fredag 16. desember 2022

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How A Soviet-Era Reconnaissance UAS Became A Cruise Missile

Piotr Butowski December 15, 2022

The Tu-141 was designed as a reconnaissance system that could see hundreds of kilometers behind enemy lines.Credit: Piotr ButowskI

On Dec. 5, Russia planned a series of air strikes against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, similar to others it had conducted periodically. Tupolev Tu-95MS bombers and Tu-22M3 bombers—from Russia’s Engels and Dyagilevo air bases, respectively—were preparing to attack that day.Located just east of the Volga River, Engels houses the 121st Heavy Bomber Aviation Regiment, which includes 16 Tu-160 and about 20 Tu-95MS strategic bombers. Initial social media posts said that a fuel truck standing next to the aircraft had been hit and that two Tu- 95MS bombers were destroyed in the explosion.

But at 6:04 a.m. local time, according to a recording from a city surveillance camera at Engels, explosions rocked the air base.

· How a Soviet-era reconnaissance UAS became a cruise missile

· Explosions occurred hundreds of miles inside Russia in early December

A satellite image published by Planet shows one Tu-95MS aircraft next to what appear to be burn marks and firefighting foam.

The strike was likely the handiwork of a Ukrainian Tupolev Tu-141, a Soviet-era reconnaissance uncrewed aircraft system (UAS) that was refashioned into a cruise missile.

But how could Ukraine hit targets hundreds of miles from its borders, deep in Russian territory? In addition to the strike at Engels, another took place at Dyagilevo air base, located near Ryazan, southeast of Moscow. The 43rd Center for Combat Application and Training of Aircrew for Long-Range Aviation there includes several Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 bombers as well as Tu-134 and Antonov An-26 training aircraft.

Leaked photos posted on the internet on the evening of Dec. 5 picture a Tu-22M3 bomber at Dyagilevo with a damaged rear part of the fuselage, engines and tailplanes. Judging from the RF-34110 registration, the aircraft belonged to a unit in Shaykovka.

In the photo, an APA-80 vehicle—a generator providing power to the aircraft—stands next to the Tu-22M3 bomber, which has a heavy Kh-22 or Kh-32 missile suspended under the wing. This indicates the aircraft was being prepared for a combat flight.

On Dec. 6, again at 6 a.m. local time, another strike on a Russian airfield took place, this time at the Kursk-Khalino air base, and the fire it caused burned for hours.

The 14th Fighter Aviation Regiment, with Sukhoi Su-30SM fighters, is stationed in Kursk, about 100 km (62 mi.) from the Ukrainian border. A group of Su-35S fighters and Su-25 attack aircraft also are deployed there. This attack was the most successful of all.

Ukraine’s preemptive strikes on airfields did not prevent Russia from launching an air strike against Ukraine in the early afternoon of Dec. 5. The Russian Defense Ministry reported that “the massive strike was carried out despite the attempts of the Ukrainian side to disrupt the combat work of Russian long-range aviation.” All 17 designated targets were hit by air-launched and naval missiles.

The Ukrainian Defense Ministry says Russia fired 70 missiles that day, of which “more than 60” were shot down. Eight Engels-based Tu-95MS strategic bombers, flying over the Caspian Sea and over the Rostov Oblast in Russia, fired 38 Kh-101/Ch-555 cruise missiles, while ships from Russia’s Black Sea Fleet fired 22 Kalibr cruise missiles. Tu-22M3 bombers flying over the Black Sea attacked with three Kh-22 missiles, while tactical aircraft fired six Kh-59 missiles and one Kh-31P.

What is THE Tu-141?

Ukraine has not confirmed that its armed forces carried out the attacks against these Russian long-range aviation bases. Then again, it did not confirm the Oct. 8 attack on the Kerch Bridge connecting Crimea with Russia or other attacks. But there is little doubt Ukraine was behind the attacks.

“[Ukraine] attempted to strike with Soviet-made jet drones against Dyagilevo and Engels airfields,” the Russian Defense Ministry said in a statement. “Ukrainian drones flying at low altitude were intercepted.”

Three Russian soldiers were killed and four injured by “pieces from Ukrainian drones,” the ministry said. The reference to “Soviet-made jet drones” points to one specific type: the Tu-141 Strizh (Swift) UAS. It is the only UAS available in Ukraine with the capability to perform such an attack.

The Tu-141, part of the VR-2 Strizh reconnaissance system, is a theater-level UAS for reconnaissance missions as far as several hundred kilometers behind the front line. Its design began in 1968, along with the similar but much smaller Tu-143. The Tu-141 made its first flight in December 1974. From 1978 to 1990, a manufacturing facility in Kharkiv, Ukraine, produced 152 of the aircraft. A plant in Kumertau, Russia, produced 950 of the smaller Tu-143s.

The Tu-141 takes off from a wheeled platform with the help of rocket accelerators. It has a range of 1,000 km along a preprogrammed route, with several turning points and altitude changes, overcoming air defenses at low altitude, from 50 m (165 ft.), at a speed of 1,100 kph (685 mph).

To convert the reconnaissance UAS into a cruise missile, the Ukrainians would have had to replace the guidance system. The missile is likely guided by inertial navigation, perhaps with updates via satellite navigation. This is the simplest variant. They likely also installed a warhead in place of reconnaissance equipment. The Tu-141 weighs 5,370 kg (12,000 lb.), which makes it possible to estimate the weight of the combat load as 500-1,000 kg.

Tu-141s have been used by Ukraine on other missions in this war, so it would not be surprising for Ukraine to have used them to hit military airfields deep in Russia. On March 10, an “unknown object,” which turned out to be a Ukrainian Tu-141, crashed in Zagreb, the capital of Croatia; undoubtedly the aircraft’s navigation failed. On March 11, another Ukrainian Tu-141 crashed or was shot down over Crimea. On May 6, the remains of a smaller Tu-143 Reys were found in the Kharkiv region. On June 28 and then on July 3, Ukrainian Tu-143 drones unsuccessfully attacked targets in the Kursk region.

The Russians appear to have used a Tu-143 Reys on April 11, probably as a decoy target to initiate Ukrainian air defenses.

Was that a Tu-141?

However, Russia’s assertions do not constitute proof that the attacks on Russian military airfields were conducted by Tu-141 Strizh UAS.

Ukraine also recently declared that it was close to implementing its own long-range uncrewed system. The country has the qualifications and technical capabilities to build an advanced uncrewed system, including a strike one. Its design and production facilities can manufacture airframes and engines, as well as mission equipment and air-launched weapons.

The Ukrainian strike on military airfields deep in Russia will change the nature of this war—all previous attacks had been in close proximity. The ease with which these missiles flew several hundred kilometers over Russian territory and attacked strategic air bases, which are part of the Russian nuclear triad, certainly has to be concerning to the Russians.

The attack on Ryazan also is of great psychological importance. Just look at the map: The route from northern Ukraine to Dyagilevo is not much different from the route to Moscow.

Russia Under Fire