Ballongflygere - Må ha samme krav til dem som CPL flygere - FAA - Curt Lewis

 

Treat balloon pilots like other pilots

A view of the hot air balloon crash site, Monday Aug. 1, 2016, where 16 people were killed on Saturday July 30, 2016 near Maxwell, Texas in Caldwell County.

Alfred "Skip" Nichols wasn't allowed to drive a car. He shouldn't have been allowed to pilot a commercial hot air balloon.

That basic premise is the starting point for addressing the obvious safety issues with commercial balloon flights, which are more dangerous than other forms of commercial flight.

Nichols was the pilot in a tragic commercial balloon crash that killed 16 people last summer near Lockhart just outside of Austin. He had numerous past drunken driving convictions in Missouri, and prior to the fatal flight Nichols had taken what one doctor has called a "witches' brew" of prescription drugs, including Valium, Prozac and oxycodone.

He should never have been piloting a nine-story-tall balloon with a gondola big enough to carry 16 passengers and a pilot. He should never have been allowed to launch on a foggy July morning with visibility so limited he failed to see power lines.

Federal Aviation Administration officials have repeatedly rebuffed efforts to better regulate commercial hot air balloon flights. In the past, the National Transportation Safety Board had pleaded with the FAA to regulate commercial balloon operators, citing recurring safety issues and predicting a tragedy like this would happen without better oversight.

The FAA recently issued a statement to Express-News investigative reporter John Tedesco, saying better regulations would not have prevented the Lockhart tragedy. The agency's argument is twofold: Better regulations would be based on flimsy self-reporting. Second, that the number of commercial hot air balloon flights are relatively small, and therefore so is the risk of tragedy.

It's not factually wrong to make such assertions, of course. But it's also not really intellectually honest to say there is nothing to be done. The FAA's response is incomplete, reflecting entrenched flawed policy. True, as the FAA asserts, better regulations might not have prevented the Lockhart tragedy. But they might have. They certainly would create a more professional environment, which would improve safety standards.

True, as the FAA asserts, there aren't nearly as many commercial balloon flights as airline or helicopter tours. But it's also true the crash rates for balloons are higher than for private and corporate aircraft. Also, the general public probably isn't aware it is much easier to get a pilot's certificate to fly a commercial balloon than other forms of flight.

Perhaps that's why pilot error accounted for more than half of the 140 private and commercial balloon crashes since 2005, Tedesco found after scouring aviation records. Nearly 1 in 5 incidents involved power lines. In that time, 70 passengers and pilots have been killed or injured.

It only makes sense to place commercial balloon pilots on par with other commercial pilots who conduct tours in terms of flight hours, medical tests and background checks. Whether the 16 passengers are in a hot air balloon or a private plane for a tour, the risks and purpose are the same. Pilots should have to qualify for a "letter of authorization" from the FAA, ensuring they meet basic expectations of passengers when it comes to experience and safety.

The FAA also needs to regulate the size of these balloons. As Tedesco reported, some can be as large as 11 stories tall in an effort to carry more passengers. Nichols' balloon was nine stories tall and would regularly hold 12 to 14 passengers.

Finally, there is the issue of ensuring the public is aware of a pilot's history. The Balloon Federation of America is developing a pilot rating system for consumer review, but Tedesco found flaws in this voluntary system. The FAA should require commercial pilots to disclose all crash history, if any, to potential passengers, as well as require an annual background check.

There is a strong anti-regulatory sentiment in Washington, D.C., which does not portend well for greater oversight of anything, especially something as "small" as the commercial balloon industry. But doing nothing is not a solution - as the FAA's past resistance on this issue shows. Doing nothing is an invitation to more fatal crashes. The families who lost loved ones in the Lockhart crash undeniably wish someone had done something.

It simply makes no sense not to hold commercial balloon pilots to the same standards as other commercial pilots. Nichols wasn't allowed to drive a car. Why was he allowed to fly a commercial hot air balloon with 16 passengers?