September 14, 2023
Ukraine’s drone strikes are a window into the future of warfare
On the night of August 29, Ukrainian kamikaze
drones penetrated more than 370 kilometers into Russia in a bold attack on
Russian airfields. The attack destroyed two of Russia’s roughly one hundred IL-76 heavy transport
aircraft and damaged two other planes. Up to twenty drones may have been
involved, reportedly launched from within Russia with either the knowledge or
oversight of Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Directorate. That same week,
Ukrainians used cardboard drones from Australian firm SYPAQ to damage a MiG-29 and four Su-30 fighters in Russia’s Kursk Oblast. And
this week, Ukraine reportedly used drones as part of a mission to destroy Russian S-400 and S-300
air-defense systems in Crimea.
Inexpensive do-it-yourself (DIY) drones such as
SYPAQ’s do not have the explosive power of artillery, cruise missiles, or
loitering munitions. However, these recent attacks demonstrate that small
drones can still have asymmetric strategic impacts. Only a fraction of drone
attacks need to be successful, and even small explosives can have outsized
effects. Parked aircraft are uniquely
vulnerable. Observers
should wonder what the advent of these weapons means for the future of warfare.
The capability for inexpensive long-range drone
strikes is not new, however. The drone technology for covert actors to cheaply
penetrate deep behind enemy lines, avoid electronic and kinetic defenses, and
precisely strike military targets has existed since roughly 2012. However,
integrating and operationalizing the technology has traditionally required
climbing a steep learning curve. This is especially true in a contested
battlefield environment.
Innovative Ukrainians are rapidly ascending this
learning curve in three ways: spreading knowhow, solving outstanding technical
challenges, and building companies to produce turnkey solutions at scale. As
the obstacles to adoption fall, observers should expect this technology to
proliferate both in Ukraine and abroad. Such attacks will likely now be a
routine feature of warfare.
The rise of small drone strikes
Long-range precision strike capability has long
been a holy grail for both military forces and violent nonstate actors. The
advent of the airplane made long-range strikes possible, but accuracy remained
a problem for decades. Even with human aircrew and technological aids such as
the Norden bombsight, bombing accuracy remained low in combat conditions,
driving a shift away from precision bombing and toward area bombing. Numerous
countries experimented with precision-guided munitions as early as World War I,
but most methods relied on human input via remote control. Inventors such
as Charles
Draper led enormous
efforts, with substantial government funding, to create inertial guidance
systems that would allow a weapon to autonomously navigate to precise
coordinates. The development of the Global Positioning System (GPS) in the
second half of the twentieth century brought a revolution in precision
navigation.
Small drone technology can be understood as the
culmination of this quest for precision strike capability. Whereas a
national-level effort was once required to solve the problem of precision,
anyone can now carry gyroscopes, accelerometers, and GPS receivers in their
pockets. Drone autopilots such as Cube or Pixhawk repackage these same mobile phone components in a specialized
flight controller. Running free open-source software stacks such as ArduPilot or PX4, these autopilots can precisely and autonomously navigate airplanes,
helicopters, quadcopters, ground vehicles, boats, submarines, or rockets to any
point on earth. These flight controllers have many positive uses, but they also
give any reasonably talented hobbyist the ability to create precision-guided
munitions for less than one thousand dollars apiece. Weaponization was
inevitable. I wrote in 2017 that parking aircraft worth hundreds of millions of
dollars where they might be stuck by drones was “akin to lining up battleships
at Pearl
Harbor.” With the advances since
then, that is even more true today.
The challenge of drones
Nonetheless, these long-range fixed-wing drone
strikes have been slow to proliferate, which might raise legitimate questions
about whether such warnings are overblown. After all, putting all the pieces
together into a working operational system still requires climbing a steep
learning curve. Anyone can
pilot a ready-to-fly DJI quadcopter, which is why these drones are now
ubiquitous on the battlefield. However, long-range missions typically require
fixed-wing aircraft, which are harder to build and fly. It takes a talented
team of engineers and operators to design and build reliable aircraft capable
of autonomous navigation and weapons release. Much like manned aviation, a
successful long-range drone flight requires a thousand details to work
correctly. A single mistake can result in mission failure, a flyaway, or a
crash.
Operating in a military context requires
overcoming even more difficult challenges. The Ukrainian-Russian border is
flooded with GPS jamming. Although off-the-shelf autopilots can navigate with a
compass and inertial guidance systems, the drift rates are high enough to cause
a mission failure without sophisticated custom code and other engineering hacks.
The jamming environment also means that datalinks are unlikely to work; worse,
a careless radio frequency (RF) transmission might be enough to invite a
Russian artillery strike on the pilot. Drone engineers and operators must learn
to fly “RF dark,” without datalinks at all. Although the technology to do this
is readily available, implementing it is difficult. The developers of
open-source drone software have deliberately avoided adding conflict-specific
capabilities to their codebases, for fear of weaponization, which has forced
wartime entrepreneurs to create their own solutions.
At an organizational level, operating drones at
scale requires building a bureaucracy to train and equip forces. This presents a vulnerability; just as
in the United States’ fight against the Islamic State’s improvised explosive
devices, adversaries will attack the network of human operators.
Climbing the learning curve
Despite these challenges, numerous nonstate actors
are making significant progress. The Islamic State developed a nascent
fixed-wing DIY drone program, and Syrian insurgents most likely used such
drones to launch
attacks on the Russian
airbase at Khmeimim in January 2018. Yemeni Houthis have used both airborne
drones and autonomous
boats to attack Saudi
targets.
The Ukrainians have been particularly adept at using
both air- and sea-based drones. Although many of these drones are
military-grade, low-cost DIY systems are clearly also part of the mix, and the
line between high-end and low-end systems has blurred. In February, Ukrainian drones penetrated deep into Russia and came within sixty
miles of Moscow. In May, two explosive drones targeted the Kremlin in what
Russian officials called a “terrorist attack.” Although Ukrainian officials
denied involvement, US intelligence agencies believe
otherwise. Ukrainians have also
used drone boats to great effect, recently damaging a Russian amphibious landing ship at the Black Sea port of
Novorossiysk. Last month’s attacks on parked aircraft are only the continuation
of this trend.
The future of Ukraine’s drone warfare innovation
The Ukrainians are now innovating at a
breathtaking pace. Three trends will make these attacks more frequent and
successful.
First, the Ukrainians are spreading technical
knowhow through both formal and informal channels. Government-led initiatives
such as the Army
of Drones have trained more
than ten thousand drone
operators in the past year. A large, decentralized network of engineers,
operators, and businesspeople now collaborate on research, development,
distribution, and employment. As Ukrainians circulate “best practices” for
employing drones, the barriers to entry will fall.
Second, Ukrainian engineers are creating
specialized technologies to make drones more effective on the battlefield. For
example, Ukrainians have modified open-source flight control software to
include sophisticated algorithms to detect GPS jamming and fall back on
alternative means of navigation. Some of these systems include vision-based
navigation, which is still at the technological frontier and difficult to use
in practice. Ukrainians are also developing artificial
intelligence-based algorithms for keeping locks on mobile targets even without a human
operator.
Third, Ukrainians and foreign partners are
creating new companies to provide inexpensive drone strike technology at scale.
A network of more
than two hundred decentralized
and often independently funded drone startups now operate in Ukraine. They
often manage their own international supply chains. Foreign suppliers,
rightfully eager to support Ukrainians in their righteous fight against Russian
aggression, are now providing turnkey solutions that lower the obstacles to
drone employment. The cardboard drones supplied by Australia’s SYPAQ are a case
in point. Ukraine-based One Way Aerospace, co-founded by British and Australian
veterans and a Ukrainian engineer, is now pitching low-cost
kamikaze drones.
In the crucible of Ukraine, knowhow is spreading
rapidly, and insatiable demand has unleashed powerful market forces. As a
result, long-range DIY drone strikes have become a feature of modern warfare.
Even as state-controlled military forces acquire and employ higher-end
autonomous systems, nonstate actors and grassroots auxiliaries will be able to
acquire their own inexpensive precision strike capability. Although Ukrainians
and their foreign supporters are focused on their own war, their tireless
innovation will usher in a new generation of DIY drone technology. In future
wars, the learning curve might not be so steep.
Mark Jacobsen is a nonresident senior fellow in
the Forward Defense program of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for
Strategy and Security. Jacobsen is the deputy director of Blue Horizons at the
Air Force’s Center for Strategy and Technology, an educational program that
prepares battle-ready entrepreneurs for the US Air Force.
The views expressed in this article are those of
the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US Air
Force, the Department of Defense, or the US Government.
Ingen kommentarer:
Legg inn en kommentar
Merk: Bare medlemmer av denne bloggen kan legge inn en kommentar.