Boeing Recommends Sim Training for MAX
Backtracking on its previous indications, Boeing is now recommending simulator training for 737 MAX crews. In a statement, the company wants “simulator training in addition to computer-based training for all MAX pilots prior to return to service of the 737 MAX. This recommendation takes into account our unstinting commitment to the safe return of service as well as changes to the airplane and test results. Final determination will be established by the regulators.”
“Safety is Boeing’s top priority,” said interim Boeing CEO Greg Smith. “Public, customer and stakeholder confidence in the 737 MAX is critically important to us and with that focus Boeing has decided to recommend MAX simulator training combined with computer-based training for all pilots prior to returning the MAX safely to service.”
Boeing’s largest domestic customer for the MAX, Southwest, had felt that it could bring its crews up to speed with computer training. “That being said, we stand ready to comply with the FAA’s final recommendation and have teams within Southwest that are considering training models for both simulator or computer-based training programs,” Southwest said in a statement to the press. “Since our plans are in the early stages as we await further guidance, we don’t have any time or cost estimates to offer.”
No doubt to stem public fears about the MAX, Boeing has changed tack on the simulator requirement. Making crews a fungible asset across all the recent 737s was a large part of the design process for the MAX itself. Given the fleet size and the number of qualified pilots, it was important for Boeing and its customer airlines to make the transition from earlier 737s to the MAX as seamless and cost-effective as possible.
This request from Boeing and the need to modify existing simulators to emulate the MAX’s handling qualities will likely add to the delays getting the airliner into widespread service. Already, airlines are facing significant effort in taking mothballed aircraft from storage.
The company had long maintained that the training wasn't needed to fly the plane, which was grounded after two deadly crashes.
Pilots were not required to undergo simulator training for Boeing's 737 Max before it was grounded in March.
From its inception, Boeing's 737 Max was designed to save airlines the expense of training their pilots on flight simulators. During the initial approval of the plane and after two crashes killed 346 people last year, Boeing argued in conversations with the Federal Aviation Administration that simulator training was not necessary.
Now, after a worldwide grounding has cost the company billions of dollars over nearly 10 months and caused it to temporarily halt the production of the Max, Boeing has reversed course. On Tuesday, the company said it would recommend that pilots train in flight simulators before flying the Max.
The decision stems from Boeing's analysis of recent flight simulator tests that were part of the work necessary to return the Max to service, which showed that pilots were not using the right procedures to handle emergencies. Those tests are the latest hurdle for Boeing, which has encountered setback after setback as it tries to fix problems with the Max and persuade regulators that the plane is ready to fly.
The Max has been grounded since March, and Boeing has been working for months on changes to the software that contributed to both accidents. Boeing, the largest aerospace manufacturer in the world and one of the most important companies in the United States, has been roiled by the Max grounding, which still has no end in sight. Last month, the company's board ousted its chief executive, Dennis A. Muilenburg, who had presided over a deteriorating relationship with the F.A.A. and key airline customers.
His successor is now grappling with a company in crisis, as Boeing shares have declined by 20 percent and it continues to uncover potential flaws with the Max, its most important jet. Boeing said it would temporarily shut down the Max factory this month, and new problems with the Max unrelated to the software have been identified, raising the prospect of further delays.
The training requirement may further complicate efforts to return the plane to service. The final decision on whether to mandate simulator training will be made by the F.A.A., which is likely to follow the company's advice. The agency still has to complete testing of the plane.
The F.A.A. said it would consider Boeing's recommendation, adding in a statement that it was "following a thorough process, not a set timeline, to ensure that any design modifications to the 737 Max are integrated with appropriate training and procedures."
At least one airline, United, has considered requiring its pilots to undergo simulator training whether or not the F.A.A. mandates it, recognizing that it may make the public more comfortable flying on the plane, according to two people familiar with the matter.
Simulator training will add another issue for many airlines, which have struggled with mounting losses throughout the Max crisis. It could delay the return of the Max even after regulatory approval. It will make it more difficult for airlines to schedule pilots and planes. And they may need to buy new, multimillion-dollar simulators to train pilots who are not already flying the 737 NG, the predecessor to the Max.
"This erodes one of the key selling points of the Max in the first place," Jonathan Raviv, an analyst for Citi, said in a research note.
Boeing's marketing material for the 737 Max promoted the fact that simulator training wouldn't be needed.Credit...House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
The Max is the latest update to Boeing's 737, which has been flying since the 1960s. By making the plane similar to the 737 NG, Boeing was able to persuade regulators that pilots did not need to train on simulators. That was important for Boeing, which faced stiff competition from its chief European rival, Airbus, and was under pressure to produce a plane that could be easily integrated into airlines' fleets.
In marketing material detailing the "737 Max advantage," Boeing emphasized that the plane was similar enough to its predecessor that experienced pilots would not need to be taught in simulators. In negotiations with Southwest Airlines while the plane was being developed, Boeing agreed that if the Max required such training, it would give Southwest a discount of $1 million per plane.
But Boeing did make fundamental changes to the plane, including the addition of software known as MCAS, which played a role in both crashes. Initially, pilots were not made aware that the software existed and were not trained on how to react if it was erroneously activated.
Southwest made its first Max order in 2011 based on Boeing's promise that the airline wouldn't have to educate its pilots on simulators, which can cost tens of millions of dollars to operate over the life of an aircraft. Instead, airline pilots who were certified to fly the 737 NG took a short course on an iPad to become familiar with the Max.
"You're out there trying to buy an airplane and negotiate a price and produce your schedule based on a PowerPoint, and you just need to have some guarantees," Mike Van de Ven, Southwest's chief operating officer, said in an interview last month.
Representative Peter A. DeFazio, who has been investigating the crashes as the head of the House transportation committee, said in a statement that he supported the decision but was baffled that it had taken so long.
"It's remarkable that it took two deadly crashes, numerous investigations and untold public pressure before Boeing arrived at this decision," said Mr. DeFazio, an Oregon Democrat.
Boeing's decision stems from its analysis of flight simulator tests of the Max it conducted with airline pilots from United, Aeromexico, American Airlines and Southwest last month, according to a person familiar with the matter.
In the tests, which were part of the work involved in evaluating the software update, many of the pilots did not use the correct procedures to handle emergencies, instead relying on their flying skills. Those results raised questions about whether simply informing pilots of which procedures to use would be sufficient to prepare them to fly the plane.
"Safety is Boeing's top priority," Greg Smith, the company's interim chief executive, said in a statement on Tuesday. "Public, customer and stakeholder confidence in the 737 Max is critically important to us, and with that focus Boeing has decided to recommend Max simulator training combined with computer-based training for all pilots prior to returning the Max safely to service."
Pilots who are certified to fly both the 737 NG and the 737 Max may have to undergo recurrent training for both models. If a 737 NG has a maintenance problem, it will no longer be easy to swap it out for a Max. And if a pilot certified to fly the Max misses a flight, airlines will have to make sure the replacement is certified on the Max, not just the NG.
There are currently 34 certified Max flight simulators worldwide, according to a person familiar with the matter. Airlines may also be able to use the more than 200 737 NG simulators to conduct the training, though it isn't clear yet whether that is possible.
"We have not been a part of Boeing's recent discussions regarding their recommendation on pilot training for returning the Max to service," Southwest said in a statement. "Teams within Southwest have been modeling scenarios for both simulator and computer-based training programs to ensure we're ready to comply with final recommendations and guidance from the federal regulators. Cost and timing estimates are premature to share ahead of that specific guidance."
U.S., European regulators to meet with Boeing this week on 737 MAX software audit
(Reuters) - U.S. and European aviation safety regulators will meet with Boeing this week in an effort to complete a 737 MAX software documentation audit - a key step toward the grounded plane's eventual return to service.
FILE PHOTO: An aerial photo shows Boeing 737 MAX airplanes parked on the tarmac at the Boeing Factory in Renton, Washington, U.S. March 21, 2019. REUTERS/Lindsey Wasson
The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) both confirmed on Tuesday that they will meet in the Seattle-area with Boeing before heading to a Rockwell Collins facility in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, in an effort to complete the audit.
Documentation requirements are central to certification for increasingly complex aircraft software, and can become a source of delays. In 2008, EASA nearly derailed Europe's Airbus A400M military transporter over software documentation following a failed audit.
In early November, EASA and FAA met with Boeing at the Rockwell Collins facility in Cedar Rapids and did not approve the audit. Instead, they sought revisions to the documentation of the 737 MAX software fix and flagged a number of issues, Reuters reported.
In mid-January, Boeing will halt production on the best-selling plane, which has been grounded since March following two crashes in Ethiopia and Indonesia that killed 346 people in five months. Boeing said on Monday it was reassigning 3,000 employees to other jobs as a result of the temporary halt.
Reuters has reported previously that the FAA is unlikely to approve the plane until at least February and perhaps until March or later.
Boeing said in November that regulators had requested the "information be conveyed in a different form, and the documentation is being revised accordingly."
Boeing did not immediately comment on Tuesday.
In September, FAA Administrator Steve Dickson said the agency had told Boeing it is "better to be very methodical and very detailed rather than try to rush a partially completed product and then say, 'We'll get back to you with the rest of it.'"
Aviation software audits frequently uncover inconsistencies or omissions in documentation but rarely lead to changes in the underlying software or system, according to an industry official.
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