ADS-B - Stadig nye spørsmål vedr. "cybersecurity" - AIN

Few Answers for ADS-B Security Concerns

Since the introduction of the 2020 ADS-B mandate in 2010, the FAA has addressed pricing, availability of technology, the amount of paperwork required, and a variety of other concerns. But it has yet to comprehensively address cybersecurity issues associated with ADS-B, which broadcasts aircraft position, velocity, and identification information. That data can be picked up via homebuilt sub-$100 ADS-B receivers that can connect to the Internet with the intent to crowdsource aircraft position data, subverting the need for the public FAA air traffic feed that also omits aircraft with blocked tail numbers. The leading idea for addressing blocking concerns is to change the aircraft ID transmitted by ADS-B so that it does not correspond to the airplane’s registration information. This solution preserves the benefits of ADS-B while resolving at least part of the aircraft identification concerns. There is no word on whether the FAA will approve this change. Additionally, the configuration of ADS-B raises additional data security questions. The most well-known cyber attack against ADS-B systems is spoofing, where false data is transmitted to make it seem like there are airplanes where there are none. There is no indication that the FAA will implement any encryption for ADS-B before the 2020 mandate. In the absence of encryption, many of the possible cyber attacks can be mitigated by cross-referencing ADS-B data with traditional radar information.