MAX oppdatering - Curt Lewis

The 737 Max has cost Boeing $9.2 billion and counting A photo of Boeing 737 MAX airplanes parked on the tarmac at the Boeing Factory in Renton Farnborough 2016 - Foto: Per Gram More than 1,500 hours of safety tests later, the Boeing 737 Max is still as grounded as ever, with no real guidance on precisely when it will hit the skies again. For the airplane's manufacturer, it's all getting very, very, very expensive. In the third quarter of 2019, according to an earnings report today (Oct. 23), the plane's continued grounding cost Boeing $900 million, bringing the total to $9.2 billion, since two fatal crashes between them killed nearly 350 people in March. Boeing still managed to make $1.2 billion in profit in the quarter, largely due to an uptick in higher defense and services revenue. In the same quarter last year, it made $2.4 billion. Max-related losses are rippling throughout the aviation sector: Boeing's US airline customers estimate they've lost hundreds of millions since the plane was grounded at the start of the year, Earlier this month, the Southwest Airlines Pilots Association announce it would sue Boeing for $100 million in lost income. Boeing has already committed to paying out $5 billion after tax in compensation to airlines, though it's not yet clear whether this will come in the form of discounts or other benefits. (Either way, the approximately 10,000 pilots in the union probably won't see much of it.) While the company was reluctant to issue much by way of detailed advisory today, it says it expects the plane to be back in the air before the end of the year. This is broadly in line with the estimates of US airlines: As of earlier this month, American Airlines said it expected the Max to return to service on January 16, while United Airlines had a more ambitious expected date of January 6. Southwest, meanwhile, has removed it from its schedules entirely until at least February.

FACTBOX-Nine factors that contributed to Lion Air 737 MAX crash Oct 23 (Reuters) - Mechanical and design issues are among nine sets of factors that contributed to the crash of a Boeing 737 MAX jet operated by Lion Air last October, Indonesian investigators have found. Following is a transcript of slides presented by officials to relatives at a briefing on Wednesday, obtained by Reuters, together with an unofficial explanation of key technical terms. The full report will be released on Friday . CONTRIBUTING FACTORS 1. During the design and certification of the Boeing 737-8 (MAX), assumptions were made about pilot response to malfunctions which, even though consistent with current industry guidelines, turned out to be incorrect. 2. Based on the incorrect assumptions about pilot response and an incomplete review of associated multiple flight deck effects, MCAS's reliance on a single sensor was deemed appropriate and met all certification requirements. 3. MCAS was designed to rely on a single AOA sensor, making it vulnerable to erroneous input from that sensor. 4. The absence of guidance on MCAS or more detailed use of trim in the flight manuals and in pilot training, made it more difficult for flight crews to properly respond to uncommanded MCAS. 5. The AOA DISAGREE alert was not correctly enabled during Boeing 737-8 (MAX) development. As a result, it did not appear during flight with the mis-calibrated AOA sensor, could not be documented by the flight crew and was therefore not available to help maintenance identify the mis-calibrated AOA sensor. 6. The replacement AOA sensor that was installed on the accident aircraft had been mis-calibrated during an earlier repair. The mis-calibration was not detected during the repair. 7. The investigation could not determine that the installation test of AOA sensor was perform(ed) properly; however the mis-calibration was not detected. 8. Lack of documentation in the aircraft flight and maintenance log about the continuous stick shaker and use of the Runaway Stabilizer NNC meant that information was not available to the maintenance crew in Jakarta nor was it available to the accident crew, making it more difficult for each to take the appropriate actions. 9. The multiple alerts, repetitive MCAS activations and distractions related to numerous ATC communications were not able to be effectively managed. This was caused by the difficulty of the situation and deficiencies in manual handling, NNC execution and flight crew communication, leading to ineffective CRM application and workload management. These deficiencies had previously been identified during training and reappeared during the accident flight. GLOSSARY Following is an unofficial explanation of the abbreviations used, based on previous Reuters reports and industry documents. AOA: Angle of Attack, a key flight parameter which indicates the angle between the wings and the oncoming flow of air. If the angle becomes too high, the aircraft can stall or lose lift. The data is drawn from two sensors, one on which side of the nose. AOA DISAGREE: An indicator, optional at the time in the 737 MAX, indicating the two AOA sensors are producing values that differ by an excessive margin. Boeing plans to make this feature standard as part of a redesign following the Lion Air accident and a separate crash five months later in Ethiopia. ATC: Air Traffic Control CRM: Crew Resource Management, a method of coordination between pilots designed to improve their responses to errors and reduce stress. It was developed in response to earlier crashes and is now a standard part of pilot training and procedures. MCAS: Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), a flight control software patch designed to lower the nose of the aircraft when there is an elevated Angle of Attack. It was developed for the latest version of 737, the MAX, to compensate for the tendency of the plane's nose to drift higher due to the size and shape of the its newer and larger engines. Boeing has redesigned the software in order to soften its impact and prevent repeated misfirings. NNC: Non-Normal Checklist or problem-solving procedure. RUNAWAY STABILIZER: Uncommanded movements of the plane's horizontal stabilizers - small wings near the bottom of the tail that are designed to control the pitch or up/down movement. (Reporting by Fanny Potkin, Jessica Damiana, Bernadette Christina Munthe, Tim Hepher Editing by Nick Zieminski)

Ex-Boeing Pilot Complained of Management Pressure on MAX, Former Colleagues Say Mark Forkner, a former senior Boeing Co. pilot who was publicly vaulted into the company's 737 MAX crisis, complained years ago that he felt pressure from management to ensure the series of jets wouldn't require expensive pilot training, according to former colleagues. Mr. Forkner, who at the time was the chief technical pilot for the MAX and who is a focus of a federal probe of the jet's development, became well-known Friday when internal messages that Boeing turned over to congressional investigators suggested he might have had concerns about the plane's flight-control system after encountering some problems in a simulator. Federal agents have in the past few months questioned Mr. Forkner's former co-workers and supervisors about their efforts to develop the 737 MAX, the latest version of Boeing's best-selling jet, according to people familiar with the matter. Some of the questions are related to his successful effort in 2016 and 2017 to persuade the Federal Aviation Administration not to require extra simulator sessions before allowing MAX pilots to fly passengers, one of these people said. Mr. Forkner's attorney David Gerger declined to address questions about his client, who is now assisting with technical matters at Boeing's largest MAX customer, Southwest Airlines Co. Mr. Gerger told The Wall Street Journal on Monday: "Mark flew the MAX. His Air Force buddies flew the MAX. He would never put himself, his friends or any passenger in an unsafe plane." According to a fellow pilot who had worked closely with Mr. Forkner at Boeing, Mr. Forkner repeatedly indicated to this ex-colleague that he feared losing his job if the FAA rejected Boeing's arguments to minimize training, and the fellow pilot recalled making that point in an interview with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. That interview is part of the widening Justice Department probe into how the MAX was designed and certified as safe by the FAA and whether Boeing officials may have misled regulators as part of that process. Boeing didn't respond to a request for comment about pressure on Mr. Forkner. Over the weekend, the company said it was still investigating the circumstances surrounding the internal messages. "We understand entirely the scrutiny this matter is receiving and are committed to working with investigative authorities and the U.S. Congress as they continue their investigations," the company said. A Justice Department spokesman declined to comment. On Tuesday, Boeing removed Kevin McAllister as head of its commercial airplanes unit, making him the highest-profile departure from the company since the MAX crisis. The FBI, which is working with the Transportation Department's inspector general's office, is looking into whether inaccurate statements, incomplete technical submissions or undue management pressure inside Boeing contributed to two fatal crashes of MAX jets in less than five months, according to people familiar with the situation. The misfire of an automated flight-control feature known as MCAS led to the accidents that took a total of 346 lives and grounded the global fleet in March. Mr. Forkner's responsibilities at Boeing focused on pilot-training issues and devising manuals for the fleet. One of his main objectives was to make sure airlines purchasing the MAX wouldn't have to pull pilots off moneymaking passenger flights for additional training. Rick Ludtke, a former Boeing flight deck engineer who worked with Mr. Forkner, said: "Mark was under an enormous amount of pressure....He clearly was stressed." Some of Mr. Forkner's former colleagues recall him as an honest co-worker who wasn't able to fly much at Boeing because of labor disputes and budget issues affecting the group he worked in. One former colleague described him as someone with the character to take a stand over safety issues. The fellow pilot said some co-workers were surprised when Mr. Forkner, known as an avid Seattle Seahawks football fan, took the Southwest job and relocated to the Dallas region, leaving a large group of relatives behind. When Mr. Forkner's internal Boeing messages to another pilot emerged Friday, Southwest Airlines Pilots Association President Jon Weaks said the messages showed "Boeing misled pilots, government regulators and other aviation experts about the safety of the 737 MAX." Southwest has pulled the MAX from its schedules through early February. In the documents that congressional investigators have gathered, which total hundreds of thousands of pages, is a Boeing marketing brochure for the MAX that advertised the jet wouldn't require significant additional pilot training, according to Rep. Peter DeFazio, the Oregon Democrat who chairs the House Infrastructure and Transportation Committee. Boeing has said that was a design objective "always subordinate to other requirements, including safety." Among the documents, which total in the hundreds of thousands of pages, congressional investigators have gathered is a Boeing marketing brochure for the MAX that advertised the jet wouldn't require significant additional pilot training, according to Rep. Peter DeFazio, the Oregon Democrat who chairs the House Infrastructure and Transportation Committee. Boeing has said that was a design objective "always subordinate to other requirements, including safety." Southwest, with some 10,000 pilots, years ago signed what Mr. Ludtke has called an unusual deal for a Boeing customer: a $1 million rebate for any aircraft that required extra simulator training for cockpit crews. Investigators for the House panel also have documents verifying that arrangement, according to a person familiar with the committee's work. Mr. DeFazio said Mr. Forkner has declined to meet with congressional investigators. A Southwest spokeswoman said its MAX contract was a "very standard agreement" that "holds parties accountable to previously determined benefits of launching a new aircraft type." The union representing pilots at Southwest have sued Boeing, alleging that the plane maker rushed its 737 MAX jet to market and misrepresented the plane as safe. Boeing has said it respects the Southwest pilots but it will defend itself against the suit. Southwest had 34 MAX jets in its fleet at the time of the grounding and was supposed to have around twice as many by the end of the year. Mr. Forkner hasn't been interviewed by Boeing, the company has said. In September, an FBI agent told one of the former co-workers of Mr. Forkner that he hadn't cooperated with questioning, the fellow pilot said. Mr. Gerger declined to comment. Boeing has tried for months to interview Mr. Forkner about what he meant in the messages, a person familiar with the company's internal review of the matter said. People familiar with the matter said Boeing and Mr. Forkner don't have a joint defense agreement, indicating that their interests might not be aligned and that they aren't routinely sharing documents or other information. Instant messages between Mr. Forkner and a colleague in November 2016 were lighthearted and technical by turns and started with banter about drinking vodka in a hotel room. Later in the exchange, Mr. Forkner said: "So I basically lied to the regulators (unknowingly)," apparently referring to how engineers modified the MCAS flight-control system. Mr. Gerger has said Mr. Forkner was referring to a malfunctioning simulator program, not problems with the MCAS feature itself. In January 2017, Mr. Forkner said in an email to the FAA that all mention of MCAS should be removed from manuals because the flight control system activates "way outside the normal operating envelope," meaning pilots would practically never experience its activation. An earlier email included Mr. Forkner's mention of his skill at "Jedi-mind tricking" foreign regulators into adopting the FAA's position on training requirements. Mr. Forkner's internal messages have sparked condemnation on Capitol Hill, where Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg is slated to testify before two panels next week. They have also further strained an already tense relationship between Boeing and the FAA. During the time of the internal messages, four months before U.S. regulators in March 2017 approved MAX to begin commercial service, Mr. Forkner sent a separate message from his official Boeing email account to an FAA official about working to certify the jet with the FAA and foreign regulators. "It was a huge deal, but I got what I needed to, at least so far," he wrote. The message ended with: "You know me. I usually get what I want." The name of the recipient was blacked out in the copy, which was among a batch of emails obtained by congressional investigators and which was reviewed by The Wall Street Journal. Over the weekend, Boeing said various FAA officials knew about MCAS's final configuration regardless of what Mr. Forkner said in chat messages or emails. The company said Mr. Forkner's counterparts at the FAA were exposed to the modified system on test flights starting a few months before his chat messages. The FAA has said it continues to review the MAX's approval and outside recommendations to improve the agency's certification procedures. At Southwest, Mr. Forkner has worked on regulatory and MAX issues, people familiar with the airline said, sometimes shaping discussions between the FAA and Southwest's management. The Southwest spokeswoman said Mr. Forkner has worked on various projects as part of the flight operations technical team but hasn't worked as a leader on the airline's plans to return the MAX to passenger service.