B-787 og Sikorsky S-92A sertifisering - Dette er særdeles alvorlig

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Certification: a missing link in the safety chain?



På Flyoperativt Forum nylig, snakket havariinspektør Tor Nørstegård om en alvorlig hendelse og spør om liv skal gå tapt før en får tatt fatt i påviste feil og svakheter ved systemer. Det gjaldt en hendelse med en Widerøe -8 maskin i 2006. På Forumet tok jeg meg den frihet å stille spørsmål til Luftfartstilsynet som var tilstede, vedr. sertifiseringen av S-92A. Hovedgearboksen er sertifisert etter den samme norm som gjelder for Boeing 787s batteripakke, nemlig at en hendelse skal ikke skje før etter 10 millioner flytimer. S-92S hadde en nødlanding i 2008 i Australia etter tap av all olje i hovedgearboksen. På det tidspunkt tipper jeg at typen hadde omtrent 15 000 flytimer under beltet. Den skulle ha hatt 10 millioner før en slik hendelse skulle inntreffe. S-92A var sertifisert av Luftfartstilsynet her til lands. Jeg spurte hva LT foretok seg etter nødlandingen i Australia. De ble og er svar skyldig. For å følge opp Nørstegårds spørsmål på konferansen: Må liv gå tapt før en gjør noe? Svaret er JA! I 2009 havarerte en S-92A i Canada etter den samme feil som førte til nødlandingen i Australia året før. Forstår du at noen gambler med ombordværendes liv her? Nå er det samme spørsmålet stillet i USA:

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) faces significant challenges to certificate new aircraft including finding sufficient resources to do the job while remaining up to speed on new technology, according to a senior US transport watchdog.

In testimony before a US Senate committee examining the FAA's progress on key safety initiatives, Gerald Dillingham of the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) said that although the aviation agency recognises the value of certification as a safety tool, the task is becoming increasingly difficult.

Citing a report from the US Aircraft Certification Process Review and Reform Aviation Rulemaking Committee, Dillingham said these certification challenges will become increasingly difficult to overcome, as industry activity continues growing and government spending for certification remains relatively flat.

As one means of responding to its ever-increasing certification workload, the FAA delegates many activities to FAA-approved individuals and organisations called designees to better leverage its resources. FAA s designees perform more than 90 per cent of FAA's certification activities.

"However, our prior work has shown that there are concerns that designee oversight is lacking, particularly with the new organisational designation authorities in which companies rather than individuals are granted designee status," said Dillingham.

"There are also concerns that, when faced with certification of new aircraft or equipment, FAA staff have not been able to keep pace with industry changes and, thus, may struggle to understand the aircraft or equipment they are tasked with certificating."

He said the implementation of a safety management system within the FAA should reduce certification delays and increase available resources to speed the introduction of advanced technologies. In response to a provision in the 2012 FAA Reauthorization, FAA is assessing the certification process and identifying opportunities to streamline the process.

Dillingham who is director of physical infrastructure issues said the GAO had formed its opinion on the FAA's safety oversight efforts after a review of FAA documents and interviews with agency officials.

In her testimony, Deborah Hersman who is chairman of the US National Transportation Safety Board updated the Senate committee on Boeing's 787 battery technology which led to the grounding of the new aircraft in January.

"In its notice of proposed Special Conditions for the Boeing 787 airplane issued in 2007, the FAA indicated that large, high capacity, rechargeable lithium ion batteries were a novel or unusual design feature in transport category airplane, " she said.

"The FAA noted that this type of battery has certain failure, operational, and maintenance characteristics that differ from those of the nickel-cadmium and lead-acid rechargeable batteries approved at that time for installation on large transport category airplanes.

"As such, the FAA approved the use of these batteries by issuing nine special conditions to provide a level of safety equivalent to existing airworthiness regulations. Boeing performed a series of tests to demonstrate that the battery complied with the conditions and would not pose a higher safety risk.

"It was determined that the probability of a smoke event was once in every 10 million flight hours. However, as of January 16, 2013, when the FAA issued its airworthiness directive grounding the 787 fleet, the fleet had accumulated less than 52,000 in service flight hours and had two smoke events involving its lithium ion batteries."