GPS signaler, de sivile, er lette å jamme eller påvirke på annen måte - AIN

 

Dersom du flyr nær konfliktområder, switch til INS som primært navigasjonshjelpemiddel og bakkebaserte tjenester dersom mulig. Har du ikke INS, sier du? Vel, da er det en svakhet ved systemet du bruker. Dobbel eller trippel INS bør være standard i dag. (Red.

Spoofing av det groveste slaget? KLM på ville veier. Flightradar24 kl2330. (Red.)

GPS Spoofing Incidents Increase in Middle East

OpsGroup said GPS spoofing continues to expand and increase, noting nearly 50 reports of fake signals impacting operators involving three different types of incidents.

It first sounded the alarm in September, saying it had received a dozen separate reports of aircraft being targeted with fake signals as they flew over Iraq near the Iranian border. In late October, reports flowed in from operations over the eastern Mediterranean, Egypt, and on approach to Amman, Jordan. In these cases, the aircraft showed a false position of being stationary over Tel Aviv Ben Gurion International Airport (LLBG) even though they actually were up to 212 nm away.

The latest GPS spoofing incidents now involve flights from LLBG that are being led toward Lebanon.

OpsGroup said this has been a “real-world discovery of a fundamental flaw in avionics design—if a GPS position signal is faked, most aircraft are incapable of detecting the ruse.” Complete loss of navigation occurs in some cases, while in others the fake signals have led to “subtle, undetected erroneous tracking." 

OpsGroup further said, “The industry has been slow to come to terms with the issue, leaving flight crews alone to find ways of detecting and mitigating GPS spoofing.” Key signs of spoofing include a rapid jump in estimated position uncertain figures, an EFIS warning related to navigation, and/or a significant change in the UTC clock time.