tirsdag 26. mars 2019

Helikopter - Ny motor for B525 - AIN

FAA Certifies New GE Engine for Bell 525

GE Aviation has received FAA type certification for the CT7-2F1, the 2,000-shp-class engine that will power the Bell 525 Relentless helicopter, the engine maker announced on Monday. “Achieving FAA certification is a great accomplishment for the CT7-2F1 program and the dedicated team involved,” said GE Aviation executive product manager Elissa Lee.
The engine’s features include a new improved-life high-pressure turbine, engine electronic control unit, a health and usage monitoring system (HUMS), and up to 2,129 shp for emergencies and 1,979 shp for takeoff. It is the latest variant of GE’s CT7/T700 engine family that has accumulated more than 100 million flight hours on civil and military rotorcraft and turboprop airplanes. 

Bell is aiming for certification of the super-medium twin by the end of the year. The fly-by-wire helicopter is designed to support customers in the oil-and-gas industry, search-and-rescue, emergency medical services, and VIP transport.

B737 MAX nødlandet på vei for parkering i ørkenen - ABC Nyheter


Boeing 737 MAX 8-fly måtte nødlande i USA
NTB
26. mars 2019 22:22 – Oppdatert 26. mars 2019 22:32
Del (1)TweetEpostEt Boeing 737 MAX 8-fly måtte tirsdag nødlande på vei fra Orlando til Victorville i California. Det var ikke passasjerer i flyet.
MAX 8-flyet landet trygt ved 19-tiden norsk tid etter å ha fått motorproblem. Problemene oppsto kort tid etter flyet tok av fra Orlando International Airport i Florida. Flyet fra Southwest Airlines skulle til Victorville i California.
Den amerikanske luftfartsmyndigheten (FFA) har satt flytypen på bakken, men tillater flyselskaper å fly med Boeing-modellen uten passasjerer for å flytte flyene mellom ulike lufthavner.
Flyet er av samme type som Ethiopian Airlines-flyet, som styrtet kort tid etter avgang. 157 mennesker omkom i flystyrten. Også Lion Air-flyet som styrtet i Indonesia i oktober i fjor, der 189 mennesker omkom, var et MAX 8-fly.
Ifølge den amerikanske luftfartsmyndigheten er det lite trolig at det datastyrte stabiliseringssystemet MCAS skal ha noe med denne nødlandingen å gjøre.
Stabiliseringssystemet mistenkes å ha vært en vesentlig faktor under flystyrten i Indonesia i 2018 og under flystyrten i Etiopia 9. mars. Boeing har etter styrten arbeidet med å rette programvarefeilen på flytypen.

Ethiopian havariet - Oppdatering - Curt Lewis

Boeing fix will prevent repeated activation of anti-stall system -sources

By Eric M. Johnson and Tim Hepher           


SEATTLE/LONDON, March 25 (Reuters) - A Boeing Co software fix for the grounded 737 MAX will prevent repeated operation of an anti-stall system at the centre of safety concerns and deactivate it altogether if two sensors disagree widely, two people familiar with pilot briefings said.

The anti-stall system - known as MCAS, or Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System - has been pinpointed by investigators probing October's fatal Lion Air crash and faces new scrutiny in the wake of another fatal accident in Ethiopia.

Those accidents, which killed nearly 350 people, triggered the worldwide grounding of Boeing's flagship 737 MAX aircraft and ignited a debate over the proper balance between man and machine in piloting the latest version of the 50-year-old 737.

The MAX has bigger engines, mounted further forward, which can force the plane's nose higher, threatening a stall. MCAS was designed to counter this but some experts say it overcompensated and the latest changes give some authority back to the pilot.

Airline briefings on the software upgrade, which is designed to address the situation faced by pilots of the doomed Lion Air jet last October, started on Saturday. 

Pilots have been told that the MCAS system - which forces the nose downwards to avoid a stall, or loss of lift - will only operate one time for each event rather than impose repeated corrections like those believed to have pushed the Lion Air jet into a dive, the two people familiar with the briefings said.

Additionally, MCAS will be disabled whenever two sensors that measure the 'angle of attack' - a parameter that determines how close a plane is to an aerodynamic stall - differ too much.

"Otherwise it would be garbage in, garbage out," a third person familiar with the briefings said.

This is a change from the previous set-up which only linked MCAS to one sensor at a time, ignoring the other, and which may have resulted in a single point of failure on Lion Air 610.

The pilot will be able to deduce that MCAS is no longer working in the background because the system will show a warning message labelled "AOA disagree", indicating the two sensors are producing values that differ by an excessive margin.
Previously the "AOA disagree" warning would not have halted the MCAS software because the system was designed to focus on either the left or right sensor, alternating between flights. It was oblivious to whether readings from the sensors were aligned.
Boeing said on Monday its software patch would incorporate more than one angle of attack input, limit trim commands and limit authority but gave few details.
"We've been working diligently and in close cooperation with the FAA on the software update. We are taking a comprehensive and careful approach to design, develop and test the software that will ultimately lead to certification," a statement said.

FAA APPROVAL NEEDED
The change sheds light on Boeing's previously reported decision to make the warning light a standard feature, since the change in flight control laws now makes it indispensable.

The third person said Boeing would need to give pilots in their training a full explanation of what the fix is and why it is being implemented. Both the software fix and the training have to be approved by the Federal Aviation Administration.

Other methods for holding the nose of the aircraft in the right position, known as manual or electric trim, are unchanged as is the ability to cut out the automated trim system altogether using a standard step-by-step checklist.

Boeing has previously said that existing crew procedures, which include using a pair of cut-out switches, would have addressed a condition known as a stabilizer trim runaway and by doing so, automatically deal with any problem with MCAS.

But it has faced criticism for designing a system that potentially out-runs the ability of pilots to recover by repeatedly forcing the nose down using hefty forces, as the pilots in the doomed Lion Air flight experienced. (
 
(Reporting by Eric M. Johnson in Seattle, Tim Hepher in London, Allison Lampert in Montreal; Editing by Lisa Shumaker)

Back to Top 
In Test of Boeing Jet, Pilots Had 40 Seconds to Fix Error


A 737 Max 8 at Boeing's plant in Renton, Wash. In simulations of a suspected problem in the crash of a Max 8 in Indonesia last fall, pilots had just moments to disengage a faulty system.CreditCreditRuth Fremson/The New York Times

During flight simulations recreating the problems with the doomed Lion Air plane, pilots discovered that they had less than 40 seconds to override an automated system on Boeing's new jets and avert disaster.

The pilots tested a crisis situation similar to what investigators suspect went wrong in the Lion Air crash in Indonesia last fall. In the tests, a single sensor failed, triggering software designed to help prevent a stall.

Once that happened, the pilots had just moments to disengage the system and avoid an unrecoverable nose dive of the Boeing 737 Max, according to two people involved in the testing in recent days. Although the investigations are continuing, the automated system, known as MCAS, is a focus of authorities trying to determine what went wrong in the Lion Air disaster in October and the Ethiopian Airlines crash of the same Boeing model this month.

The software, as originally designed and explained, left little room for error. Those involved in the testing hadn't fully understood just how powerful the system was until they flew the plane on a 737 Max simulator, according to the two people.

Compounding the flaws, pilots received limited training about the system before the first crash. During the final minutes, the captain of the Lion Air flight flipped through a technical manual trying to figure out what was happening.

In a tacit acknowledgment of the system's problems, Boeing is expected to propose a software update that would give pilots more control over the system and make it less likely to trigger erroneously, according to three people, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe the private meetings.

There are common procedures in place to counteract MCAS, as currently designed. If the system starts pushing the plane's nose down, pilots can reverse the movement via a switch at their thumb, a typical reaction in that situation. In doing so, they can potentially extend the 40-second window, giving them more time to avoid a crash.

To fully neutralize the system, pilots would need to flip two more switches. That would shut off the electricity to a motor that allows the system to push the plane toward the ground. Then the pilots would need to crank a wheel to correct whatever problems had emerged.

The pilots, in the simulations, followed such procedures to successfully shut off the system and land safely. But they did so with a far better understanding of how it worked and prior knowledge that it would be triggered - benefits that the pilots of the fatal 737 Max crashes did not have.

If pilots don't act hastily enough, attempts to disable the system can be too late. In the Lion Air crash, pilots used the thumb switch more than two dozen times to try to override the system. The system kept engaging nonetheless, most likely because of bad readings from a sensor, until the plane crashed into the Java Sea, killing all 189 people on board.

John Cox, an aviation safety consultant and a former 737 pilot, said pilots are highly likely to use the thumb switch to extend the 40-second window to several minutes. But that may still not be enough time to diagnose and solve the problem, especially if the pilots, like the Lion Air crew, were not informed of the system.

"There is a limited window to solve this problem, and this crew didn't even know that this system existed," he said.

A Boeing spokesman said that existing procedures for flying the 737 Max include how to respond to similar conditions. The spokesman added that Boeing had reinforced those procedures in a bulletin to pilots after the Lion Air crash.

"Our proposed software update incorporates additional limits and safeguards to the system and reduces crew workload," the spokesman said in a statement.

The new software system was designed to be a safety feature, operating in the background to help avoid a stall. Taking data from a sensor, the system would engage if the nose of the jet was too high. It would then push down the nose of the plane to keep it from stalling.

The planes flew in similar erratic patterns, suggesting to experts that an automated system might have malfunctioned on both flights.

In the current design, the system engages for 10 seconds at a time, with five-second pauses in between. Under conditions similar to the Lion Air flight, three engagements over just 40 seconds, including pauses, would send the plane into an unrecoverable dive, the two people involved in the testing said.

That conclusion agreed with a separate analysis by the American Airlines pilots' union, which examined available data about the system, said Michael Michaelis, the union's top safety official.

One of the people involved in the training said MCAS was surprisingly powerful once tested in the simulator. Another person found the system controllable because it was expected. Before the Lion Air crash, Boeing and regulators agreed that pilots didn't need to be alerted to the new system, and training was minimal.

At least some of the simulator flights happened on Saturday in Renton, Wash., where the 737 Max is built. Pilots from five airlines - American, United, Southwest, Copa and Fly Dubai - took turns testing how the Max would have responded with the software running as it was originally written, and with the updated version, known as 12.1.

In the simulations running the updated software, MCAS engaged, though less aggressively and persistently, and the pilots were also able to control the planes.

Boeing's software update would require the system to rely on two sensors, rather than just one, and would not be triggered if the sensors disagreed by a certain amount, according to the three people. Given that the 737 Max has had both sensors already, many pilots and safety officials have questioned why the system was designed to rely on a single sensor, creating, in effect, one point of failure.

The update would also limit the system to engaging just once in most cases. And it would prevent the system from pushing the plane's nose down more than a pilot could counteract by pulling up on the controls, the three people said.

In conversations with pilots and airline officials over the weekend, Boeing executives didn't directly address why MCAS was designed with such flaws, one person with direct knowledge of the meetings said. Instead, the company stayed focused on the software updated, the person said.

The software changes still require approval by the Federal Aviation Administration. Pilots' unions have said they are comfortable with the proposed changes but want to review them before making a decision. Pilots will be required to complete a training on the updated system on their iPads.

Norwegian wetleaser - Check-In


Boeing 737-800 fra Norwegian i Oslo Lufthavn. (Foto: Kristin S. Lillerud)

Norwegian: Vi bliver nødt til at wetlease

Norwegian har iværksat en række tiltag for at minimere antallet af aflysninger som følge af MAX-krisen, og nu går man i gang med at wetlease fly fra andre selskaber.
Norwegian har i lighed med andre Boeing 737 MAX-operatører i øjeblikket store logistiske udfordringer med at få trafikprogrammet til at gå op efter groundingen af 18 MAX-fly den 11. marts.

BA til Dusseldorf - Rolf Liland forklarer

En liten betraktning til historien om et British Airways-fly som landet i Edinburgh, mens passasjerene skulle til Dusseldorf.
Artig historie, men mens det er bilder av jumbojeter og liknende i artiklene, var dette et mindre fly, leaset inn fra et tysk utleieselskap.
Besetningen får arbeidsplanen sin fra arbeidsgiveren (i dette tilfelle det innleide tyske flyselskapet), og flyselskapet har også laget flygeplanen til dit flyet skal, og sendt dette inn til lufttrafikktjenesten, som gir klareringer i henhold til ruten flyselskapet har bedt om å få. Så besetningen drar der selskapet sier at de skal dra, som oftest, selv om vær og føre kan gjøre at de fra tid til annen havner et annet sted.
Så mens tyskerne fikk seg en snartur til Skottland på vei hjem, flygerne kunne "glede" seg over oppmerksomheten British Airways fikk på deres vegne og avislesere verden over fikk seg en god latter, går nok BA gjennom rutiner og kontrollfunksjoner for bestilling av flighter fra og i sine innleide underleverandører, mens underleverandører verden over nok tar en diskret titt på sine egne rutiner for å sikre at fly, besetning og passasjerer har sånn omtrentlig samme plan for hvilken by de skal begi seg til
(Det har vært mange episoder over årene; der man har fått øye på "feil" flyplass der man trodde destinasjonen lå. Det går som oftest bra, men noen ganger har det vært litt styr å få et stort transportfly opp fra en liten småflyplass, og når jeg tenker meg om "kjenner jeg en" som kjapt besøkte flygelederne på en vestlandsflyplass i tusen kilometer i timen i sin håpefulle ungdomstid, mens flygelederne på en annen flyplass i nærheten tålmodig ventet på et lowpass som aldri kom...).

Well Hoskins, I told you we should head east, not north..... Twitter

Vel, denne vil sitte i veggene hos BA en stund. Blame it on T. May (Red.)


BA flight lands in Edinburgh instead of Düsseldorf by mistake


Edinburgh and Dusseldorf Image copyright Getty Images
Image caption Edinburgh or Düsseldorf? Spot the difference
A British Airways flight destined for Düsseldorf in Germany has landed in Edinburgh by mistake, after the flight paperwork was submitted incorrectly.
The passengers only realised the error when the plane landed and the "welcome to Edinburgh" announcement was made.
The plane, which started at London's City Airport, was then redirected and landed in Düsseldorf. WDL Aviation ran the BA flight through a leasing deal.
BA said it was working with WDL to find out why it filed the wrong flight plan.
"We have apologised to customers for this interruption to their journey and will be contacting them all individually," BA said in a statement.
BA flight route map
On its final flight on Sunday, the plane flew to Edinburgh and back so it seems that someone at WDL mistakenly repeated the same flight plan for the next day, according to BA.
When the crew arrived at London City airport on Monday it is thought that they saw Edinburgh on the flight plan from the day before and followed the old flight route.
German firm WDL said it was "working closely with the authorities to investigate how the obviously unfortunate mix-up of flight schedules could occur". 

Kinas myndigheter elsker Airbus - Megaordre i Paris - Twitter

  • Airbus and China sign an agreement for the purchase of 290 A320s and 10 A350 jets by Chinese airlines during the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping in Paris