| Could Southwest Airlines Ever Operate An Airbus
Aircraft? Southwest Airlines is perhaps the most famous Boeing 737 operator in the world. Its entire fleet is made up of Boeing 737s. This includes the now-grounded Boeing 737 MAX. However, amid this grounding, could Southwest defect from Boeing and go for Airbus aircraft?  Could Southwest, known for its iconic Boeing 737 fleet, fly an Airbus aircraft? Photo: Southwest Airlines Southwest Airlines and the 737 Southwest loves its 737 aircraft. It is well known that no airline would ever pay a lower price for a Boeing 737 than Southwest as per a "handshake agreement." And, it seems that since then, Southwest has gotten pretty attractive pricing on 737s. According to its fleet page, the airline has over 750 Boeing 737s as of June 30, 2019. Most of these are Boeing 737-700s. However, a decent number of them are Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. Not to mention, Southwest has hundreds of MAX aircraft on order.  Southwest Airlines MAX nose Southwest Airlines has hundreds of 737 MAX aircraft on order. Photo: Southwest Airlines Onboard, the narrowbody is outfitted in a traditional 3-3 configuration. As a low-cost carrier, the airline operates an all-economy configuration. And, the airline is unique in that it does not offer pre-reservable seating. Rather, passengers select their seats once onboard. This helps reduce turnaround time, since passengers are more likely to show up on time for boarding in order to get a good seat. That is, avoid a middle seat. Earlier this year, it seemed that Southwest was looking at Airbus aircraft, specifically, the A220. Previously known as the Bombardier CSeries, the A220 is the smallest aircraft in Airbus' lineup. However, no orders followed.  Airbus A220 The Airbus A220 is the smallest passenger aircraft in terms of capacity in the Airbus lineup. Photo: Airbus The A220 does not directly compete with the Boeing 737. Rather, Airbus has its own narrowbody to compete. The Airbus A320ceo and next-generation Airbus A320neo are tailored to compete directly with the 737. A320 and C Series The Airbus A320 competes more directly with the 737 than the A220. Photo: Airbus Southwest could reasonably take on either aircraft. The A320 would fit more in terms of interior standardization since onboard the standard seating is in a 3-3 configuration. Meanwhile, the A220 is in a standard 2-3 configuration. However, the A220 could work if Southwest wants a smaller, 100-seater aircraft to fit more niche destinations in which a 737 or A320 would be too large. What message would it send if Southwest ordered Airbus aircraft? This would be a big shock to the industry, kind of like that of Delta's tie-up with LATAM. If Southwest were to order Airbus aircraft, it would send a signal that the airline is losing confidence in Boeing. Moreover, it could also take the shape of IAG's letter of intent with Boeing. In this case, it would give Southwest more freedom and flexibility outside of "Boeing captivity."  Airbus A320 If Southwest ordered Airbus aircraft, it would send a shockwave through the aviation world. Photo: Airbus Neither Southwest nor Airbus have announced any sort of order, letter of intent, or even proposal solicitation. Simple Flying reached out to Southwest, however, we did not hear back in time for publication. This article will be updated if we receive a comment from Southwest Airlines.Lion Air 737 MAX families set for crash report briefing  * Final report for families due Wednesday * No date given for public release (Adds background on 737 MAX grounding, preliminary crash report) JAKARTA, Oct 21 (Reuters) - Indonesia plans to share a final report into a deadly Boeing Co 737 MAX crash with the families of victims on Wednesday, according to a spokesman for the country's air accident investigator. A Lion Air 737 MAX jet crashed into the Java Sea shortly after take-off from Jakarta on Oct. 29, 2018, killing all 189 people on board. The 737 MAX was grounded worldwide following a second deadly crash in Ethiopia in March 2019. The families of victims of the first crash will be briefed before the report into the loss of Lion Air flight 610 is made public, Indonesian National Transportation Safety Commission (KNKT) press officer Anggo Anurogo told reporters on Monday. He did not provide a date for the public release. U.S. planemaker Boeing is under growing pressure to explain what it knew about 737 MAX problems before the aircraft entered service. A preliminary report into the Lion Air accident released last November focused on airline maintenance and training and the response of a Boeing anti-stall system to a recently replaced sensor but did not give a cause for the crash. Boeing last month settled the first claims stemming from the Lion Air crash, a U.S. plaintiffs' lawyer said. Three other sources told Reuters that families of those killed will receive at least $1.2 million each. The manufacturer is facing nearly 100 lawsuits over the Ethiopian Airlines crash on March 10 which killed all 157 people on board the flight from Addis Ababa to Nairobi. Boeing survey showed that employees felt pressure from managers on safety approvals
 The tail wing of an American Airlines plane pulls into its gate after arriving at the Miami International Airport. A 2016 internal survey at Boeing showed a third of employees polled felt "potential undue pressure" on the job, including for safety approvals, according to documents received by lawmakers investigating the manufacturer's 737 Max plane following two fatal crashes. Some employees in the commercial aircraft unit complained about high workloads and schedule pressure, showed the survey, which was based on 523 responses. The survey, reviewed by CNBC, wasn't conducted specifically about the 737 Max plane, which has been grounded since mid-March in the wake of two crashes - a Lion Air flight in Indonesia in October 2018 and an Ethiopian Airlines 737 Max in March - that killed all 346 people on the planes. The survey was received by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, which is investigating the beleaguered plane's development and the Federal Aviation Administration's approval of the jets, Boeing's best-seller, in 2017. The 2016 survey, conducted toward the end of the approval process for the planes, was not provided to the committee by Boeing. The survey, reported earlier by The Wall Street Journal, said some of the stresses were related to safety compliance activities. Certain Boeing employees performed certification tasks for the planes before the FAA's final signoff, a longstanding practice. Messages revealed concerns about 737 Max The latest revelation comes on the heels of a tough week for Boeing, which on Friday posted its worst day on Wall Street since February 2016 with a loss of 6.79%. The downturn on the week's final day of trading came after messages showed that a Boeing pilot warned about problems with the flight-control program on the 737 Max before the FAA approved the plane for public use in 2017. The Boeing pilot said in one of the messages that a flight-control system known as MCAS was difficult to control. In a 2016 exchange made public on Friday, a former top Boeing pilot warned a colleague that MCAS behaved aggressively in a simulator. Months later, the pilot told the FAA to delete MCAS from training materials, according to emails. That flight-control system and pilots' inability to recover from its failure have since come under fierce scrutiny by regulators after it was implicated in both crashes. It malfunctioned during both flights, repeatedly pushing the nose of each plane down until their final, fatal dives. The FAA publicly scolded Boeing for not releasing the messages earlier. "We are continuing to investigate the circumstances of this exchange, and are committed to identifying all the available facts relating to it, and to sharing those facts with the appropriate investigating and regulatory authorities," Boeing said in a statement on Sunday. The company defended its pilot training requirements for the 737 Max, which debuted in 2017. Some pilots complained that they weren't informed about MCAS until after the first crash. "We understand entirely the scrutiny this matter is receiving, and are committed to working with investigative authorities and the U.S. Congress as they continue their investigations," said Boeing's statement. Boeing did not immediately respond to a request for comment about the survey. The crashes have engulfed Boeing in regulatory and financial headwinds, aggravated by repeated reports over the course of the year that underscored the company's haste to get the aircraft to market. The Seattle Times in May reported that one senior Boeing engineer balked at management demands for looser testing of the fire-suppression system around the 737 Max's new engines. Boeing's board members were meeting on Sunday in San Antonio, Texas, days before the company's quarterly financial report on Oct. 23. Though speculation ranged as to what the board members could be discussing, a spokesperson for the company told CNBC that the board meets in person every other month at a Boeing facility and that the current meeting would conclude on Monday. Earlier this month, the company stripped CEO Dennis Muilenburg of his chairman role so he could focus more on running the company as the 737 Max controversy continues to play out. Muilenburg is scheduled to testify before Senate and House lawmakers on Oct. 29 and Oct. 30, respectively. It will be his first time before Congress since the crashes and lawmakers are expected to question Muilenburg about MCAS, Boeing's safety culture and how much of the 737 Max certification process was handled by Boeing instead of the FAA. |
Boeing expresses regret over ex-pilot's 737 MAX messages,
faults simulator
The Boeing logo is pictured at the LABACE fair in
Sao Paulo
SEATTLE/WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Boeing Co said on Sunday it
understood the outcry over leaked messages from a former test pilot over erratic
software behavior on its 737 MAX jet two years before recent crashes, and added
it was still investigating what they meant.
The world's largest
planemaker, under growing pressure to explain what it knew about 737 MAX
problems before it entered service, said it had not been able to speak directly
to former employee Mark Forkner but echoed his lawyer's subsequent claims that
the problems were linked to a faulty simulator.
The role of the simulator
has emerged as a crucial issue since the 2016 messages surfaced on Friday, since
investigators will want to know whether erratic movements reported by the pilot
meant Boeing was aware of problems on the aircraft itself or only in the
artificial cockpit.
The FAA on Friday ordered Boeing Chief Executive
Dennis Muilenburg to give an "immediate" explanation for the delay in turning
over the "concerning" document, which Boeing discovered some months
ago.
In the messages from November 2016, then-chief technical pilot
Forkner tells a colleague the so-called MCAS anti-stall system - the same one
linked to deadly crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia - was "running rampant" in a
flight simulator session.
At another point he says: "I basically lied to
the regulators (unknowingly)."
The messages, first reported by Reuters,
prompted a new call in Congress for Boeing to shake up its management as it
scrambles to rebuild trust and lift an eight-month safety ban of its
fastest-selling plane.
"We understand entirely the scrutiny this matter
is receiving, and are committed to working with investigative authorities and
the U.S. Congress as they continue their investigations," Boeing said in its
statement on Sunday.
Boeing said it informed the FAA about its decision
to expand MCAS to low speeds. The FAA also observed MCAS operation in the
low-speed configuration during certification flight testing, from August 2016
through January 2017, Boeing said.
The instant messages prompted harsh
reactions from several Democratic lawmakers in Washington, with Representative
Peter DeFazio saying, "This is no isolated incident."
"The outrageous
instant message chain between two Boeing employees" suggests "Boeing withheld
damning information from the FAA," DeFazio, who chairs the U.S. House
Transportation Committee, said on Friday.
Muilenburg, who was stripped of
his chairman title by the company's board nine days ago, is set to testify
before the committee on Oct. 30.
'UNDUE PRESSURE'
DeFazio's
committee also obtained details of a 2016 Boeing survey that found nearly 40% of
523 employees handling safety certification work perceived "potential undue
pressure" from managers, such as bullying or coercion.
Other top concerns
include "schedule pressure" and "high workload," though 90% of the employees
said they were comfortable raising concerns about "undue pressure" to
management, according to a copy of the Boeing presentation of the survey results
seen by Reuters on Sunday.
The presentation was obtained by the
committee's investigators and not among a trove of documents handed over the
committee by Boeing itself, a person briefed on the matter said.
Evidence
of "undue pressure" was also pinpointed by a group of international regulators
reviewing the 737 MAX certification.
A Boeing spokesman did not
immediately respond to a request for comment on the survey
results.
SIMULATOR FLAWS
On Sunday, Boeing said it has not been
able to speak to Forkner directly about his understanding of the
document.
"He has stated through his attorney that his comments reflected
a reaction to a simulator program that was not functioning properly and that was
still undergoing testing," Boeing said.
"The simulator software used
during the Nov. 15 session was still undergoing testing and qualification and
had not been finalized," Boeing added.
Reuters reported on Friday that
the simulator had a number of software problems, citing a former Boeing test
pilot who analyzed the transcript and who had direct knowledge of the flight
simulator at the time.
Such calibration problems may have contributed in
some way to Forkner's observations and conclusions about MCAS' behavior, the
former pilot, and a second former Boeing engineering employee, Rick Ludtke,
said.
Boeing's statement was released as its board of directors and top
executives from its airplanes division and supply chain gathered in San Antonio,
Texas for previously scheduled meetings on Sunday and Monday.
The board
meetings come as pressure mounts on the Chicago-based company not only from the
regulatory and criminal investigations stemming from the crashes but also from
the financial burden caused by the jet's safety ban and continued high
production.
Several industry sources said there was speculation inside
the company of significant job cuts as it continues to experience a cash drain.
The 737 production rate may also have to come down if regulators further delay
the MAX's return to service, the people said.
The Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) - Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control System
Introduction
The Review was commissioned by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as a direct consequence of their recognition in the aftermath of the two fatal accidents to Boeing 737 MAX-8 aircraft in Indonesia on 29 October 2018 and in Ethiopia on 10 March 2019, that the type certification process as applied to the flight control system of the 737 MAX-8 and MAX-9 was likely to have played a significant part in their causation.
The Review Team consisted of technical representatives from the FAA, NASA, EASA and the Civil Aviation Authorities of Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Indonesia, Japan, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates. It was Chaired by a former Chairman of the NTSB and conducted its work between May and September 2019 before presenting its completed report to the FAA on 11 October 2019. In accordance with the instructions given by the FAA, the Review was not required to produce a Report and limited itself to documenting Observations and Findings in support of a series of Recommendations. It formally defined these terms as follows:
It was noted that not all Findings and Observations had necessarily resulted in Recommendations.
Recommendations
A total of 12 Main Recommendations were made.
The First 5 Recommendations concerned “The Certification Process” and were as follows:
Based on the JATR team’s observations and findings related to the application of the Changed Product Rule to the certification of the flight control system of the B737 MAX, JATR team members recommend that the FAA work with other civil aviation authorities to revise the harmonized approach to the certification of changed products. Changed Product Rules (e.g., 14 CFR §§ 21.19 & 21.101) and associated guidance (e.g., Advisory Circular 21.101-1B and FAA Orders 8110.4C and 8110.48A) should be revised to require a top-down approach whereby every change is evaluated from an integrated whole aircraft system perspective. These revisions should include criteria for determining when core attributes of an existing transport category aircraft design make it incapable of supporting the safety advancements introduced by the latest regulations and should drive a design change or a need for a new type certificate. The aircraft system includes the aircraft itself with all its subsystems, the flight crew, and the maintenance crew.
These Changed Product Rule revisions should take into consideration the following key principles:
Based on the JATR team’s observations and findings related to the regulations, policy, and compliance methods applied to the B737 MAX, JATR team members recommend that the FAA update regulations and guidance that are out of date and update certification procedures to ensure that the applied requirements, issue papers, means of compliance, and policies fully address the safety issues related to state-of-the-art designs employed on new projects. JATR team members also recommend that the FAA review its processes to ensure that regulations and guidance materials are kept up to date. [Recommendation R2]
Based on the JATR team’s observations and findings related to the certification of the B737 MAX flight control system and related interfaces, JATR team members recommend that the FAA review the B737 MAX compliance to 14 CFR §§ 25.1329 (Flight Guidance System), 25.1581 (Airplane Flight Manual – General), and 25.201 (Stall Demonstration) and ensure the consistent application and interpretation of regulatory guidance material for the system safety assessment, handling qualities rating method, and conformity requirements for engineering simulators and devices. Should there be a non-compliance, the root cause should be identified and measures implemented to prevent recurrence. [Recommendation R3]
Based on the JATR team’s observations and findings related to the FAA type certification process, JATR team members recommend that the FAA review and update the regulatory guidance pertaining to the type certification process with particular emphasis on early FAA involvement to ensure the FAA is aware of all design assumptions, the aircraft design, and all changes to the design in cases where a changed product process is used. The FAA should consider adding feedback paths in the process to ensure that compliance, system safety, and flight deck/human factors aspects are considered for the aircraft design throughout its development and certification. [Recommendation R4]
Based on the JATR team’s observations and findings related to FAA’s oversight by the Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office (BASOO), JATR team members recommend that the FAA conduct a workforce review of the BASOO engineer staffing level to ensure there is a sufficient number of experienced specialists to adequately perform certification and oversight duties, commensurate with the extent of work being performed by Boeing. The workforce levels should be such that decisions to retain responsibility for finding compliance are not constrained by a lack of experienced engineers.
The FAA should review the Boeing Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) work environment and ODA manual to ensure the Boeing ODA engineering unit members (E-UMs) are working without any undue pressure when they are making decisions on behalf of the FAA. This review should include ensuring the E-UMs have open lines of communication to FAA certification engineers without fear of punitive action or process violation. [Recommendation R5]
The next 3 Recommendations concerned the “Integrated Approach to Development and Certification” and were as follows:
Based on the JATR team’s observations and findings related to the design process of the flight control system and the related system safety assessments for the B737 MAX, JATR team members recommend that the FAA promote a safety culture that drives a primary focus on the creation of safe products, which in turn comply with certification requirements. Aircraft functions should be assessed, not in an incremental and fragmented manner, but holistically at the aircraft level. System function and performance, including the effects of failures, should be demonstrated and associated assumptions should be challenged to ensure robust designs are realized. The safety analysis process should be integrated with the aircraft development assurance process to ensure all safety requirements and associated assumptions are correct, complete, and verified. The FAA should encourage applicants to have a system safety function that is independent from the design organization, with the authority to impartially assess aircraft safety and influence the aircraft/system design details. Adoption of a safety management system is one way this can be achieved. [Recommendation R6]
Based on the JATR team’s observations and findings related to human factors-related issues in the certification process, JATR team members recommend that the FAA integrate and emphasize human factors and human system integration throughout its certification process. Human factors-relevant policies and guidance should be expanded and clarified, and compliance with such regulatory requirements as 14 CFR §§ 25.1302 (Installed Systems and Equipment for Use by the Flightcrew), 25.1309 (Equipment, Systems, and Installations), and 25.1322 (Flightcrew Alerting) should be thoroughly verified and documented. To enable the thorough analysis and verification of compliance, the FAA should expand its aircraft certification resources in human factors and in human system integration. [Recommendation R7]
Based on the JATR team’s observations and findings related to the development assurance process applied to the design of the flight control system of the B737 MAX, JATR team members recommend that the FAA ensure applicants apply industry best practice for development assurance, including requirements management, visibility of assumptions, process assurance activities, and configuration management. The FAA should ensure achievement of the close coupling that is required between the applicant safety analysis process and the development assurance process to classify failure conditions and derive the level of rigor of design development and verification. A current example of industry best practice is SAE International’s Aerospace Recommended Practice 4754A (ARP4754A).
The FAA should review and amend Advisory Circular 20-174 to clearly articulate the principles of ARP4754A, promoting industry best practice for development assurance of aircraft and aircraft systems to address applicants’ design trend of increasing integration between aircraft functions and systems. [Recommendation R8]
The next 3 Recommendations concerned the “Impact of Design Changes on Operations and Training” and were as follows:
Based on the JATR team’s findings and observations related to the operational design assumptions of crew response applied during the certification process for the flight control system of the B737 MAX, JATR team members recommend that the FAA require the integration of certification and operational functions during the certification process. The FAA should be provided all system differences between related aircraft in order to adequately evaluate operational impact, systems integration, and human performance. [Recommendation R9]
Based on the JATR team’s findings and observations related to flight crew training, JATR team members recommend that the FAA require a documented process to determine what information will be included in the Airplane Flight Manual, the Flight Crew Operating Manual, and the Flight Crew Training Manual. The FAA should review training programs to ensure flight crews are competent in the handling of mis-trim events. [Recommendation R10]
JATR team members recommend that the FAA conduct a study to determine the adequacy of policy, guidance, and assumptions related to maintenance and ground handling training requirements. [Recommendation R11]
The final Recommendation concerned “Post-Certification Activities” and was as follows:
JATR team members recommend that the FAA review its policies for analyzing safety risk and implementing interim [[Airworthiness Directive|airworthiness directive] action following a fatal transport aircraft accident. The FAA should ensure that it shares post-accident safety information with the international community to the maximum extent possible. [Recommendation R12]
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