Automatic anti-stall system activated before Ethiopian Airlines crash:
report
(CNN)Preliminary findings from officials investigating
the Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 MAX 8 crash suggest that a flight-control
feature automatically activated before the plane nose-dived into the ground,
according to reporting from the Wall Street Journal.
Citing multiple
unnamed sources, the WSJ reported that the findings are the first to come to
light based on data retrieved from Flight 302's black boxes.
Earlier this
month, the Federal Aviation Administration agency grounded all Boeing 737 Max
planes, saying it had identified similarities between the Ethiopian Airlines
crash and the Lion Air crash in Indonesia six months earlier.
Ethiopian
Minister of Transport later reiterated that point, saying preliminary data
recovered from the black boxes of the crash in Ethiopia showed similarities to
the Lion Air crash.
Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed the morning of
March 10 after taking off from Addis Ababa on its way to Nairobi, Kenya, killing
all 157 people on board.
Lion Air Flight 610 crashed into the Java Sea in
Indonesia on October 29 after taking off from Jakarta. All 189 people on board
died.
The reported findings come from a preliminary report that's
required by the investigating authority to be produced within 30 days of an
incident. The findings are not final and subject to change as the investigation
continues.
If confirmed, the preliminary findings cited in the Wall
Street Journal would suggest that the automated flight software called the
Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), which was installed in
both planes could be to blame in the two incidents.
The MCAS is a system
that automatically lowers the nose of the plane when it receives information
from its external angle of attack (AOA) sensors that the aircraft is flying too
slowly or steeply, and at risk of stalling.
In the Lion Air crash, the
MCAS forced the plane's nose down more than 24 times before it finally hit
water, according to a preliminary investigation by Indonesia's National
Transportation Safety Committee, which also found the system was responding to a
faulty sensor.
Investigators have also pointed to whether pilots had
sufficient training with the system.
According to Ethiopian Airlines CEO
Tewolde GebreMariam, pilots transitioning to the Boeing 737 Max 8 aircraft from
older 737 models were required only to undertake a short computer-based training
program prescribed by Boeing and approved by the FAA.
GebreMariam also said
the flight simulator that pilots trained on to learn how to fly the Boeing 737
Max 8 plane did not replicate the MCAS automated feature that crash
investigators are scrutinizing.
Pilots' union spokesmen for Southwest and
American said the self-administered course -- which one pilot told CNN he took
on his iPad -- highlighted the differences between the Max 8 and older 737s, but
did not explain the MCAS feature.
On Wednesday, Boeing unveiled an
overhaul to the software system and the pilot training of its 737 MAX
plane.
At Senate hearings in Washington on Wednesday, Trump
administration officials were grilled about the decision to defer large parts of
the 737's safety certification to Boeing.
Transportation Secretary Elaine
Chao said that she found it "very questionable" that safety systems were not
part of the standard package offered by Boeing on its 737 Max jets.
A
Boeing official said Wednesday that the company had conducted a number of its
own "thorough audits" since the Lion Air crash and found "nothing that concerns
us."
"If you look at the performance of the system, it would indicate
that we are continuing to learn and continuing to get better and better over
time. And so right now, I would be very careful about indicting any part of that
process until we know more from the specifics of these accidents," the official
told CNN.
Grounded Boeing 737 Max also grounds FAA
reputationEthiopian Airlines and Lion Air crashes
only the latest tragedies from Federal Aviation Administration's coziness with
airline industry: Our viewConsider this worst-case
scenario: A Congress bent on streamlining government orders the Federal Aviation
Administration to turn over more and more safety oversight to aircraft makers.
Factors such as production, profits and U.S. jobs seep into federal safety
certification so that Boeing, eager to outsell rival Airbus, wins reduced
scrutiny for its new 737 Max series. The new fleet turns out to have a hidden
flaw - an automated anti-stall feature that can be violently activated by an
errant sensor, wrestling control of the aircraft from undertrained pilots and
plunging it into the ground. This flaw contributes to two air disasters within
five months, one in the seas off Indonesia on Oct. 29 and a second in Ethiopia
on March 10, that leave 346 people dead.
It all seems unthinkable - if
only so much of it wasn't already known to be true and the rest the focus of
investigation. "Clearly," Transportation Department Inspector General Calvin
Scovel told a Senate subcommittee on Wednesday, "confidence in the FAA as the
gold standard for aviation safety has been shaken."
Actually, this
wouldn't be the first time that excessive FAA coziness with airlines and
manufacturers has contributed to tragedy. Lax FAA oversight was a factor in the
1996 crash of a ValuJet flight into the Florida Everglades, killing 110, and an
Alaska Airlines crash in 2000 that left 88 dead.
A Boeing 737 MAX 9 test plane on March 22, 2019,
in Seattle.FAA: We don't allow companies to police
themselvesOver the past decade, U.S. commercial airlines have
had an extraordinary safety record. But there's the risk that success bred
complacency on safety certification, particularly as avionics and software grew
increasingly complex.
Congress and successive administrations pushed the
FAA to cut costs by delegating more regulatory work to manufacturers - a
practice not unlike allowing authors to review their own books. Insiders have
warned for years that FAA was delegating away its world-class reputation on
safety:
►In 2004, an FAA union called it a "reckless" practice that
"would actually compromise public air safety" and was establishing a "fox
guarding the henhouse mentality."
►Agency workers complained in 2012 that
FAA management and Boeing - between which there was virtually a revolving door
of employees - were growing too familiar.
►A 2015 internal audit raised
concerns that oversight of the delegation program was focusing more on
"paperwork - not on safety-critical items."
That same year, as reported
in The Seattle Times last week, the FAA delegated to Boeing a review of the
automated anti-stall feature now at the center of the 737 Max crash
investigations, and the safety analysis that came back was deeply
flawed.
In the wake of the two jetliners falling from the sky shortly
after takeoff, multiple investigations are underway to get to the bottom of what
went wrong. President Donald Trump has finally nominated a permanent
administrator for the FAA and its 44,000 workers. Boeing this week announced
software fixes to the anti-stall feature of the 737 Max series.
Those
jetliners remain grounded worldwide, as well they should, until the fixes are
fully tested and pilots are fully trained. In the meantime, the FAA, once at the
global forefront of air safety issues, finds itself leading from behind.