7 March 2020
The U.S. Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) proposes a $19.68 million civil penalty against The Boeing Co. for
allegedly installing equipment on hundreds of the company's 737 aircraft
containing sensors that were not approved for that equipment.
The FAA alleges that between June 2015 and April 2019, Boeing installed
Rockwell Collins Head-up Guidance Systems on 791 jetliners, including 618 Boeing
737 NGs and 173 Boeing 737 MAX aircraft. The FAA alleges that the guidance
systems in these aircraft were equipped with sensors that had not been tested or
approved as being compatible with those guidance systems.
The FAA alleges that Boeing violated Federal Aviation Regulations when it
certified these aircraft as airworthy when they were not in conformance with
their type certificate. The agency further alleges that Boeing failed to follow
its own Business Process Instructions, which are in place to help prevent such
situations from occurring.
The manufacturer of the head-up guidance system, Rockwell Collins, subsequently conducted the necessary testing and risk analysis and updated the documents.
Boeing has 30 days to respond the FAA's enforcement letter.
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Boeing Co's proposal to leave wiring bundles in place on the grounded 737 MAX has not won the backing of U.S. aviation regulators, a person briefed on the matter told Reuters.
Last month, Boeing told the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) it does not believe it needs to separate or move wiring bundles on its grounded 737 MAX jetliner that regulators have warned could short circuit with catastrophic consequences.
The source said the FAA told Boeing on Friday that it did not agree with the planemaker's argument that the planes' wiring bundles meet safety standards and now it is up to Boeing to decide how to proceed.
The FAA said Sunday it "continues to engage with Boeing as the company works to address a recently discovered wiring issue with the 737 MAX. The manufacturer must demonstrate compliance with all certification standards."
Boeing said Sunday it was in ongoing discussions with the FAA over the issue. Boeing could opt to make a new proposal or move the bundles or try to convince the FAA to reconsider its position, but a U.S. official said it was "unlikely" the FAA would reconsider.
Boeing and the FAA first said in early January they were reviewing a wiring issue that could potentially cause a short circuit on the 737 MAX, and under certain circumstances lead to a crash if pilots did not react in time.
Boeing's 737 MAX was grounded worldwide last March after two crashes in Indonesia and Ethiopia killed 346 people within five months.
There are more than a dozen different locations on the 737 MAX where wiring bundles may be too close together. Most of the locations are under the cockpit in an electrical bay.
If the bundles pose a potential hazard, regulations would typically require separating the bundles or adding a physical barrier.
Boeing has noted in talks with the FAA that the same wiring bundles are in the 737 NG, which has been in service since 1997 and logged 205 million flight hours without any wiring issues.
New safety rules on wiring were adopted in the aftermath of the 1998 Swiss Air 111 crash.
A company official told Reuters in January Boeing had been working on a design that would separate the wiring bundles, if necessary. Moving the bundles could pose further delays to the return of the MAX, however, a key certification test flight is not expected until April or later.
Ethiopia jet crash report likely to blame Boeing and pilots
(AP) Ethiopian investigators are expected to release an interim report this week on the crash of a Boeing 737 Max 8 jet that killed 157 people
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WHAT WE KNOW
There's little doubt that Ethiopian investigators will find fault with the Max's flight control software called MCAS, an acronym for Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System. It automatically lowers the plane's nose to prevent an aerodynamic stall. Initially, pilots worldwide weren't told about the system, which Boeing said was needed because the Max had bigger, more powerful engines that were placed farther forward on the wings than previous-generation 737s. Boeing's big selling point for the plane was that it was essentially the same as older 737s and therefore little pilot training was needed to switch to the new aircraft.
A preliminary report released in April by the Ethiopian agency indicated that MCAS pushed the jet's nose down based on faulty readings from sensors outside of the plane. The agency found that pilots were inundated by multiple alarms but, at least initially, followed procedures to deal with an MCAS problem. They cut off power to MCAS, but because they failed to slow the plane from takeoff speeds, they couldn't take the next step - manually turn a wheel that would move a stabilizer on the tail to point the nose back up. One sensor measured the plane's speed at 575 miles per hour (925 kilometers per hour), which some experts believe put too much force on the stabilizer, making manual movement nearly impossible. The pilots apparently turned MCAS back on shortly before the final, fatal nosedive.
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WHAT WE DON'T KNOW
Exactly what the pilots talked about in the frantic moments after takeoff as they tried to deal with the MCAS intervention. Whether they followed checklists in dealing with the crisis, and how multiple alarms influenced their decisions. Also, why they didn't slow the plane from takeoff speeds, which could have let them manually control the rear stabilizer.
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WHY IT'S IMPORTANT
A transcript of the cockpit voice recorder would help pilots across the globe train for similar problems when automated flight control software goes awry. It also will help to train pilots on how to handle the blizzard of alarms that go off when a plane starts having problems so they can diagnose the trouble and deal with the most critical things.
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