most difficulty adapting in the current environment. Equally, on the other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. Transportation Department’s  inaction in the NAI case is appalling. Perhaps the worst aspect is that it abnegates any responsibility by refusing to take a position on the matter. While labor is officially driving the case against NAI and, more recently, NUK, all of it nicely plays into the hands of Delta Air Lines, Lufthansa and the like. Granted, these carriers represent an important part of the industry, but history has shown that protectionism ultimately does not solve structural and strategy issues; companies must solve them themselves. In Delta’s case, it has.
Ironically, there is one instance where continued inaction would be welcome. After nearly a year, the U.S. Transportation Department still has not said whether it will request consultations with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, as demanded mainly by Delta CEO Richard Anderson. He is seeking such a meeting to discuss what he alleges are unfair government subsidies to Emirates, Etihad Airways and Qatar Airways. 
It is understandable that the department does not want to make such a decision under perceived public or industry pressure, but a clear policy statement that it is not going to act would send an important signal—one that would be visible on the other side of the Atlantic.