WASHINGTON—The world’s largest pilots’ union will not ask FAA to require additional mandatory simulator training on maneuvering characteristics augmentation system (MCAS) scenarios for 737 MAX pilots before they can fly, but will recommend it as part of routine recurrent training, Aviation Week has learned.
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) will make its views known in comments on a draft of proposed minimum 737 training standards out for public comment. The Flight Standardization Board (FSB) draft report does not recommend simulator sessions as part of transition training for 737 Next Generation pilots upgrading to the MAX, opting for less costly computer-based training instead.
A person with knowledge of ALPA’s comments tells Aviation Week that the pilots’ union will go a step further, calling for hands-on simulator training at the earliest scheduled opportunity. Under this scenario, MAX pilots would fly simulated MCAS-related scenarios within a year or so as MAX simulators become available, but not before they return to line operations once flight restrictions on the model are lifted. Some regulators are expected to require simulator training as conditions for removing their operations bans, and Air Canada has said it is already using its MAX simulator—the only one in airline hands in North America—to run its 420 MAX pilots through MCAS-related scenarios.
ALPA’s training recommendations will include other additions to the draft document as well—most of them emphasizing MCAS-related differences between the NG and the MAX. The MCAS was needed for certification purposes to enhance pitch stability with slats and flaps retracted at very light weights and full aft center-of gravity (CG), ensuring the MAX handled like the NG. The system activates when the aircraft’s speed approaches threshold AOA, or stick-shaker stall-warning activation, for the aircraft’s configuration and flight profile. 
The union wants the AOA Disagree alert message and its relation to MCAS added to items given “special emphasis” in MAX training. The MCAS is fed by angle of attack (AOA) data, and activates when the data shows the aircraft’s nose as being too high for the current flight profile. ALPA wants pilots to understand the link between AOA Disagree alerts, which will now be standard on primary flight displays for all MAXs, and the MCAS’s role of automatically moving the horizontal stabilizer to compensate for an AOA approaching aerodynamic stall.
The union also wants MAX pilots to understand that nose-down stabilizer trim applied by MCAS cannot be countered by pulling back on the yokes. The MCAS is an extension of the 737 speed trim system (STS), which automatically moves the stabilizer to ensure pitch is maintained as speed increases. On the NG, stick force inputs override runaway trim, including the STS runaways. On the MAX, stick force overrides all runaway trim conditions, but not MCAS.
Boeing determined that allowing the MCAS to be countered by pulling back on the yoke could negate its purpose, so the column brake is bypassed when the MCAS is activated. Instead, the MCAS can be countered using yoke-mounted electric trim switches or, in extreme conditions, by toggling cutout switches that de-power the trim motors and using hand-cranked trim wheels.
The public has until May 15 to comment on the draft FSB report. Approving it will be a key step in getting the MAX fleet back in the air, along with having regulators sign off on changes to the MCAS software that Boeing is finalizing. 
FAA said it will consider the public’s input before making a final decision on the FSB’s contents. “We are looking forward to reviewing all of the comments,” the agency said.
The Air Line Pilots Association did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Regulators grounded the 370-aircraft operational fleet in mid-March following the second of two fatal MAX 8 accidents. The MCAS’s erroneous activation played a role in each accident. Boeing is modifying the system’s logic by adding triple redundant angle of attack validity checks to add data redundancy and reduce its authority to activate multiple times in certain scenarios and by limiting its stabilizer command authority to a single, proportionate nose down trim input. 
Boeing designed the MCAS to operate in the background and only if the aircraft were being operating in a small corner of the flight envelope. Both the company and the original FSB that worked on the model’s 2017 certification determined that special training on the system’s operation was not necessary. As a result, the system was not covered in flight manuals. The updates will add information on the system’s operation.
Boeing and the 2017 FSB team also determined that pilots would recognize an MCAS-related failure as stabilizer runaway—a common air transport issue that pilots are trained to manage with a memorized checklist. 
But in both MAX 8 accident sequences, the crew did not immediately diagnose the MCAS inputs, trigged by erroneous AOA data, as stabilizer runaway. They countered the MCAS with manual electric trim inputs, which re-set the MCAS and caused it to activate again based on the continued stream of faulty AOA data. Had the crews not used the electric trim, the MCAS system would not have activated repeatedly, eventually leading to uncontrollable dives. Boeing’s software update removes this function so that electric trim does not re-set MCAS so that it cannot operate again based on faulty data. 
ALPA, which represents pilots at MAX operators United Airlines and WestJet, also will advise that pilots practice as many MCAS-failure-related emergency scenarios as necessary to demonstrate competency. Boeing’s explanation of MCAS following the first accident, Lion Air Flight 610 in October 2018, listed nine related “indications and effects” that could result from an AOA Disagree alert and possible MCAS activation.
While the FSB still must be finalized, mandatory simulator training before qualified 737NG pilots fly the MAX is not expected to be part of the package.
“At this point, we’re not hearing that [simulator training] will be a requirement,” Southwest Airlines CEO Gary Kelly said recently. “Just getting pilots back into the simulator for an event would be a challenge, and that would take time. But my own interpretation is that we already do the kind of training that one would be contemplating to put the MAX back into service. Managing the aircraft in a runaway stabilizer scenario is something that we already trained on and…has already been covered.”