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Big, fast, range and teeth: Beijing’s secretive new fighter reveals to upend global and regional aerial balance of power

Air

08 January 2025

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By: Stephen Kuper

 

While many across the world were nursing post-Christmas food comas, Beijing surprised many with the public unveiling of a number of new combat aircraft, with apparent sixth-generation fighter aircraft at the bleeding edge of air combat capability, reaffirming the rising superpower’s focus on usurping the US as the world’s premier air power.

The concept of integrated air power has long been a cornerstone of modern military strategy, shaping the dynamics of global security and the balance of power among nations. Integrated air power refers to the seamless coordination of various aerial platforms, technologies and support systems to achieve superior situational awareness, rapid response capabilities and decisive operational outcomes.

It embodies the synthesis of fighter jets, bombers, unmanned aerial systems and surveillance platforms combined with advanced communication networks, working in unison to project power and maintain strategic dominance. In an era where technological advancements are accelerating, integrated air power remains a critical determinant of a nation’s military effectiveness and geopolitical influence.

For decades, the United States has been the undisputed leader in air power, leveraging its technological edge, industrial capacity and doctrinal innovations to maintain air superiority. From the Cold War to the present, American air power has underpinned its global military presence, enabling rapid force projection, precision strikes and unparalleled intelligence-gathering capabilities.

Flagship platforms like the F-22 Raptor, the B-2 Spirit, along with the F-35 Lightning II and the rapid development of the B-21 Raider exemplify the US’ commitment to staying at the forefront of aerial warfare. This dominance has not only reinforced its position as a global superpower but also acted as a key pillar of security in regions like the Indo-Pacific, where maintaining stability is of paramount importance.

However, the global air power landscape is undergoing a significant transformation with the rapid rise of China as a formidable military force. Over the past two decades, Beijing has invested heavily in modernising its air force, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), and integrating cutting-edge technologies into its arsenal. Once considered reliant on outdated Soviet-era platforms, the PLAAF now fields an impressive array of advanced aircraft, including the fifth-generation J-20 stealth fighter and the yet to be publicly unveiled H-20 stealth strategic bomber.

Doubling down on the rapid rate of modernisation and materiel expansion of already formidable air combat capabilities, China has revealed its development of a sixth-generation fighter aircraft, the J-36, a technological leap that underscores its ambition to challenge US dominance in the air domain, and by extension, for central US allies like Australia, Japan and South Korea to undermine their own air combat capabilities.

The unveiling of this sixth-generation platform marks a significant milestone, not only for China but for the evolving dynamics of military power in the Indo-Pacific. These aircraft are expected to incorporate next-generation capabilities such as artificial intelligence, advanced stealth, directed-energy weapons and enhanced connectivity with other domains of warfare. Such advancements have the potential to shift the balance of power, challenging the traditional superiority of the United States and its allies.

This development also raises critical questions about the future of deterrence, arms races and the strategic stability of a region already marked by territorial disputes and competing interests.

Beyond Indo-Pacific, the global implications of China’s air power evolution cannot be ignored. As Beijing seeks to project influence and protect its interests on a worldwide scale, the PLAAF’s growing capabilities signal a broader shift in the geopolitical landscape. The era of uncontested US air superiority is giving way to a more multipolar reality, where integrated air power will play an increasingly decisive role in shaping the strategic trajectories of nations.

Beijing’s Christmas surprise by far and away has fundamentally reshaped the global airpower paradigm, in much the same way that the launch of HMS Dreadnought in 1905 fundamentally reshaped and, in many ways, reset the global naval balance of power.

But what do we know, particularly about Beijing’s big new bruiser, colloquially referred to as the J-36?

Part of a ‘tea set’

Thankfully, internet sleuths and Bill Sweetman, a veteran, award-winning journalist and aerospace industry executive, in two separate pieces for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (published 31 December 2024 and 3 January 2025) have moved to dig into what these new aircraft are, the capability they will deliver and their potential roles in any future conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

Front and centre of Sweetman’s initial analysis is the broader modernisation of the PLAAF that has seen it rapidly evolve from a comparatively second-tier air force into one of the world’s most technologically advanced and largest.

In light of this modernisation and development, the J-36, as it has been called, is seen as the next step in the evolution of the PLAAF into a world-leading, technologically superior force that combines a suite of capabilities, technologies and industrial developments into a cohesive force, drawing on ancient Chinese tea ceremony and culture to form the basis of the approach.

Explaining this, Sweetman explained, “There may be more. Anonymous Chinese internet commenters with better records for accuracy than others say that the new arrivals are part of an air warfare ‘tea set’ and that we have not yet seen the ‘teapot’ – the long-expected H-20 stealth bomber; this will probably be an analogue to the Northrop Grumman B-21. Nonetheless, the J-36 alone has given observers enough to chew on.”

At the core of the new role, the J-36’s size, design and details seem to elude to a very specific role, air superiority, and by extension, air dominance, with the former being something that we have repeatedly been told is now, in the era of increasingly advanced sensors and air-to-air weapons, a complex web of integrated air defence capabilities, low observable technologies and “sensor fusion” defunct and no longer required.

Sweetman explained this, saying, “The J-36 (if that really is its name) is designed to combine supersonic performance with all-aspect stealth. That’s also the goal of the US Next Generation Air Dominance program, currently stalled by budget and policy issues…”

Going further, he said, “The aircraft was chased by a two-seat J-20B, giving a good indication of its size. It’s longer than the J-20 – about 23 metres – and its double-delta wing spans an estimated 19 metres, with around 200 square metres of wing area. (The F-22’s wing area is 78 square metres.) As I commented on the Global Combat Aircraft Program’s Tempest design, large, moderately swept deltas can accommodate a lot of fuel and are very useful if the designer is looking for long range.”

Adding further critical details into the size and inferred physical capabilities of the J-36, Sweetman added, “The tandem-wheel main landing gear units point to a big aircraft, since single wheel, tyre and brake units are inadequate at weights above about 35 tonnes. The main weapon bay, about 7.6 metres long, and supplementary side bays for smaller weapons also suggest considerable size. A 55-tonne take-off weight is a reasonable guess, two-thirds more than the J-20 and compared with an estimated 82 tonnes for the Northrop Grumman B-21.”

The advent of fifth-generation aircraft like the F-22 Raptor, the F-35 Lightning II, China’s J-20 series and J-31 and Russia’s Su-57 Felon also saw the large-scale use of low observable or stealth coatings and increased shape that are designed to reduce the radar cross section of the aircraft across a number of metrics.

Based on the released imagery, Sweetman is able to make some key deductions, saying, “The J-36 planform unequivocally speaks of stealth and supersonic speed. It is a modified version of the Hopeless Diamond, the first shot by Lockheed’s Skunk Works at all-aspect stealth, which got that name because it could not be made to fly with 1970s technology … On the J-36, the diamond is stretched into a double-delta to reduce transonic and supersonic drag. It has a leading-edge kink, a change in sweep angle.”

This design isn’t without it’s challenges though, Sweetman added, “That’s not ideal from the standpoint of radar cross-section but, as Northrop Grumman’s cranked-arrow designs have shown, it can be lived with. There is an unbroken edge and chine line around the aircraft, and all sensor apertures are inside it (not the case with the J-20 and other fighters). That is the foundation of all-aspect stealth.

“There are no vertical tail surfaces and no visible control surfaces other than the wing trailing edges, with five moving panels on each side and one behind each engine; such surfaces are called ‘elevons’. (It’s possible that there are flight-control effectors that we have not yet seen, such as inlaid panels in the upper surface of the wing.) The hinge lines of trailing-edge surfaces appear to be covered by flexible skins. The outer pair of surfaces are split horizontally to form brake-rudders, as on the B-2 and B-21, and were fully open in all pictures of the first flight.”

This brings us to perhaps the most interesting part of the J-36 design, that being the three engine configuration that diverges from the traditional twin engine and single engine configurations that have dominated contemporary fighter aircraft design for the better part of the last century. It has also drawn on some design cues from the air superiority focused F-22 Raptor.

Embracing this innovative design choice, undoubtedly, has major implications for the aircraft’s performance profile, with significant tactical and strategic ramifications for the Indo-Pacific, particularly within the first and second island chains, where conflict is most likely to occur in the short-to-medium term.

Sweetman explained the implications of this tri-engine approach, saying, “J-36 has three engines, side by side at the rear of the broad centre-body. F-22-like inlets of caret shape, with swept and canted lips, under the wing leading edge, supply the left and right engines, and the centre engine is fed by a diverterless supersonic inlet above the body.

“The three engine exhausts are ahead of and above the trailing edge, which comprises what appear to be articulating panels. Full turbofan reheat boost would impose scary thermal and acoustic loads on the trailing edge structure. (The trenches at the rear of the Northrop YF-23 into which its engines exhausted did not endure the environment as well as expected.) This tends to support the idea that the J-36’s engines are either non-afterburning or have limited afterburning used for transonic acceleration.”

However, this approach does have some drawbacks, and trade-offs, as with all aspects of physical reality, as Sweetman explained, “Three engines in the thrust class of 22,000 lb (10,000 kilograms or 100 kilonewtons) should be enough to make the J-36 a supercruiser – an aircraft that can fly supersonically without using fuel-guzzling afterburning. Its sweep angles point to doing this at Mach 1.8 to Mach 2.0 (1900km/h to 2200km/h, depending on altitude). The key is not so much achieving enough static thrust but building the engine to withstand the high temperatures at the exit of its compressor. China’s engine technology has been headed in this direction.

“Agility? High manoeuvrability is in opposition to combining supersonic cruise and range – the F-22 being deficient in the latter – because it demands large control forces and high installed thrust (and the weight it brings). Physics are a limitation: the J-36’s trailing-edge controls and thrust-vectoring systems must provide all the control force for the aircraft, unassisted by vertical stabilisers, canards or pitch-recovery devices like the Sukhoi Su-57’s movable leading-edge root extensions.”

But what does all of this technical jargon imply about the role of the J-36 and it’s place in Beijing’s “tea set” approach to integrated combat air power, particularly in the Indo-Pacific?

An ‘airborne cruiser’?

Shifting to the role part of the conversation, as previously mentioned, Beijing has sought to embrace a “tea set” approach, in which it is pursuing a suite of capabilities across air dominance/superiority, strategic strike, multi-role combat, advanced autonomous loyal wingman-style combat aircraft, advanced airborne early warning, command and control, refuelling and air lift roles.

While not drastically different to the way in which other countries like the US and, to a lesser extent, partner nations like Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan and South Korea have traditionally embraced, Beijing seems to be far less risk-averse when it comes to developing, trialling and fielding a host of advanced manned and unmanned air combat capabilities.

J-36 is at the forefront of this and based on what little is able to be inferred from the physical design of the aircraft, it seemingly fills an equally hybrid role, combining air dominance and an element of long-range strike, reminding me of the proposed FB-22, which would have seen a larger fuselage and larger delta wing added to the air superiority-focused F-22 Raptor to result in a fifth-generation F-111.

Sweetman has his own views, referring to the J-36 as an “airborne cruiser”, stating, “If J-36s can fly supersonically without using afterburning, as the prototype’s shape suggests they will, each will be able to get into and out of battle faster and more safely than conventional fighters and bombers, which cruise subsonically. A high degree of stealth will greatly help J-36s in penetrating defences. Supersonic cruise would also mean each J-36 could fly more missions in a given period.

“The design’s big main weapon bays are sized for considerable air-to-surface missiles, which J-36s could launch against such targets as airfields, aircraft carriers and air-defence batteries. With great speed and height, J-36s could also throw inexpensive glide bombs farther than other aircraft could.”

This isn’t where the confusion about the role of the J-36 lies, with Sweetman adding, “The main weapon bays are big enough to carry unusually large air-to-air missiles for engaging aircraft at great range, including vital support units such as tankers and air-surveillance radar planes. Targeting data for this might come from other aircraft, ships, satellites or ground sources. The missiles might also be launched at fighters at ranges that keep J-36s safe from counter-attack.

“J-36s are themselves likely to be sources of targeting data for other aircraft and for ships, using large passive and active sensors that aircraft of such size can easily carry. They may command aircraft that fly with them. In all this, they’d use radio links that are hard for an enemy to detect. To call the J-36 an airborne cruiser may not be far off the mark – and may call into question the West’s decision to prioritise development and production of fighters that are, by comparison, mere torpedo boats.”

This last point raises significant questions, particularly for Australia, which for the large part, has finalised the latest round of Air Force modernisations with the arrival of the nation’s final F-35s, bringing the nation’s fleet to 72 (28 short of the planned 100) and the government’s plans to keep our 4.5 generation F/A-18E/F and E/A-18G Growlers in service into the late-2030s, if not 2040s.

Adding a further layer of complexity, is, as Sweetman explained, “The J-36 combines speed and range with all-aspect stealth. Potential internal loads include such long-range air-to-air missiles as the PL-17, which the J-20 cannot carry internally. Heavier, air-to-surface missiles would be aimed at airfields and warships. It also probably supports the kind of mass-precision attacks made possible by accurate, more autonomous weapons, or – as autonomous technology advances – the carriage of loitering munitions and jammers.”

Final thoughts

With the Australian government identifying in the 2024 Integrated Investment Program that it intends to keep the nation’s small fleet of F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets and E/A-18G Growlers in service well into the 2040s, alongside the 72 F-35 Lightning IIs and an as yet undisclosed or perhaps unknown final number of MQ-28A Ghost Bat aircraft, it is time to think outside the box.

Air combat and air superiority, in particular, are only going to increase in importance over the coming decades and keeping the Royal Australian Air Force at the leading edge of that shift will require a more nuanced, bespoke approach that delivers Australian decision makers with a robust, focused, and balanced military capability and advantage of peer and near-peer competitors alike.

Yet little remains changed in the way of material difference for the Royal Australian Air Force. Ultimately, in the case of the Air Force, little remains changed from the earliest incarnations of the 2016 Defence White Paper and, arguably, even further back than that to the 2009 Defence White Paper.

In this case, it is hard to clearly see how, beyond a series of by now well “known knowns”, the Air Force is going to be materially in a significantly different place in five years’ time, let alone a decade’s time as is the proposed funding timeline for the 2024 Integrated Investment Program and the 2024 National Defence Strategy.

One can’t help but feel that this comes as a result of the Army being positioned as the “long-range strike” partner of choice for Defence via the acquisition of HIMARS and weapons systems like the Precision Strike Missile (at least until the arrival of our nuclear submarine fleet), leaving Air Force with a confused role and undefined sense of being beyond the “application of expeditionary air power”.

Get involved with the discussion and let us know your thoughts on Australia’s future role and position in the Indo-Pacific region and what you would like to see from Australia’s political leaders in terms of partisan and bipartisan agenda setting in the comments section below, or get in touch at Stephen.kuper@momentummedia.com.au or at editor@defenceconnect.com.au.