MAX - Oppdatering - Curt Lewis

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FAA lifts grounding of Boeing 737 MAX FAA Administrator Steve Dickson today signed an order (PDF) that paves the way for the Boeing 737 MAX to return to commercial service. The Boeing 737 MAX had been grounded following two fatal accidents (Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302) . In addition to rescinding the order that grounded the aircraft, the FAA published an Airworthiness Directive (PDF) specifying design changes that must be made before the aircraft returns to service, issued a Continued Airworthiness Notification to the International Community (CANIC), and published the MAX training requirements. (PDF) These actions do not allow the MAX to return immediately to the skies. The FAA must approve 737 MAX pilot training program revisions for each U.S. airline operating the MAX and will retain its authority to issue airworthiness certificates and export certificates of airworthiness for all new 737 MAX aircraft manufactured since the FAA issued the grounding order. Furthermore, airlines that have parked their MAX aircraft must take required maintenance steps to prepare them to fly again.

 

 

'Grossly insufficient': House report excoriates Boeing, FAA over mistakes that led to 737 Max crashes A cascade of false assumptions, mismanagement, rushed deadlines, miscommunication and outright deception led to the failure to catch the design flaws that led to two deadly crashes of Boeing's now-grounded 737 Max jetliner, finds a congressional report released Wednesday. "Boeing failed in its design and development of the Max, and the Federal Aviation Agency failed in its oversight of Boeing and its certification of the aircraft," concludes the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's 238-page report on the jetliner. The report pinpoints multiple times engineers questioned the safety of features that went into the jet, only to have their concerns dismissed as lacking importance or jeopardizing the development timeline or budget, the report finds. Employees charged with keeping the FAA informed about those debates didn't pass on that information to the agency. Despite ample opportunities to have realized the plane's deadly shortcomings, the 737 Max passed muster with both Boeing and the FAA, which labeled it "compliant" in certifying it as safe to go into service with many airlines in the U.S. and abroad. "The problem is it was 'compliant' and not safe – and people died," Rep. Peter DeFazio, D-Ore., the committee's chairman, said in a brief statement to reporters. A 737 Max operated by Lion Air plunged into the Java Sea 13 minutes after takeoff in Indonesia in October 2018, taking 189 lives. Five months later, an Ethiopian Airlines jet with 157 passengers and crew augered into the earth six minutes into its flight from Addis Ababa. As similar circumstances in both crashes came to light, the 737 Max has remained grounded worldwide. The FAA and other global aviation safety agencies are reviewing Boeing's improvements to decide whether to allow it to fly again. Those improvements focus primarily on software changes in a new system added to the jet and blamed for the crashes. In both the fatal Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines flights, pilots wrestled with the new computer system, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS, that wasn't on previous versions of the 737. MCAS was added in the Max to try to make the jetliner feel the same to pilots as previous generations of the workhorse 737, which first flew in the 1960s. The 737 Max has larger, heavier engines, which could make it fly differently under some conditions. The committee's report dwells on how, at multiple points in the development of the Max, engineers and test pilots noted problems in MCAS that would later prove to be at the root of the crashes. As early as 2012, a Boeing test pilot found it took 10 seconds to deal with an uncommanded activation of the MCAS system, which was deemed to be "catastrophic," the report discloses. Engineers questioned why the system was triggered on data from a single angle-of-attack sensor when it has two. The AOA sensors, as they are called, long predate MCAS and inform pilots whether the plane's nose is pointed up or down. More: Boeing 737 Max recertification: Europe's flight safety agency completes first tests following deadly crashes A test pilot noted that the MCAS system could kick in multiple times, leaving the plane's ability to stay aloft badly hindered, which is what sealed the fate of the Lion Air and Ethiopian flights, according to the report. The 737 Max's chief engineer said he approved MCAS without really understanding it, the report states, a reflection of a management system in which he had overall authority, but most of the engineers on the project reported directly to others. MCAS was so flawed that the FAA did an assessment after the Lion Air crash – and months before the 737 Max would be grounded – and estimated that it could account for 15 additional crashes over the worldwide Max fleet's lifetime, with 2,900 deaths. Despite that prediction, the FAA permitted the 737 MAX to continue flying while a fix to the MCAS software was contemplated, the report said. "During the period between the crashes, the FAA repeatedly justified its decision not to ground the 737 MAX saying that it did not have appropriate data to make that determination. That judgment proved tragically wrong," the report states. The FAA brushed off a Boeing disclosure that a key indicator light that possibly could have saved the doomed jetliners wasn't working on 80% of the 737 Max jets then in service. The light tells pilots when one of the AOA sensors appears to be malfunctioning. About a year later, the report says, the FAA's associate administrator for aviation safety was interviewed by committee staff and seemed unaware of many of the key issues that had come to light about the jet. On four occasions that the committee found, the Boeing workers charged with informing the FAA of any issues that cropped up in the development of the new jetliner failed to pass on the information to the agency, raising questions about whether employees charged with such duties have a conflict of interest. It was easy to see why: The 737 Max development team faced intense pressure to get their plane to customers without incurring heavy additional costs as they tried to fend off competition from Europe's Airbus, which had a similar fuel-saving jetliner in the works. The report notes that Boeing senior managers had a "countdown clock" installed in a meeting room, ticking down the minutes as the project was supposed to meet key deadlines. Boeing, in a statement, said it has learned "hard lessons" in the wake of the crashes as it as struggled to come up with fixes to the jet that will satisfy regulators. "As this report recognizes, we have made fundamental changes to our company as a result, and continue to look for ways to improve. Change is always hard and requires daily commitment, but we as a company are dedicated to doing the work," it said. Yet Boeing executives pushed to make sure airlines wouldn't have to include simulator training for pilots on the Max despite the inclusion of MCAS. Instead, they were allowed to learn about the new cockpit system from a tutorial on their laptops. Simulator training would have cost more. Similarly, mention of MCAS was kept out of pilot manuals. It was supposed to work seamlessly in the background. The committee also found fault with the FAA. Its actions involving the plane's certification to fly were "grossly insufficient" and that it "failed in its duty to identify key safety problems and to ensure that they were adequately addressed during the certification process. The combination of these problems doomed the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines flights," the report states. The report gives new ammunition to families of victims who feel that Boeing isn't going far enough or that 737 Max remains inherently unsafe. Michael Stumo, whose daughter Samya, 24, died on the Ethiopian flight, called for the FAA to halt the recertification process. "The FAA and Boeing hid information before and are doing it again," he said in a statement provided through a spokesman, Gary Hanauer. "Both Boeing and the FAA have refused to provide their data that support their efforts to unground the plan. The Max should not fly until Boeing and the FAA provide this data, so independent experts and the public can confirm the aircraft is safe."

 

 

Airlines will let 737 Max passengers change their tickets for free Airlines said they will allow 737 Max passengers to change their tickets at no charge if they don't feel comfortable flying on the recently recertified jet. Boeing's 737 Max has been cleared for takeoff by the Federal Aviation Administration 20 months after it was grounded following two crashes that killed everybody on board— but some passengers say they're still reluctant to board the controversial aircraft. That's forcing airlines to reassure passengers that the jet is safe — while also giving them free ticket changes if they're not comfortable flying on the Max. "If our pilots, along with the APA, FAA and our safety teams are confident the aircraft is safe, we are confident in its return to service," David Seymour, chief operating officer of American Airlines, wrote in a letter signed by five other top executives for the company. The Allied Pilots Association, or APA, is the union representing American Airlines' pilots. But, Seymour added, "if a customer doesn't want to fly on the 737 Max, they won't have to." Jenn Cammorato, 40, a revenue manager for a rental company from Los Angeles, wrote in a message: "I'd change my ticket or make the reservation over the phone to make sure I'm not flying on a Max. In fact, I don't want to fly any Boeing planes any more, and now I spend time researching routes on travel enthusiast websites and forums to find airlines that fly Airbus or other planes on flights I need to take." Other passengers have a different view. "Flying is a commodity. I'll fly on whatever the cheapest ticket gets me," wrote Lou Nunzio, 39, a mechanical engineer from Safety Harbor, Florida. "Flying is still significantly safer than driving, even on that particular plane." Airlines said customers can look at their itineraries to see which kind of aircraft they are scheduled to fly on. "For now, most airlines that have the plane will show it as the Boeing 737 Max 8 or Max 9 at booking," Brian Kelly, founder and CEO of The Points Guy, a travel advice site, said in an email. "There's been talk that some airlines could rebrand the Max as a 737-8 or Boeing 737-9 — which is different from the non-Max Boeing 737-800 or 737-900. That's something to look for." As it gets closer to their departure dates, passengers can request different flights, and the fare changes or ticket fees will be waived, the airlines said. They can also request refunds for refundable tickets. Nonrefundable tickets can be canceled and turned into credits for future flights. However, aircraft swaps can occur on the day of travel itself — so there is still a chance that a passenger who has opted not to fly on a Max will find that the jet is the only one available. For passengers who have concerns about the safety of a jet that has been out of action for months, there are several steps to return a flight to service. The planes will have to be removed from storage, maintenance checks will need to be performed, every plane will have to go through readiness flights, FAA approvals must be obtained, and pilots will have to undergo two additional hours of simulator training. "Bringing a grounded jet back into service involves a lengthy list of maintenance actions, inspections and operational flight tests, in addition to training pilots on updated software and emergency procedures approved by the FAA during the Max recertification," commercial pilot Marc Himelhoch said. "It will probably take a couple of months minimum for most airlines to get their pilots trained and accomplish all the logistics, maintenance and operational test flights required to get the planes back into revenue service," he said. Boeing said Wednesday that it has "worked closely with airlines, providing them with detailed recommendations regarding long-term storage and ensuring their input was part of the effort to safely return the airplanes to service." But winning back customer trust may prove to be more difficult than completely re-engineering a jet, as Boeing has done. "The real issue now for airlines is how they introduce it back into their systems in a way that builds confidence of the traveling public," aviation expert Mark Dombroff, a partner at the Fox Rothschild law firm, said in an email. "The aircraft is one of the most microscopically examined aircraft in the history of aviation," Dombroff said. "This has included focus by the manufacturer, the FAA, as well as non-US aviation authorities and the airline industry." Florida Tech Aviation Safety Expert Weighs in on Decision “Ungrounding” Boeing 737 MAX Shem Malmquist is a visiting professor at Florida Institute of Technology (Florida Tech) College of Aeronautics, an active B-777 captain and an expert on aviation safety. A noted accident-investigation expert, Malmquist says he still has questions for the FAA about the just-announced ungrounding--and says he remains concerned that all of the problems that led to the high-profile crashes that grounded the 737 MAX may not have been addressed.   Malmquist, who teaches advanced aircraft operations at Florida Tech, co-authored a new book on aviation safety and accident prevention. He says his concerns center around the fact that “there are some scenarios where the same type of accident could occur again despite the recent changes that have been implemented.” As part of his research for the new book, Malmquist reached out for information to determine if the changes to the 737 MAX were sufficient. “To date no one working at Boeing or the FAA on the upgraded MAX and its recertification has been able to answer our key questions fundamental to flight safety,” he says.   “While some airlines begin the process of camouflaging the identity of their Boeing 737 MAX jets, passengers want to know if they can board this ungrounded plane with confidence,” Malmquist says. “Our answer after writing a book on this subject and the future of aviation safety is that we don’t know.”  Shem Malmquist is available to weigh in on this developing story and can offer specific thoughts and insights on both problems and safety measures regarding this previously troubled airplane.