Boeing Called Indonesian Pilots 'Idiots' For Wanting More Training On
The 737 Max Prior To Crash
Illustration for article titled Boeing Called
Indonesian Pilots Idiots For Wanting More Training On The 737 Max Prior To
Crash
The Boeing 737 MAX airliner has been grounded in America since
last March, and was grounded in many other countries before that, thanks to two
tragic crashes, one an Ethiopian Airlines flight, and one an Indonesian Lion Air
flight that killed 189 people. That crash was blamed partially on a new
flight-control system installed on the planes, and partially on poor pilot
training and an unfamiliarity with the new system. Newly-released internal
Boeing documents show that when Lion Air requested more training on these new
systems, they were insulted by Boeing employees.
The new flight control
system is known as the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS)
and is designed to help combat a flying condition known as "stalling," where the
plane can lose lift if its angle of attack-the angle between the wing and the
surrounding airflow-is too high.
"Now friggin Lion Air might need a sim
to fly the MAX, and maybe because of their own stupidity."
In practice, the
MCAS system seems to have malfunctioned and caused the plane to pitch its nose
downward when not needed, and the system was confusing to override when it
failed, which relates directly to the lack of proper training for
pilots.
Boeing had been touting the 737 MAX as an aircraft that would
require minimal to no new training for pilots, which would save airlines a lot
of money. This was a major selling point of the new plane.
Boeing
provided the Federal Aviation Administration with over 100 pages of internal
documentation relating to the 737 MAX situation, and a number of those documents
show that Boeing employees were not supportive of airline requests for more
training for the aircraft.
Documents were released to the media with
redactions, but Bloomberg was able to get unredacted documents from the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, and those documents called out Lion
Air by name.
Bloomberg's article today included quotes from internal
emails from Boeing employees discussing the requests for more training on the
737 MAX's new systems, and, um, they don't really come off terribly well for
Boeing. Here's an example email from 2017:
"Now friggin Lion Air might
need a sim to fly the MAX, and maybe because of their own stupidity. I'm
scrambling trying to figure out how to unscrew this now! idiots,"
OK,
maybe that's just one, isolated example of a high-strung Boeing employee who's
maybe kind of an asshole. Then again, maybe not, as this was a response from a
colleague:
"WHAT THE F%$&!!!! But their sister airline is already
flying it!"
Do all Boeing employees freak out this quickly? If so, the
walls of their cubicles must look like Jackson Pollack paintings from all the
spit-taken coffee. And can't any of them actually use proper
profanity?
More critically, though, it's unreal that a company
manufacturing a complex aircraft would express such contempt and shock that
pilots would want training on the updated systems. You'd think it'd welcome
that, as it would help guarantee the new systems are being properly used, and
would prevent, oh, terrible crashes, which would prevent grounding aircraft,
loss of sales, losing money, all that.
And, oh yeah, not killing
anyone.
This dismissive attitude toward an airline attempting to prepare
their pilots to be as safe as possible is incredibly disturbing. Also disturbing
is that Boeing's pressure worked, with Lion Air eventually accepting that it
wouldn't need additional training.
Bloomberg was unable to get a comment
from Boeing, but a message sent from Greg Smith, Boeing's interim CEO, to Boeing
employees, addressed the documents:
"These documents do not represent the
best of Boeing. The tone and language of the messages are inappropriate,
particularly when used in discussion of such important matters, and they do not
reflect who we are as a company or the culture we've created."
Yeah, no
shit, Greg. No wonder you make the big bucks.
The U.S. Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee investigation is still ongoing. Chair Peter DeFazio
issued a statement about the released emails, pointing out that these were not
isolated issues with isolated parts or employees:
"These newly-released
emails are incredibly damning. They paint a deeply disturbing picture of the
lengths Boeing was apparently willing to go to in order to evade scrutiny from
regulators, flight crews, and the flying public, even as its own employees were
sounding alarms internally. I can only imagine how painful it must be for the
families of the 346 victims to read these new documents that detail some of the
earliest and most fundamental errors in the decisions that went into the fatally
flawed aircraft.
"For nearly 10 months, my Committee has been
investigating the design, development and certification of the MAX, and in that
time, our investigation has uncovered multiple, serious problems with Boeing's
decision-making and the priority that was placed on production and profit over
safety. But these new emails bring my concerns to an entirely new level. They
show a coordinated effort dating back to the earliest days of the 737 MAX
program to conceal critical information from regulators and the public. While it
is also clear from these emails that the problems did not merely stem from a
lone Boeing employee who uses colorful language in his communications, I have
reiterated my request for an interview with former Boeing 737 MAX Chief
Technical Pilot Mark Forkner to his attorneys, and I expect to hear from them at
the earliest possible date."
We have reached out to Boeing for comment,
and here's what it provided:
Boeing statement on documents provided today
to Congress:
In December, Boeing proactively brought these communications
to the FAA's attention in furtherance of the company's commitment to
transparency with our regulator and strong safety oversight of our industry. We
also provided copies to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Technology and the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure in
recognition of their oversight functions. These documents have been released
publicly at the encouragement of Chairman DeFazio and Chairman
Wicker.
Some of these communications relate to the development and
qualification of Boeing's MAX simulators in 2017 and 2018. These communications
contain provocative language, and, in certain instances, raise questions about
Boeing's interactions with the FAA in connection with the simulator
qualification process.
Having carefully reviewed the issue, we are
confident that all of Boeing's MAX simulators are functioning effectively. The
qualification activities referenced in these communications occurred early in
the service life of these simulators. Since that time, both internal and
external subject matter experts have repeatedly tested and qualified the
simulators at issue. Indeed, more than twenty regulatory qualifications of MAX
simulators, performed by the FAA and multiple international regulators, have
been conducted since early 2017. The specific Miami simulator that was used for
the early qualification tests has been re-evaluated six times during this time
period. The simulator software has been constantly improving during this time,
through repeated cycles of testing, qualification, and revision of the software
code.
These communications do not reflect the company we are and need to
be, and they are completely unacceptable. That said, we remain confident in the
regulatory process for qualifying these simulators.
In the context of
providing these communications to the FAA, and having carefully considered the
FAA's perspective on these matters, we also decided to provide additional
documents that were identified in the course of legal reviews of the 737 MAX
program. We provided these documents to the FAA and Congress as a reflection of
our commitment to transparency and cooperation with the authorities responsible
for regulating and overseeing our industry. We welcome, and will fully support,
any additional review the FAA believes is appropriate in connection with any of
these matters, as well as the continued involvement of the relevant
congressional committees with these issues.
We regret the content of
these communications, and apologize to the FAA, Congress, our airline customers,
and to the flying public for them. We have made significant changes as a company
to enhance our safety processes, organizations, and culture. The language used
in these communications, and some of the sentiments they express, are
inconsistent with Boeing values, and the company is taking appropriate action in
response. This will ultimately include disciplinary or other personnel action,
once the necessary reviews are completed.
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