The tragic
loss of Ukraine
International Airlines flight PS752, a Boeing
737-800 with 176 souls on board, increasingly appears to
have been a horrific mistake. Video of the
airliner careening into the ground ablaze at around 6:12AM local time on
January 8th, 2020 has permeated news headlines. It has also served as an
unexpected and horrific aftershock to the unprecedented
Iranian missile strikes on U.S.
forces in Iraq that occurred just a
few hours prior. Many are asking how an airliner taking off normally from a
major international airport located on the outskirts of a capital city could
simply be swatted out of the sky. Clearly, nobody has the complete answer to
that question at this time, but there is certainly a lot to comprehend and
ponder until we do.
The Mindset Of Iranian Air Defenders
I don't think
most people comprehend just how unique the situation was and had been for those
tasked with defending Iranian airspace at the time of the supposed shootdown.
For nearly a week, Iran's air defense network had been on high alert. Following
the airstrikes
on Iranian-backed forces in Iraq and
the assassination
of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, the
biggest crisis between the U.S. and the country in decades was unfolding. The rhetoric
between the two bitter foes had quickly reached new heights with direct threats
from President Trump about
striking 52 target sets, some of which could
include cultural sites important to the Iranian people and regime. American
military might, including
heavy airpower, was pouring in the region. A spark could ignite
a war at any time—even one caused by a relatively minor miscalculation.
An aerial
blitz, even a limited one, from the U.S. would look unlike anything Iranian air
defenders had ever seen. The U.S. relies heavily on stealth technology, electronic
warfare, and pointed cyber attacks that could make a
familiar radar scope look alien in an instant. Stealthy aircraft and cruise
missiles may appear fleetingly on those same scopes depending on the range,
aspect, and type of sensor trying to track and engage them. Getting a shot off
fast may be the only way of attempting to counter such a threat, if you are
lucky enough to ever detect it at all.
Iran's
military forces are far from homogeneous in quality and readiness. It is hard
to predict how proficient the individuals at the controls of any given Iranian
surface-to-air missile battery truly are, especially during a crisis when
reserve forces are activated. The system suspected of shooting down the
airliner, the relatively short-range Tor-M1, is not a high-end weapon, it is
used mainly for point defense and for accompanying ground forces on the move.
The quality of operator is likely significantly lower than those found in
Iran's long-range air-defense units that operate more capable and higher-end
strategic air defenses, such
as the S-300 and other indigenous systems.
After a week of being on extreme alert already
wearing down their effectiveness, and with their country having just launched a
truly unprecedented ballistic missile strike on U.S. forces in Iraq, even
though the American president swore vengeance if such a strike were to occur,
the stress and fatigue levels were likely very palpable. In
fact, the ballistic missiles flew into Iraq at roughly 3AM local time and dawn
was coming soon when the 737 went down three hours later. That makes for a
long, very tense night after a long tense week, and if the U.S. were to retaliate,
those weapons would arrive before sunrise. For the Iranian air defenders, the
window of vulnerability was closing, but as a result, the risk of such a strike
was also being compressed into that shrinking timeframe and magnified.
For the
personnel sitting in that cramped road-mobile air defense system on the western
approaches to Iran's capital city, which is rife with relevant targets, it
would be an immeasurably nerve-racking situation that they would found
themselves in around 6AM on January 8th, 2020. Their SAM system was radiating
gobs of RF emissions and positioned in the likely flight path of incoming
American combat aircraft and missiles, making them a certain target for combat
jets tasked with clearing an avenue for other attacks. Their radar, blazing
like a bright flashlight in a dark room, was literally telling hostile forces
where their location is, what they are, and that they need to be destroyed.
Under those circumstances, death would likely come by a Mach 2 flying
AGM-88 High-Speed
Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) launched off
an F-16CJ or more likely via a slower, but highly accurate GBU-39 Small
Diameter Bomb launched from the weapons bay of a stealthy F-35.
It was one horrible place to be and the worst time
to be in it. It was also a breeding ground of circumstances that invites a
hair-trigger and potentially devastating miscalculation.
Technical Unknowns
Beyond the
human factors involved, there are major technological unknowns that could have
contributed to such a disaster. Iran imported just over a couple of dozen
Tor-M1 air defense systems from Russia in 2007. So, these aren't ancient SAM
systems necessarily, but just how modern they were when they got delivered and
what upgrades or tinkering they have been through, isn't widely known, nor is
their overall mechanical condition. The tinkering part is key as Iran has
a fairly
remarkable albeit at
times puzzling organic weapons development industry that
has been known to clone foreign systems into local production. They also modify
foreign weapon systems to better suit their needs and sustainability demands.
How much modification work had occurred on these systems in the 12 years since
they have been delivered or how such work has modified their effectiveness, one
way or another, is another unanswered question.
More
importantly, we don't know exactly how deeply intertwined the Tor-M1 units are
with Iran's greater integrated
air defense system (IADS). In other words, the degree to which
a Tor-M1 battery was operating independently of a greater aerial surveillance
and command and control architecture is unknown, but it is a key factor that
could have contributed to making such a mistake. I would bet that this system
was operating without the benefit of any deep integration with a large IADS,
which makes some sense when you think about its primary road-mobile,
infantry-guarding mission set. Clearly, if indeed an Iranian SAM took the plane
down, the crew's situational awareness was compromised, both
in terms of the overall tactical picture and what was going on with normalized
air traffic in the immediate vicinity of the battery. We know for a fact that
multiple flights continued to depart in the hours following Iran's missile
barrage and leading up to the shoot-down, so it's not like the 737 appeared
following a lengthy pause in operations at the nearby airport.
Then there is the question of technical issues
with the battery itself. The doomed 737 was doing exactly what a 737 would when
departing from that airport. The Tor operators would have seen that flight
profile so many times that it would be burned into their consciousness—that is
if the crew was familiar with the area. But even still, they watched the
flights depart before the 737, and they didn't shoot those down. With all this
in mind, it seems probable more than possible that some sort of mix of
malfunctioning gear and/or a lack of networking, paired with glaring human
factors, lowered the crew's ability to distinguish friend or foe and make
quality decisions under complex circumstance to the point of catastrophe.
Sad Precedent
The depressing
truth is that these types of incidents are hardly unheard of. The shooting down
of MH17
over Eastern Ukraine surely comes to mind first. There are some
similarities with this incident and the SA-11 Buk system used in that
engagement is more akin to the SA-15 Tor-M1 than not. If the battery was
operating independently of a greater integrated air defense network, that would
also be another parallel.
But it isn't just about America's adversaries
possessing potentially lower quality of gear, less well-trained personnel, and
making blundering decisions under stress. Case in point, the American guided
missile cruiser USS Vincennes infamously shot down Iran Air
Flight 655 in 1988 during another highly tense situation. The ship was equipped
with the most modern air defense system the world had ever seen and was staffed
with a crew made up of sailors from world's preeminent Navy, yet still, a
confluence of stress, timing, and confusion, often referred to as the "fog
of war," resulted in the deaths of 290 innocent people.
During a
running gunfight with Iranian fast boats, the cruiser's crew mistook the Airbus
A300, which was squawking properly and had been in English communication with
air traffic control as normal just seconds before being shot down during its
short flight between Bandar Abas and Dubai, for an Iranian F-14 Tomcat on a
bombing run. The Airbus's low altitude route, maxing out at around 14,000 feet,
for the short flight, was a contributing factor to the confusion, although the
Airbus was not even descending at the time the SM-2 missile struck it. Bandar
Abas was also a major operating point for Iranian Tomcats. There were a number
of other contributing factors, as well, which you can read
all about here, including communications issues and unanswered
warnings from the Vincennes. Regardless, it was a terrible thing
that neither side wanted to see happen.
The loss of the Airbus A300 is still very visceral
to the Iranian people and the regime uses the tragedy to stir-up anti-American
sentiment to this very day. But above all else, the incident should work as a
reminder that it isn't always just failed or dated technology and badly trained
personnel that can cause such a disaster. A series of unfortunate factors and
missed opportunities for recognizing major issues can truly create a deadly
cocktail that gets stirred up and poured too fast to realize what was even
drank.
Beyond this
especially relevant example, there are plenty of friendly fire incidents by
various militaries, including the U.S. and its allies, where even the most
advanced radar systems and military aircraft equipped with specialized
identification friend or foe (IFF) gear couldn't stave off tragedy. Whether it
be the
loss of a RAF Tornado GR.4 to an American
Patriot battery during the opening of Operation Iraqi Freedom or the shooting
down of
an Indian Mi-17 helicopter by an Indian
surface-to-air missile during last year's flare-up of aerial violence with
Pakistan near Kashmir, there is a well-documented and continuing history of
these events.
Harsh Reality
If indeed Iran shot the plane down as it is
increasingly believed, they are directly responsible for such a terrible
miscalculation, but it didn't happen on some random Tuesday morning. It
happened during the highest point of tension between the two countries in
decades. It may be quite inconvenient for some people to come to terms with the
fact that this occurred, at least indirectly, because the U.S. and Iran cannot
figure out a way forward that doesn't include being on the brink of war with
one another periodically.
The fact is that when the geopolitical situation
is allowed to degrade to such a perilous point, the chances that major mistakes
may occur skyrockets. And those mistakes can have huge impacts on countries and
people who are not even involved with the ongoing crisis. The whole thing
should serve as a powerful warning of the cost brinksmanship and how even
limited conflict can spill into unintended areas, resulting in highly
unfortunate consequences.
Thankfully no Americans died in the ballistic
missile attacks on U.S. occupied facilities in Iraq on January 8th, 2020, and
neither did any Iranian soldiers. But 176 people that had nothing to do with
any of it may very well have died as a result of those actions and the
situation that proceeded it. It just takes the wrong people in a position of
great responsibility at the wrong time to transform the great potential for a
horrific loss into reality.
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