WASHINGTON—American Airlines pilots are emphasizing detailed instruction on the maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) and revamped emergency procedures as key elements to ensuring a safe return to service for the grounded Boeing 737MAX fleet, adding that simulator training should be introduced, but not necessarily as a condition to getting the MAX back flying.
In comments to FAA on the Flight Standardization Board (FSB) draft report that will update 737 training standards, the Allied Pilots Association (APA) tracked closely with what colleagues from the Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) said. Among both groups’ recommendations: the MCAS modules being introduced must go beyond basic computer-based training (CBT) and provide pilots with real-world scenarios to help them understand the system and related failure scenarios.
“A [computer-based] training (CBT) module that only discusses system knowledge regarding [the new MCAS software] will not provide a level of confidence for pilots to feel not only comfortable flying the aircraft but also relaying that confidence to the traveling public,” APA told FAA. “At a minimum the CBT should include videoed simulator sessions explaining MCAS and its operation along with Runaway Stabilizer demo, Unreliable Airspeed Demo, [Angle of attack (AOA)] Disagree Demo, and manual [stabilizer] trim demo at both low and high-speed scenarios. Both [737 MAX] accidents had all of these situations happening at once and looking at each of them will provide a level of training to bring confidence to the pilot group.”
While both pilot groups emphasized the importance of detailed MCAS training, APA specifically called for a higher level of instruction for pilots transitioning from the 737 Next Generation (NG) to the MAX than FAA has proposed.
“APA believes that a Level B coupled with Level C training should be mandatory,” the union said. “When pilots visually experience the failure modes and then apply them, the lesson is cemented in their minds.”
Level B training—which FAA approved as the NG-to-MAX differences training standard—is computer-based, but does not require video or training aids. Level C training integrates more interactive learning, including training devices, but stops short of Level D’s full-flight simulators.
The MCAS and related training are being revamped based on lessons learned from  the October 2018 crash of a Lion Air 737-8 and the March 2019 Ethiopian Airlines 737-8 accident. The second accident led to the country-by-country worldwide grounding that remains in place.
A more reliable MCAS system and better training are two of the requirements that FAA has put on removing its MAX operations ban. Other regulators are taking FAA’s work into account, but also are conducting their own evaluations of Boeing’s changes, which still have not been finalized. The result: the 370-aircraft in-service MAX fleet will almost surely be cleared to fly in phases, with U.S. operators likely to fly first. The exact timeline remains unclear.
The key issue where regulators will differ is expected to be training. While the FAA has said it will not finalize its FSB update until it reviews its final training package, it is not expected to require full-flight simulator sessions as a condition of allowing pilots to fly the MAX again, while other countries have signaled their intent to consider immediate simulator time.
FAA is however expected to mandate new simulator sessions during recurrent training—a move that would place far less burden on operators. APA and ALPA in have signaled their tentative endorsements for FAA’s approach, so long as the baseline training is “robust,” as ALPA said in its FSB comments. Both APA and ALPA emphasize that their comments were filed without the benefit of reviewing Boeing’s final training package, and their views could change.
Among the issues FAA is reviewing is the runaway stabilizer trim emergency procedure that Boeing positioned as key to overcoming an MCAS failure. Neither the Lion Air nor Ethiopian flight crews followed the checklist, information released by investigators shows. The Lion Air crew never recognized the MCAS failure as a runaway stabilizer issue. The Ethiopian crew apparently did, and followed some of the checklist’s steps. But they were unable to pull the aircraft’s nose up after the MCAS, acting on erroneous angle-of-attack data, directed it downward by moving the horizontal stabilizer. They deviated from the checklist in several ways, including not reducing the aircraft’s speed enough and re-engaging the automatic stabilizer motors that MCAS uses to trim the aircraft. The pilots also were not able to manually move the stabilizer to counter-act the MCAS inputs.
Boeing and FAA have said that a misfiring MCAS’s uncommanded stabilizer movement should be recognized as runaway stabilizer. But unlike classic runaway stabilizer, MCAS moves the flight-control surface intermittently, which could make it more difficult to diagnose. An MCAS failure also triggers other flight-deck warnings, adding to the pilot’s workload.
APA and other pilot groups have pointed out that Boeing’s runaway stabilizer checklist is neither clear nor detailed enough when applied to an MCAS failure scenario, and should be revamped. Among the issues: the 737 flight crew operations manual (FCOM) on does not explain that moving the stabilizer manually may require both pilots, or that aerodynamic loads on the stabilizer may have to be reduced—such as by pushing the nose down—before trimming the aircraft manually. These details are included in supplemental training documents, however, and APA wants to see more of them in the FCOM. FAA is reviewing the checklist, and is likely to require changes.
Despite MCAS’s improvements, APA believes the revamped checklist—which would also apply to the 737 Next Generation—should be in place before the MAX is approved to fly again.
“[The runaway stab trim checklist] is related to the MCAS, even the new software,” APA spokesman and American 737 captain Dennis Tajer said. “It’s still what I’m left with to recover the aircraft if the MCAS misfires.”
American Airlines management has signaled that it is willing to adopt whatever APA believes is needed to ensure its 4,000 737 pilots are comfortable operating the MAX, Tajer said. That means APA’s FSB comments will likely become American’s training standard.
“We’re getting additional computer-based training because there are things that we all agree need to be added” even if they are not in the final FSB, Tajer said. “We’re going to be comfortable with what we have—American [management] has been very responsive.”
APA’s push, Tajer said, is about ensuring that MAX training standards are set as high as possible, as not every airline will go beyond the minimum requirements.
“We want one global standard of safety and training, and we’re pressing hard on this,” he said. “If there’s a problem with the MAX anywhere in the world, it’s a problem for all of us.”